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PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW ARISING FROM 
THE USE OF COMPUTER MODELS AND OTHER 
QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGIES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 
Charles D. Case* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing use of quantitative models, particularly computer 
models, has placed a new burden upon the courts in their review of 
environmental decisions based on those models. This burden is a part 
of the "new era" in environmental decisionmaking,l which arises out 
of the increasing involvement of scientific and technical issues in 
legal decisionmaking.2 Recent cases involving the judicial review of 
environmental decisions based on models raise questions as to the 
proper role of judges and courts in such review. In particular, ques-
tions are raised as to, first, whether the expertise of judges and re-
sources of courts are sufficient to provide meaningful review of such 
• B.S., Physics, North Carolina State University at Raleigh; J.D., Harvard University; Ad-
junct Professor, Campbell University School of Law; Member of North Carolina Bar; Member 
of the law firm Allen, Steed & Allen, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina. 
1. See Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 581, 597 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). Accord, lnt'nl Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring). See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the 
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1974); Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Courts: Judicial 
Review Under NEPA, 9 GA. L. REV. 417 & n.6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cost-Benefit 
Analysis]. 
2. "During the present century, litigation requiring for its resolution a voluminous eviden-
tiary record of complex and technical data has increased discernibly." Whitney, Technical and 
Scientific Evidence in Administrative Decisionmaking, 45 U. CINN. L. REV. 37 (1976). See 
generally, Mayda, Conservation, "New Conservation" and Ecomanagement, 1 ENVT'L L. REV. 
21 (1970); Maechling, Systems Analysis and the Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 72 (1976); Eastin, The 
Use of Models in Litigation: Concise or Contrived? 52 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 610 (1975); Wilkins, 
Computer Impact on Public Decision Making, 28 PUB. AD. REV. 503, 507-10 (1968). 
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decisions, and second, whether the "deferential standard of review" 
used in such cases precludes a meaningful level of judicial review. 
Cases dealing with such environmental decisions demonstrate 
that, although there are problems with judicial expertise, court re-
sources, and appropriate review levels, those problems are not insur-
mountable. In fact, courts have displayed substantial creativity in de-
veloping innovations such as court-retained experts, joint technical 
appendices, and post-argument explanatory briefs. Additionally, the 
recent passage of the Magistrate Act3 offers the potential for even 
greater flexibility and innovation in dealing with the problems of 
reviewing environmental decisions based on computer and other 
mathematical models. 
Recent cases have precluded access to federal district courts in 
certain types of environmental decisions.4 These developments 
threaten to exacerbate the problem of assuring an adequate level of 
judicial review in environmental cases involving models because 
federal appellate courts, unlike the district courts, "cannot hold evi-
dentiary hearings to answer complicated technical questions in-
volved in each case."6 Environmental cases involving models must 
involve such an evidentiary hearing in order to ensure sufficient 
analysis of the case. More generally, modeling cases demonstrate 
that a court must have sufficient expertise and resources to enable 
the court to digest and analyze-and, if need be, supplement-the 
complicated and technical record which accompanies such en-
vironmental decisions involving computer and mathematical models. 
The level of judicial review in such environmental decisions involv-
ing quantitative models is usually described as the well-known "arbi-
trary and capricious" or "hard look" standard of review.6 This arbi-
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1977 & Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 (Act 
Oct. 10, 1979, P.L. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643) significantly expanded the duties that may be under-
taken by a United States Magistrate. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. 
4. In Harrison v. P.P.G. Ind., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980), the United States Supreme Court 
construed broadly the phrase "any other final action" under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), thus requiring that most challenges to final 
actions under the Act must be brought in the circuit courts of appeal, rather than the federal 
district court where a record could be made if needed. See Dow Chern. USA v. EPA, 491 F. 
Supp. 428, 431 (M.D. La. 1980). 
5. Kramer, Air Quality Modeling: Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Reactions, 5 
COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 236, 249 n.78 (1979) (discussing So. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 
646, 665 (1st Cir. 1974». For environmental rulemaking proceedings, courts of appeals have 
held that federal district courts have jurisdiction to hold hearings to supplement the record 
where there is no record based on proceedings at the administrative level. EDF v. EPA, 598 
F.2d 62, 90-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See EDF v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
6. The leading case applying the arbitrary and capricious level of judicial review to environ-
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trary and capricious standard of review has not been uniformly ap-
plied; thus, environmental decisions based on mathematical models 
have not always received a uniform, constructive, or meaningful 
level of judicial scrutiny. The arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review is usually said to include a thorough, probing level of factual 
review, but a deferential level of ultimate policy review, to avoid hav-
ing the court substitute its judgment for the reviewing agency. This 
creates a tension in the judicial review of those many questions in 
environmental cases involving both factual and policy determina-
tions. The presence of a computer or mathematical model tends to 
exaggerate the tension that is inherently felt in accommodating the 
required probing level of factual review with the deferential level of 
ultimate review. In particular, the presence of the model makes it 
more difficult to engage in a thorough inquiry of the factual bases of 
the environmental decision formed by the model. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the presence of the mathematical model appears to de-
mand that a reviewing court be prepared, at least in some instances, 
to accord less deference to the agency's decisions involving the 
model and even to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, at 
least to the extent that the decision does not involve inextricable 
policy decisions. 
In order to understand why computer models and other mathe-
matical methodologies have placed these novel strains on judicial ex-
pertise, court resources, and the accepted standards of judicial 
review, this article will examine the nature of a model and its use in 
environmental decisions. The reasons for using such models in en-
vironmental decisions, and the problems inherent in such use will 
then be examined, along with a more detailed description of the 
various characterizations of the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review normally used in environmental cases involving computer 
models and mathematical methodologies. This is followed by a dis-
cussion of the particular treatment given by courts to the models in-
volved in such environmental decisions as the approval of state im-
mental decisions is Justice Marshall's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In Overton Park, the Supreme Court stated that the reviewing 
court should address three questions of whether the agency decision was: (1) within the scope 
of the agency's authority; (2) in compliance with procedural requirements; and (3) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Id. at 415-17. It is 
this third part of the Overton Park standard of environmental review that involves a substan-
tive review of the environmental decision and its underlying model. Professor Kramer has 
stated that "[i]n most instances, it is this third inquiry that is the heart of the judicial review 
process." Kramer, supra note 5, at 244. This Overton Park standard of review was adopted 
for review of rules in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9). 
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plementation plans (SIP), environmental impact statements (EIS), 
and various other environmental decisions and regulations. Changes 
are required in such areas as levels of judicial review, structure of 
the courts, and availability of expertise to address these problems. In 
so doing, courts will be better able to deal with all cases involving the 
interrelationship of law and science with technology, which include 
the environmental cases involving models discussed in this article. 
II. MODELS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 
A. Introduction to Models 
The "model" is an abstract, formal representation of a theory 
about, or empirical observation of, a defined set of facts or system. 7 
Models can range in complexity from a simple mathematical equa-
tion or expression to the most complex simulation models requiring 
computers to run them. 8 The model is a decisionmaking tool which, if 
applied properly, can greatly assist decisionmakers in dealing with 
the rising problems of environmental pollution and other technical 
issues.9 Since the model is a mathematical representation or embodi-
ment of a theory about a physical system, to be useful, it must act in 
7. "[I)t is the essence of any model to introduce a simplified representation of complex reali· 
ty. Of course, if the model is too simple in comparison to reality, it is worthless. But that 
possibility does not constitute an argument against any use of models to gain better under· 
standing of an overly complex reality." Bauer-Bernet, The Effects of Information Science on 
the Formation and Drafting of Law, 14 JURIMETRICS 235, 235-36 (1974). See generally, Eastin, 
supra note 2, at 618; Mayda, supra note 2, at 31; Wilkins, supra note 2, at 507-10. 
8. "Computer simulation techniques may be said to answer questions of the form, 'What 
would be likely to happen if ... ?' Initially it is necessary to formulate some model of the proc-
ess for which an assessment of variation is required." Wilkins, supra note 2, at 507. "Where a 
simulation model can be constructed, it is not necessary to experiment with the whole 
system." Using the model, "reasonable statements can be made about the probability of (pro-
posed) modifications of the system itself." Id. at 508. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United 
States, 222 Ct. Claims 423 (1980) (allowing inventors to reduce an invention to practice under 
the Patent Laws by the use of a computer simulation model). 
9. As one commentator notes: 
The advantages of the model include its ability to describe and comprehend the facts 
of the situation better than any verbal description can hope to do. It can uncover rela-
tionships between the various aspects of the problem which are not apparent in the 
verbal description. It also can indicate what data should be collected to deal with the 
problem quantitatively, establish measures of effectiveness and explain situations 
that have been left unexplained in the past by giving cause and effect relationships. A 
mathematical model makes it possible to deal with the problem in its entirety and 
allow a consideration of all the major variables of the problem simultaneously. It pro-
vides for the capability of being enlarged step by step to a more comprehensive model 
to include factors that are neglected in verbal descriptions. It also uses mathematical 
techniques that might otherwise appear to have no applicability to the problem. In 
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a way similar to the physical system being modeled.10 The model can 
be used to analyze existing data to gain a greater understanding of a 
presently existing system.l1 A model can also be used to predict con-
ditions that do not exist and that may never have existed in the past 
or may never exist in the future. 12 
Models, as broadly defined in this paper, are used in a variety of 
ways to assist in making decisions in many different areas of the 
law.13 This paper focuses on the use of models for environmental 
decisionmaking. At present, quantitative models are being widely 
used in the environmental decisionmaking process,14 and inevita-
bly will be used to a greater extent in the future. Increasing prob-
lems of environmental pollution necessitate the use of modeling tech-
niques.15 Specific statutes or regulations require the use of models in 
addition, a mathematical model frequently leads to a solution that can be adequately 
described and justified on the basis of verbal descriptions. 
Eastin, supra note 2, at 618. 
10. Models are "quantitative or mathematical representations or simulations which attempt 
to describe the characteristics in relationship of physical events." U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES ON 
AIR QUALITY MODELS, A1-A34, 48 (1978) [hereinafter cited as EPA GUIDELINES ON MODELS]. 
"A model's utility is not determined by truth criteria; rather it is measured with respect to a 
given set of well-defined purposes and intentions." Brewer & Owen, Policy Analysis IYy Com-
puter Simulation: The Needfor Appraisal, 21 PUB. POL. 343, 346 (1973). Neither the results of 
the models nor the models are "end[s] in themselves but [are] ... tools that augment existing 
management techniques." G. HAGEVIK, DECISION-MAKING IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 192 
(1970). "[A] model is an aid, not a value judge or decision maker .... " Mayda, supra note 2, 
at 31. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 238 n.12. 
11. See, e.g., Movement Against Destruction (MAD) v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 547-54 
(D.Md. 1975) (using models to analyze the relation of present traffic levels to socio-economic 
variables). 
12. See, e.g., id. at 562 (using understandings of present relationships of vehicular travel 
levels to predict future traffic levels). See also R. MAYER, R. MORONEY & R. MORRIS, CENTRAL· 
LY PLANNED CHANGE 161 (1974). 
13. For instance, models are used in policy analysis. E.g., Jones, Systems Approaches to 
Multi-Variable Socioeconomic Problems: An Appraisal, 18 J. PUB. L. 21 (1969); Sarnoff, The 
Social Uses of Computer Forecasting, 17 COMPUTER DIG. 3 (1969). Models are used in more 
specific policy decisions, such as accident studies on color televisions. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania 
Incorporated v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 404 F. Supp. 352, 357, 361 (D.Del. 
1975). See generally Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 G.W.L. 
REV. 791 (1975); Handler, A Rebuttal: The Needfor a Sufficient Scientific Base in G01Jernment 
Regulation, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 808 (1975). 
14. Ackerman, Rose-Ackerman & Henderson, The Uncertain Search for Environmental 
Policy: The Costs and Benefits of Controlling Pollution Along the Delaware River, 121 U. P A. 
L. REV. 1225, 1251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Delaware River Costs and Benefits]; Ackerman 
& Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Policy: Scientific Facifinding and Ra-
tional Decisionmaking Along the Delaware River, 120 U. P A. L. REV. 419, 472, 543 n.52 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Delaware River Factfinding]. See W. RAMSAY & G. ANDERSON, MANAGING 
THE ENVIRONMENT 161 (1972); Note, EpistemicAmbiguity and the Calculus of Risk: Ethyl Cor-
poration v. Environmental Protection Agency, 21 S.D. L. REV. 425 (1975). 
15. "The ecological crisis calls for some kind of programmatic approach .... " W. RAMSAY 
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the making of an environmental decision in certain situations. 16 Ad-
ditionally, provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA),17 as well as judicial decisions construing NEPA and 
other environmental statutes, should facilitate the increased use of 
such models. 
Mathematical and computer models are used in the environmental 
decisionmaking process generally in three ways: (1) to project pollu-
tion levels; (2) to evaluate environmental cleanup technologies and 
predict their effectiveness; and (3) to aid in cost-benefit analysis. A 
given environmental decision may well involve all three uses of such 
models. Presented below is a discussion of the three uses of such 
models in greater detail, followed by a discussion distinguishing be-
tween computer models and other quantitative or mathematical 
methodologies involved in environmental decisionmaking. 
B. Use of Mathematical and Quantitative Models 
in Environmental Decisionmaking 
1. Projections of Resulting Levels of Pollution 
The primary use of models is to assist in the prediction of the levels 
of projected pollution given certain polluting and cleanup technolo-
gies. For example, a model may be used to test whether proposed 
new construction would cause a violation of an air quality standard 
by projecting the quality of the resulting ambient air based on the 
amount of pollutants assumed to be emitted into the atmosphere by 
the new construction.18 Alternatively, the modeler can take as a 
given the allowable level of pollution and work backwards to calcu-
late the amount by which the pollution must be reduced in order to 
& G. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 217. See id. at 156, 219-20; W. MATTHEWS, RESOURCES 
MATERIALS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION 214-23 (1976) and authorities 
cited therein; Faulk, The Global Environment and International Law: Challenge and 
Response, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 385 (1975); Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a Criterion for Public 
Land Policy, 10 NAT. RES. J. 203, 212-16 (1970). 
16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7475(a), (e) (Law. Co-op. 1982), which specifies in part (eX2) 
therein the data that can be relied on, in part (eX3XB) the factors to be analyzed, and in part 
(eX3XD) the factors to be included in the model and the specified sets of conditions which the 
model is to be used and that the model is to be described with reasonable particularity; § 
7491(aX3XB) requires that models be used to project future visibility pollution; and § 7501(2) 
which allows models to be used to designate nonattainment areas. See also, 42 U.S.C. § 7620, 
which requires the holding of a conference at least every three years to establish appropriate 
modeling techniques necessary to carry out the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) 
provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7470-7491 (Supp. IV 1980). 
17. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4321-4347 (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
18. E.g., MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1975). 
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achieve the required production and pollution. This can be done 
either by adding more cleanup technology or by altering the pollution 
sources.19 
2. Technology Assessment 
A second use for models in environmental decisionmaking is the 
measurement of the efficacy of a particular pollution reduction tech-
nology.20 As described above, the substantive environmental model 
will have predicted or projected the amount of the substance to be 
permitted into the environment. A model may be used to test 
whether a particular cleanup technology or device is capable of 
achieving that required reduction.21 Models may also be used to 
determine whether a technology is "achievable" or "practicable."22 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
A third use for models in environmental decisionmaking is cost-
benefit analysis.23 There are two ways a model may be required for 
19. E.g., So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). 
20. See, e.g., Green, Limitations in the Implementation of Technology Assessment, 14 ATOM. 
ENERGY L.J. 59 (1972); Baram, Technology Assessment and Social Control, 17 JURIMETRICS 79 
(1973); Weinburg, Technology Assessment Decisions, 27 SCI. 177 (1972); Green, The Resolution 
of Uncertainty, 12 NAT. RESOURCE J. 182 (1972); Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses ofScientificlnfor· 
mation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 376 n.13 (1974); Note, The 
Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment, 55 CORNELL L.Q. 861 (1970). 
21. E.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1096 (1980); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weyerhauser Co. v. 
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Int'n! Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
22. E.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1053-62 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Supreme 
Court may have precluded consideration of cost in the evaluation of technologic and economic 
feasibility. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976). See EPA v. DuQuesne Power & 
Light Co., 427 U.S. 902 (1976). Even after Union Electric, however, the courts must still 
review the models and mathematical methodologies which underlie the l<~P A's determinations 
of achievable, practicable, or feasible technologies. E.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 
1011, 1041, 1056, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1293-1301 
(9th Cir. 1977). See Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 114-17 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (technology to 
meet health related standard). Where a model is speculative in that it is not being based in fact, 
its results would not be sufficient to support a determination that technology is available. See 
Hooker Chern. & Plastic Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1976). 
23. A cost-benefit model for an environmental decision is based on a model of the substan-
tive environmental decision, such as a model predicting the resulting level of pollution or pro-
jecting the required level of pollution reduction, as described above. Generally speaking, the 
"benefits" involved in the cost-benefit analysis are the effects flowing from the pollution 
reduction; the "cost" involved is normally the increased expense and reduced productivity 
resulting from the required cleanup efforts. See generally Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1. 
The problem in such cost-benefit analysis is that the pollution reduction benefits must be 
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the comparison of costs and benefits.24 First, a cost-benefit ratio may 
be specifically required.26 Second, a cost-benefit ratio may be man-
dated either by language requiring that environmental clean-up ef-
forts be "achievable,"26 "feasible,"27 or "practicable,"28 or by lan-
guage generally requiring the examination or comparison of costs 
and benefits, such as in the requirement of an EIS in NEP A. 29 
This paper will not focus on the use of cost-benefit analysis in en-
vironmental decisionmaking. Nevertheless, those cases concerning 
cost-benefit analysis and the NEP A impact statements serve as im-
portant precedents for later cases involving the substantive environ-
mental models discussed in this paper. Additionally, these cases 
share with modeling cases such problems in judicial review as lack of 
judicial expertise and court resources to deal with the technical 
given a monetary value in order that those benefits may be compared in some way to the costs 
of cleanup. This assignment of value to environmental quality intrinsically involves the ar-
bitrary assignment of values based on subjective estimates of such environmental values as 
clean air and water, absence of noise, and other aspects of improvements in human environ-
ment. 
24. See statutes listed in Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 688, 710 n.27 (1980) (Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). 
25. E.g., 33 U.S.C.S. § 701a (Law. Co-op. 1980) (Flood Control Act of 1936); 42 U.S.C.S. § 
7545(c)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1982) (Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C.S. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (Law. Co-op. 
1980) (Clean Water Act). These statutes generally specify that a project is to proceed if the 
benefits outweigh the costs (i.e., if the cost-benefit ratio is less than 1). 
26. E.g., 33 U.S.C.S. § 1317(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1980) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 [hereinafter cited as FWPCAA)), discussed in Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 
598 F.2d 91, 110 nn.36 & 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (achievability technology to reduce the re-
duction of toxaphene and endrin to the environment); 42 U.S.C.S. § 1857c-6(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 
1973), transferred to 42 U.S.C.S. § 7411 (Law. Co-op. 1982) (1977 Clean Air Act), discussed in 
Nat'l Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (1972 Act). 
27. E.g., 43 U.S.C.S. § 1347(b) (Law. Co-op. 1980) (Outer Continental Shelf Land Act); 42 
U.S.C.S. § 6295(a)(4)(D) (Law. Co-op. 1982) (Energy Policy and Conservation Act); 29 
U.S.C.S. § 655(b)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1982) (Occupational Safety and Health Act). See, e.g., Indus. 
Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 612 (1980); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 
F.2d 1011, 1031-32, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (feasibility of best practical control technology cur-
rently available for pulp and paper effluent standards promulgated under FWPCAA); Bunker 
Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1291, 1301 (9th Cir. 1977) (feasibility of technology for the 
Idaho SIP under the Clean Air Act). It has been held that such language on feasibility as is con-
tained in FWPCAA does not require the mathematical balancing of quantified values by cost-
benefit analysis. E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 1976). 
See generally Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Ambiguity 
as a Control Device, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 565 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ambiguous FWPCAA 
Control]. 
28. 33 U.S.C.S. § 1314(b)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1980) (FWPCAA); 42 U.S.C.S. § 1857c-
5(a)(2)(A)(i) (Law. Co-op. 1973), transferred to 42 U.S.C.S. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
See BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1096 (1980). 
29. An EIS is required under § 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.S. § 4332 (Law. Co-op. 1982), but 
the statute contains no explicit requirement of a cost-benefit ratio. The Fifth Circuit has 
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issues underlying such cost-benefit analysis, as well as problems in 
determining the appropriate standard of judicial review. These cost-
benefit and EIS cases also involve the additional problem of assign-
ing arbitrary values to un quantifiable environmental amenities as a 
necessary part of calculating the costs and benefits, thus introducing 
a further level of complicating issues. This paper will restrict itself 
largely to substantive environmental models with the observation 
that the conclusions drawn herein concerning environmental models 
are applicable to cost-benefit and EIS cases to the extent that those 
decisions are based on an environmental model. 30 
recently said that "[u]pon the enactment of NEPA, however, some courts, including this one 
began to require some judicial review of agency determination of economic benefit .... These 
decisions, however, were rendered before the Supreme Court decision of Vermont Yankee 
[Nuclear P()Wer Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)] and Strycker's Bay [Neighborhood Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam)]." So. La. Envt'l Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 
F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). This author believes that Justice Marshall's 
dissent in Strycker's Bay is correct to note, 444 U.S. at 228-31, that Vermont Yankee should 
not be read in derogation of the "hard look" preview standard under Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) and Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 
(1976). In fact, the Supreme Court may have applied a cost-benefit test in the recent case in-
volving OSHA standards for benzene, although it declined to admit that it was so acting. See 
Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 614-15, 656, 662, 688, 695 n.9, 
701-05 (1980) (Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). But see Burger's 
concurrence, id. at 662-64. Some analysis is still required under NEP A if such analysis is possi-
ble. Compare Cal. v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 481-84 (E.D. Cal. 1980) with Nat'l Wildlife 
Fed. v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Col. 1977). A mathematically expressed cost-benefit 
ratio is not required, e.g., EDF v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), but, as noted 
in South Louisiana, 629 F. Supp. at 1011, some review of assumptions and procedures is re-
quired for other courts to perform the necessary review. 
30. The same pressures to improve the quantitative decisionmaking methodologies in sub-
stantive environmental decisions will also likely require improved quantitative methodologies 
in the calculation of cost-benefit ratios. Previous cases, however, have rejected the suggestion 
that the Flood Control Act or NEP A necessitate the use of computer analysis in calculating 
cost-benefit ratios. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 928 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd 
on other grounds, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). The court in EDF went on to say that 
"[a]lthough computers may some day be used to quantify ecological elements more precisely, 
we conclude that at this point in time a valid ecosystems analysis may be achieved by an inter-
disciplinary team of scientists conducting a rigorous examination of the areas affected by [a 
proposed] project." 348 F. Supp. at 928. 
It has been held that NEPA does not require the use of "an intricate, computerized system 
of analysis," or even a "formal equation." Columbia Basin Land Protection Assn. v. Kleppe, 
417 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D. Wash. 1976) (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 
1286 n.14 (9th Cir. 1974». In Trout Unlimited, the court noted that progress is "being made in 
devising techniques which will make cost-benefit analysis more reliable." 509 F.2d at 1286. 
These opinions imply that better quantitative decisionmaking methodologies such as computer 
modeling could be required for such cost-benefit analysis in the future if the state of the art 
permits it. Accord, Mon. Wildlife Fed. v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 489, 491 (D. Mont. 1976)(citing 
Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975». It is certainly conceivable that the pro-
gressing state of the art, together with other factors discussed herein, will allow and mandate 
the use of computer models in such cost-benefit analysis. 
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C. Types of Environmental Models 
The modeling of an environmental decision may involve the use of 
computer models or mathematical models or both. A computer may 
be used to construct a mathematical model in the form of a graph or 
three-dimensional figure. 31 Conversely, a graph (expressed as a 
mathematical expression or relation) may be used as an input to a 
computer model.32 Finally, the results of one mathematical model 
may be used as an input to another mathematical model or the 
results of a computer model may be used as the input to another com-
puter model. 33 
1. Mathematical Models 
A mathematical model may consist of an algorithm34 or other 
methodology for analyzing large amounts of data, such as by averag-
ing or statistical analysis. The courts have upheld EPA's use of an 
algorithm to determine "achievable" levels of pollution cleanup cal-
culated by simply averaging the amount of effluent discharge from a 
number of specially selected model plants.35 The courts have also 
upheld the weighted averaging of all data from a number of specially 
selected plants, even though this overemphasized the data from 
plants producing the most data.36 In addition, courts have upheld the 
31. See, e.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 587, 591-94 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975) (computer-generated contours); GM Corp. v. Costle, 631 F.2d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 
1980) (SYMAP computer graphs of air quality). 
32. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 294-95, 300 (5th Cir. 1974) (graph of the functional rela-
tionship of hydrocarbon emissions to resulting pollution used in computer model to assist in 
creation and validation of SIP for Texas). The theoretical relationship of emissions to pollu-
tions is called a reduction model, which the court noted is "normally displayed in graphical 
form." Id. at 294-95. 
33. See, e.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975) 
(results of a computerized traffic model used as an input in the computerized study of resulting 
noise levels). See also MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1975), on remandfrom MAD 
v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md.), affd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). 
34. The Supreme Court in recent patent cases has defmed an algorithm as "a generalized 
formulation for programs to solve mathematical problems," Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63,65 (1972), and "[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem," Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 n.1 (1978). See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 n.9 (1981); In re 
Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 764 n.4 (Ct. Cus. & Pat. App. 1980) (algorithms defined as "methods of 
calculation, mathematical formulas, and mathematical procedures generally"). Each of the 
foregoing three Supreme Court cases evaluated the patentability of a computer software pro-
gram. Each program implemented a specific result, such as number conversion in Gottschalk 
and running an industrial process in Parker and Diamond. Thus, these particular algorithms 
are not models of reality like the environmental models discussed herein, but both types are 
structured as algorithms. 
35. See Hooker Chern. and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 632 (2d Cir. 1976). 
36. In BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 655 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,444 
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"variability factor"37 included in point source effluent regulations 
promulgated under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (FWPCA) on the basis of statistical analysis. 38 The 
model can be based on a selection of the organisms most sensitive to 
a substance to establish a standard for that substance.39 
Mathematical models in environmental decisionmaking also as-
sume the form of a graph. A graph is a visual representation of a 
mathematical functional relationship, and as such can be constructed 
to model a polluting entity. The graph will usually express (or model) 
U.S. 1096 (1980), the First Circuit Court of Appeals approved EPA's methodology in demon-
strating the practicability of the hydrolysis method of cleanup. The EPA had simply averaged 
the data from dissimilar plants, giving equal weight to each datum, rather than to each plant. 
The First Circuit, although noting that the choice of mathematical methodologies or models 
set the result, stated that it was up to the EPA to choose its own statistical methodologies. [d. 
at 655. Even though some of the data that was averaged came from plants using cleanup tech-
nologies (hydrolysis and biological cleanup as opposed to simple hydrolysis) which were dif-
ferent from those allegedly being tested and involved other nonstandard conditions, the 
methodology was upheld. [d. at 654-55. The court noted that, after all, any method of statis-
tical analysis is subject to attack. [d. at 655. 
37. The variability factor is a number inserted into the regulatory calculation model to ac-
count for allowing the effects of worst-case conditions. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 
F.2d 1023, 1035 (10th Cir. 1976). The EPA in its regulations defines this variability factor as 
"the multiplier by which the long-term achievable values [of permitted effluent pollution 1 must 
be multiplied in order to derive the value not permitted to be exceeded [in the short run of one 
day or 30 days]." See id. at 1035 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 21941). By that regulation, the daily 
variability factor was defined as the 99th percentile probability of occurrence value divided by 
the mean and the 30-day variability factor was chosen as the 98th percentile. EPA had set out 
in the regulation itself the application of a formula with variability factors to determine long 
term achievable values. 
38. In Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1979), the Tenth Circuit re-
jected the industry's attack on EPA's variability factors used in the setting of point source ef-
fluent regulations under FWPCAA. Petitioners had alleged that EPA's statistical analysis 
was based on insufficient and geographically biased data and irrationally disregarded dif-
ferences among various sub-categories of regulated refineries. The court engaged in a struggle 
with a "turmoil of numbers" in trying to sort out the propriety of the variability factors EPA 
applied in calculating the effluent limitations. The court ultimately deferred to the expertise of 
the agency saying that "[s]tatistical methodologies are for the experts," id. at 1035, and re-
ferred the reader to the regulations where those procedures were set out. See 40 Fed. Reg. 
219. 
39. In Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals upheld the use of the most sensitive test organisms in reviewing the methodology 
used by EPA in establishing standards for the toxic substances toxaphene and endrin. In set-
ting those dual standards, EPA used a six-step model based on laboratory studies of six 
aquatic animals, see id. at 103-04,114-15, as follows: (1) six aquatic animal species known to be 
most sensitive to the substances chosen; (2) short term exposure of those species to large 
amounts of the substances to establish a short term lethal dosage; (3) use of an extrapolation 
factor, which EPA had obtained from the National Academy of Sciences, to predict long term 
lethal dosages based on short term dosages established in laboratory tests; (4) use of a model to 
set safe ambient standards on the basis of a long term lethal dosage; (5) use of another model to 
set effluent discharge standards to attain the safe ambient level; and (6) establishment of a 
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the relationship between the amount of pollutant emitted into the en-
vironment and the resulting change in ambient air quality caused 
thereby.40 Using such a graph, an environmental decisionmaker can 
determine the necessary amount of reduction in emitted pollutants 
required to achieve the mandated improvement in the ambient 
air.41 Graphs can also model the efficacy and cost of the treatment 
technology42 or the response of an organism exposed to a pollut-
mass limitation to prevent dilution to evade the effluent discharge standard. EPA's use of the 
most sensitive organisms was approved based on EPA's making explicit its statistical assump-
tion that although many animals were shown to be less susceptible to the substances, statistics 
indicate that future study will turn up many animals that are more susceptible to the 
substances. Id. at 106. In the case of endrin, the court in Hercules again upheld EPA's choice 
of sensitive animals, since those reasons were set forth at length and the court further held 
that "[c]hoice among scientific test data is precisely the type of judgment that must be made 
by EPA, not this court." Id. at 115. In both toxaphene and endrin, EPA's choices were upheld 
as within the zone of reasonableness allowed under the substantial evidence test. Never-
theless, rather than basing that decision on the discretion accorded to the agency because of its 
expertise and because of the policy-oriented nature of the choice, the court emphasized that its 
upholding of the number was justified based on "the scientific uncertainty attending the 
choice" and "administrative convenience." See id. at 107-09, 115-18. 
40. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 n.16 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) (graphical rollback model); So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 
662-63 (1st Cir. 1974) (rollback model); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 294-95, 300 (5th Cir. 
1974) (rollback models); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 565 (D.C. Md. 1975) (reduction 
model relating hydrocarbons to photochemical oxidants). 
41. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1974) Oocating the correct point on 
the reduction model curve or graph to determine the required hydrocarbon emission control 
required to effect efficient reduction in photochemical oxidant pollution to meet national air 
quality standards for that particular air quality control region). 
42. In Ass'n of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980), the EPA had utilized 
financial data to construct a graph to estimate the cost of cleanup for a hypothetical-or 
model-processing plant. Petitioners in that case challenged the limitations promulgated for 
those plants using a model plant analysis. Petitioners claimed that, because of the nature of the 
model and data used, the model plant underestimated the cost of compliance. The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that the complete accuracy of the model was not the question before the court. Id. 
at 809-10. The Ninth Circuit found in determining the model that EPA had engaged in suffi-
ciently "reasoned decisionmaking, adequately supported by information available to the Agen-
cy." Id. at 809; accord, id. at 812. Although the court in Pacific Fisheries noted that EPA 
"itself recognized that its data collection was not as thorough as it otherwise would have 
been ... ," the court declined "to second guess the agency's expert determinations as to the 
model plant, since there is adequate support for those conclusions in the record." Id. at 810-11. 
Although the court noted that certain post-decisional studies showed "that various statisti-
cal and analytical errors by the EPA impugn the validity of the effluent guidelines," id. at 811, 
the court stated that such post-decisional data might be used to overturn a decision only if 
those studies show that EPA "proceeded upon assumptions that were entirely fictional or ut-
terly without scientific support .... " Id. at 812 (citation omitted). See also Weyerhauser Co. 
v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding EPA's hypothetical model for the 
dewatering solution to the problem of disposing of sludge bacteria for the dissolving sulfite 
process); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1979) (use of simple 
model of the cleanup technique in carbon absorption to perform a limited comparison of cost 
and benefits). 
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ant.43 Finally, a graph can serve as a coefficient in a computer 
model. 44 
Models are often used in environmental decisions to extrapolate 
from existing data45 because such decisions must be made on the 
basis of a sparse data base.46 For instance, the courts have upheld 
the extrapolation of test results showing the health effects of one 
substance to project the health effects of the use of another sub-
stance for which there exist no dataY The issue of data extrapola-
tion also arises in the environmental field in the area of "technology 
transfer" where probable cleanup efforts are projected based on the 
hypothetical application of one cleanup technology from data 
gathered from the use of a similar technology in another industry.4s 
43. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 1941 
(1976), where the court upheld EPA's use of a theoretical "standard man" to show the func-
tional relationship between air and blood lead levels "to provide a rough estimate of the 
dangers posed by exposure to various ambient air lead concentrations." [d. at 42,55. The func-
tional relationship was based on absorption figures for ingested lead. EPA then established 
certain values for the three parameters: (1) air-lead concentration, (2) volume of air inhaled 
daily, and (3) the percent of inhaled lead absorbed to establish a "standard." [d. at 55. 
44. See, e.g., Cin. Gas and Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660, 664 (6th Cir.1978)(use ofagraph 
in a computer model to represent six sets of coefficients of different weather conditions). 
45. A lack of data normally does not permit an administrative agency to defer making an en-
vironmental decision. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 740-42 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As a 
result, for such technical environmental decisions on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the 
court said that it would "demand adequate reasons and explanations, but not 'findings' of the 
sort familiar from the world of adjudication." [d. at 740-41. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. 
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 688-724 (1980) (Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackmun, JJ., 
dissenting). 
46. These decisions based on insufficient data necessarily involve policy judgments. [d. at 
706. In environmental decisionmaking, one cost to be weighed in almost every decision "is the 
cost of uncertainty-i.e., the cost of proceeding without more and better information." Alaska 
v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 922 (1978). 
47. Data for such environmental decisions do not exist because of insufficient time to gather 
such data, or because of economic or technical contingencies. For instance, the First Circuit in 
BASF Wyandotte v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1979), upheld the EPA's extrapolation from data 
relating to 10 pesticides to justify regulations also applicable to 39 other pesticides. The EPA 
had relied on scientific literature to establish the similarity between the 10 pesticides for which 
there was data and the 39 pesticides for which there was no data. [d. at 655-56 & nn. 27, 34. 
The First Circuit held that it was within the agency's expertise to use such an extrapolation 
and noted that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (FWPCAA) did not 
"outlaw scientific deductive reasoning." [d. at 655 & n.34. Similarly, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals in Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978), upheld the EPA's ex-
trapolation from data on the carcinogenicity of strobane to predict the carcinogenicity of tox-
aphene to justify a regulation promulgated under FWPCAA limiting the discharge of tox-
aphene into the water. [d. at 109. See also Int'nl Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 
642-47 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
48. Recent cases have upheld the application of data from one technology to project the 
existence of sufficient cleanup technology to meet future, more stringent regulations. E.g., 
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Environmental cases involving toxic substances often involve the ex-
trapolation from data based on the use of high dosages over extreme-
ly short periods of time; in order to establish a reasonable and safe 
level of ambient exposure, this high-dosage data must be extrapo-
lated to project the effects of a more realistic, lower level of exposure 
over a longer period of time.49 As a general matter, the courts have 
upheld an agency's extrapolations based on limited, or even arguably 
irrelevant, data bases, and have done so even though such extrapola-
tions are often "quantitatively imprecise."50 
2. Computer Models 
Computer models, which vary widely in their application, are the 
second major type of environmental decisionmaking model discussed 
in this paper. Computer models are a type of mathematical model 
which are used, or "run," on a computer. The speed of the computer 
permits these computer models to be as complicated or intricate as is 
necessary for the problem to be solved. As will be discussed in 
greater detail below, very complicated models are required to assist 
in thoroughly addressing environmental problems. Consequently, 
the models used in environmental decisionmaking are most often 
computer models. 
Ideally, the many possible environmental impacts of a proposed 
project can be simulated or predicted by the use of a comprehensive 
computer model. For example, computer models can be used to pro-
ject levels of automobile traffic on a highway51 or aircraft traffic on a 
runway.52 More importantly, a computer model can project resulting 
Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1980) (considering 1977 and 
1983 effluent point source regulations for fish processing plants promulgated under 
FWPCAA). Courts have also overturned similar effluent limitation guidelines issued under 
FWPCAA on the basis that the EPA did not sufficiently describe its extrapolation of data to 
show the efficacy of a cleanup technique (lead filtration). CPC Int'nI, Inc. V. Train, 515 F.2d 
1032, 1049 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977). 
49. In Hercules, Inc. V. EPA, 598 F.2d 91,109-10,155 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the EPA gathered 
data by exposing the most sensitive known test animals to extremely high dosages over a short 
period of time, extrapolating the results to project the effects of long term exposure to toxa-
phene and endrln. The regulations promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA), 15 U.S.C.S. 55 2601-2628 (Law. Co-op. 1980), regulating these substances were 
upheld in the face of significant contradictory evidence. 
50. See, e.g., EDFv. EPA, 598 F.2d62, 87 (D.C. Cir.1978)(quotingEDFv. EPA, 510 F.2d 
1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975». 
51. See, e.g., MAD V. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 539-40, 548-56 (D.Md. 1975). See also MAD 
V. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (D.Md. 1973), affd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). 
52. City of Romulus V. Butterfield, 392 F. Supp. 578, 586-90 (E.D. Mich. 1975). 
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levels of air pollution,53 water pollution,54 or noise pollution55 from 
such proposed projects. A computer can also be used to choose the 
best location for a nuclear power plant,56 a sewage disposal plant,57 
or an off-shore gas pipeline. 58 Computers may be used in making 
53. E.g., Rep. Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 
606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 579 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1978); 
Cin. Gas and Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir.1978); Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 
F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978), affd onreh'g, Cin. Gas and Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 
1978); No. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1978); Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 
547 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1976); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976); NRDC v. 
EPA, 529 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1976), on remand from Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, rev'g in part 
on other gnds, sub nom., NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 
F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 
646,662-64 (1st Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974); Life of the Land v. 
Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 470 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 961 (1974); MAD v. Trainor, 
400 F. Supp. 533, 561, 572 (D. Md. 1975); MAD v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360, 1391-93 (D. Md.), 
affd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPUTER 
MODELLING OF TRANSPORTATION-GENERATED AIR POLLUTION: A STATE·OF·THE-ART SURVEY 
(Darling ed. 1972). 
54. See, e.g., CPC Int'nl, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032,1045-46 (8th Cir. 1975); Ohio v. EPA, 
460 F. Supp. 248, 251 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 237, 243-44 (S.D. Ohio 
1978); Conserv. Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 782-85, 789-92 (M.D.N.C. 
1977); EPA, SIMPLIFIED MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF WATER QUALITY (March 1971); EPA, 
ADDENDUM TO SIMPLIFIED MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF WATER QUALITY (1972); EPA, COSTS 
AND WATER QUALITY IMPACTS OF REDUCING AGRICULTURAL NINE POINT SOURCE POLLUTION: AN 
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY (EPA-600/5-79-009); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, MULTI-
PLE REGRESSION MODELING ApPROACH FOR REGIONAL WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT 
(EPA-60017-78-198); L. KONIKOW, COMPUTER MODEL OF Two-DIMENSIONAL TRANSPORT AND 
DISPERSION IN GROUNDWATER; EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL PATHWAYS OF SELECTED CHEMICALS IN 
FRESH WATER SYSTEMS (EPA-60017-77-113 and EPA-60017-78-074). 
55. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
961 (1974); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 591-97 (E.D. Mich. 1975); 
Sec'y of Envt'l Aff. v. Mass. Port Auth., 366 Mass. 755, 769, 323 N.E.2d 329, 343 (1975). See 
generally Note, Port Noise Complaint, 6 Harv. CR-CL L. REV. 61 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Port Noise Complaint]. See also Donley, Miller & Novikas, Computer Analysis to the City 
Noise-Preliminary Algorithm (83rd Meeting of the Acoustical Society of America, East 
Hanover, New Jersey, April 21, 1972, by R. Guernensey); U.S. ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORA-
TORY, TRANSPORTATION NOISE: IMPACTS AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES (October, 1973). 
56. Compare Gros, Power Plant Siting: A Parentian Environmental Approach (1974) (Har-
vard University Environmental Systems Program, Discussion Paper #74-4) with Soc. forthe 
Protection of N.H. Forests v. Site Evaluation Comm., 115 N.H. 172,337 A.2d 778 (1975) 
(placement of the Seabrook nuclear power plant). 
57. Compare Thomas, Shapiro & Houghton, Parentian Analysis of Regional Systems for 
Sewage Disposal (1974) (Harvard University Environmental Systems Program, Discussion 
Paper (74-2» with Mid-Shiawassee County Concerned Citizens v. Train, 408 F. Supp. 650 
(E.D. Mich. 1974); Ohio v. EPA, 460 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Evans v. Train, 460 F. 
Supp. 237 (S.D. Ohio 1978). 
58. The Wall Street J., Oct. 24, 1968, p. 2, col. 3. 
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more policy oriented, multi-variable decisions, such as the structure 
of an urban transportation 59 or waste disposal60 system or a plan of 
city development61 or land use.62 Computer models may also be used 
to evaluate erosion by river currents,63 to establish the mean high 
water line on a piece of property adjoining a watercourse,64 and to 
predict the effects of industrial development and other future ac-
tions on ground water supplies. 65 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER AGENCY ACTION 
A. An Agency's Obligation to Employ Models in 
Environmental Decisionmaking 
There are a number of reasons for the increasingly widespread use 
of mathematical and computer models in environmental decisions. 
First, Congress has mandated the use of computer models in the 
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.66 Under the 1977 Amend-
59. ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, APPLICATION OF COMPUTERS TO THE PROBLEMS 
OF URBAN SOCIETY, 4th Annual Symposium (1969); c. BERGE, PROGRAMMING, GAMES AND 
TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS (1965); Thomas & Thompson, The Value of Time for Commuting 
Motorists, 314 HIGHWAY RESEARCH RECORD 1 (1970); Tipping, Savings in Transport Studies, 
78 ECON. J. 843 (1968); Wohl & Martin, Methods of Evaluating Alternative Road Projects, 1 J. 
TRANSPORT PLAN. AND ECON. 28 (1967). 
60. J. Kuhner and J. Harrington, Towards Planning Models for Evaluating Solid-Waste 
Resource Recovery Programs (Harvard Environmental System Program, 1974). See D. HEN· 
NING, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 79 (1974). 
61. See D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 79. 
62. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. § 1962d-17 (a) (Law. Co-op. 1978). See also, Elm, NEPA's Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement, Social Impact, and Federally Funded Low Income Housing, 11 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 613, 624-25 (1974); Cost-Benefit Note, supra note I, at 424-25; Alabama v. 
Corps of Engineers, 411 F. Supp. 1261, 1271 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (interest rate used to calculate 
cost of flood control project). 
63. E.g., Petterson v. Froehlke, 354 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Or. 1972), remanded on other 
grounds, Citizens Committee for Columbia River v. Callaway, 494 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1974). 
64. See, e.g., N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. Borough of E. Rutherford (S.Ct. of N.J., 
Law Div.), consolidated with City of Newark v. Natural Resource Council (S.Ct. N.J., App. 
Div., Docket No. A-3311-72), as discussed in A. Porro, The Lawyer and the Statistical-Com-
puter Expert, ELEVENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN COMPUTER SCIENCE 
AND STATISTICS (Institute of Statistics, North Carolina State University of Raleigh, N.C., 
March 6 & 7,1978). 
65. EPA, A LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL FOR ASSESSING REGIONAL IMPACTS OF THE 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON WATER RESOURCES (July, 1977); EPA, MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF 
A SOCIOLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGIC DECISION SYSTEM (June, 1978). The United States Geological 
Survey of the Department of Interior has undertaken a Southeastern Carbonate Aquifer 
Study, which will result in "a computer model, or simulation, for the overall aquifer system [of 
every region in the country and its water suppliesl, supported by more detailed simulations of 
local problem areas." Newsletter of the Water Resources Research Institute of the University 
of North Carolina, No. 159, May, 1979. 
66. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (1977), codified at 
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401-7428 (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
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ments models must be used in connection with the prevention of 
significant deterioration of air quality (PSD)67 and for designation of 
nonattainment areas.68 Under the PSD program enacted in the 1977 
Amendments, a major emitting facility in an area subject to PSD 
regulations must apply for and receive a permit prior to commencing 
construction,69 which must be preceded by an analysis of air quality 
impacts projected for the area as a result of growth associated with 
such facility.70 This analysis must be performed using air quality 
models specified by regulations promulgated by EPA. 71 The 1977 
Amendments also require a conference on air quality modeling every 
three years to ensure that air quality models used in the PSD pro-
gram reflect the current state of the art in modeling.72 
The 1977 Amendments also explicitly provide for the use of air 
quality modeling in the designation of nonattainment areas.73 The 
1977 Amendments define a nonattainment area for any air pollutant 
as an area "which is shown by monitoring data or which is calculated 
by air quality modeling (or other methods determined by the 
administrator to be reliable) to exceed any national ambient air quali-
ty standard for such pollutant." 74 Courts have upheld EPA's use of 
either monitoring or modeling data in nonattainment designations. 75 
Further, it is clear that models will be required in the nonattainment 
permit program. The permit must be applied for and received prior 
to the construction or operation of a new or modified major sta-
tionary source in a nonattainment area. 76 Prior to the issuance of 
any permit, an analysis must be performed of alternative sites, sizes, 
production processes, and environmental control techniques for the 
proposed source, which demonstrates that the benefits of the pro-
posed source significantly outweigh the environmental and social 
costs resulting from its construction or modification. 77 Additionally, 
67. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 7475 (Law. Co-op. 1982). The PSD regulations, including those dealing 
with models, were upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Alabama Power Co. v. Cos-
tie, 636 F.2d 323, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This opinion superseded the prior interim opinion 
published at 606 F.2d 1068. 
68. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7501-7508 (Law. Co-op. 1982), especially § 7502. 
69. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7475(a) (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
70. Id. § 7475(a)(2), (6). 
71. Id. § 7475(e)(3)(D). 
72. See id. § 7620; see also Kramer, supra note 5, at 260 n.141. 
73. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7501-7508 (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
74. Id. § 7501(2). 
75. See, e.g., Rep. Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 805-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
76. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7502(b)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1982). See id., §§ 7501(4) (defining "modified"), 
76020) (defining "major stationary source"), 7503. 
77. Id. § 7502(b)(1l)(A). 
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prior to granting any permit, this source must demonstrate either (1) 
that the total emissions from all sources in the non attainment region 
will be sufficiently less than total emissions prior to the permit to 
assure reasonable further progress towards the attainment of appli-
cable and national ambient air quality standards,78 or (2) that the ad-
ditional emissions from the source will not be greater than the al-
lowed increase of emissions as calculated under the nonattainment 
plan.79 Regulations promulgated by the EPA specify the types of 
models to be used under the Clean Air Act in predicting ambient 
levels of air quality for metropolitan areas and the extent to which 
that level will be affected by proposed projects or pollution reduction 
efforts.8o 
Other statutes evince a congressional intent that mathematical 
methodologies be used. For instance, Congress has enacted statutes 
which require the use of models to show feasibility or to calculate a 
cost-benefit ratio.81 Congress has also enacted statutes requiring the 
use of "the best available evidence" and "the latest available scien-
tific data in the field,"82 which may be interpreted to require the use 
of models. 
NEP A may also mandate the use of quantitative or computer 
models under certain circumstances. By the enactment of NEP A 
Congress has set a high level for the decisionmaker to meet.83 His 
78. Id. § 7503(1)(A). See id. § 7501(1) (defining "reasonable further progress"). 
79. Id. § 7503(1)(B). See id. § 7502(b)(5), which requires the calculation of allowance for each 
pollutant. 
80. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(k) and (I), 52.21(k) and (I) (1981). 
81. See supra text at notes 25-29. 
82. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.S. § 655(b)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1982) (provision of the Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Act of 1970 specifying requirements for promulgating standards dealing with 
toxic materials and/or harmful physical agents). In interpreting § 655(b)(5) of that Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted that provi-
sion to require that the risk from a toxic substance be quantified sufficiently to enable the 
secretary to characterize it as significant in any understandable way. Indus. Union Dep't v. 
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The Supreme Court specifically stated that the 
requirement in the act that the risk be significant is not a "mathematical straightjacket," nor 
does it require OSHA "to calculate the exact probability of harm" or "to support its finding 
that a significant risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty." Id. at 655. The 
Supreme Court recognized that it must be tolerable of such findings where they are "made on 
the frontiers of scientific knowledge," id., and where they necessarily involve the intertwining 
of factual determinations and policy judgments. Id. at n.62. 
83. EDF v. Corps of Engineers (Gillham Dam), 470 F .2d 289, 297 n.12 (8th Cir. 1972)( citing 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971». See 
generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973); Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 
443-45; Annot., 17 A.L.R. FED. 33 (1973). 
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decisions must be based upon a "systematic, interdisciplinary ap-
proach"84 that "utilize[s] ecological information in the planning and 
development of resource-oriented projects" 85 and gives "presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values . . . appropriate 
consideration in decisionmaking along with technical and economic 
considerations . . . ." 86 This mandate extends beyond merely list-
ing the factors to be considered; it also forcefully states a congres-
sional intent that these factors be considered "to the fullest extent 
possible" 87 through the use of "all practicable means and 
measures." 88 The goal that has been set is the attainment and main-
tenance of a broadly defined, high standard of living89 and a "health-
ful environment" 90 for "present and future generations of Amer-
icans," as well as other peoples of the world. 91 
84. 42 U.S.C.S. § 4332(2)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
85. 42 U.S.C.S. § 5332(2)(H) (Law. Co-op. 1982). One of the original purposes of the Act was 
"to enrich the understanding of ecological systems." Id. § 4321 (1970). Courts have said that 
ecological factors must be considered by the agency under the requirements of NEP A. See, 
e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 211 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted in Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 
485 F.2d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). 
86. 42 U.S.C.S. § 4332(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1982). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.6 (interdisciplinary 
preparation), 1502.23 (cost-benefit analysis) (1980). 
87. 42 U.S.C.S. § 4332 (Law. Co-op. 1982). See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1975). The regulations 
formerly stated that "[t]he phrase 'to the fullest extent possible' in section 102 is meant to 
make clear that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the section unless 
existing law applicable to the agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes compliance im-
possible." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4 (1975). The regulations now stress a reduction in paperwork and 
delay; see id. §§ 1500.1(c), 1500.4, 1502.1, 1502.2 and 1502.7; but do require the decisionmaker 
to specify the extent to which the underlying information is incomplete or unavailable, id. § 
1502.22. "NEP A was intended to be broad and all inclusive in its concern for the environment. 
Federal agencies are to apply its provisions to the fullest extent possible." Note, State 
Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements for Federally Aided Highway Programs, 4 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 597, 602 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Highway Impact Statements]. See 
Calvert Cliffs' Coord'g Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bucks County Bd. 
of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1975); EDF v. Corps of 
Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 927 (N.D. Miss. 1972), ajfd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). 
88. 42 U.S.C.S. § 4331(a) (Law. Co-op. 1982) (1970). Subsection (b) of that section directs 
that "[i]n order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of 
the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . ." to attain the six specific goals set 
out in the subsection. The only limitation on this directive is that it be "consistent with other 
essential considerations of national policy." Id. 
89. See id. § 4331 (Law. Co-op. 1982): § (a) ("fulfill the social, economic, and other require-
ments of present and future generations of Americans"), § (b)(2) ("safe, healthful, productive, 
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings"), § (b)(3) ("without ... risk to health 
or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences"), § (b)(4) (diversity and in-
dividual free choice), § (b)(5) ("high standards of living"), § 101(b)(6) (maximum resource use), 
and § (c) ("that each person should enjoy a healthful environment"); see also id. S 4321 (1970) 
("stimulate the . . . welfare of man"). 
90. Id. § 4331 ("stimulate the health . . . of man"). 
91. See id. §§ 4331(a), (b)(I); 4332(2)(C)(v), (2)(D)(iv), (2)(E). 
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As reflected in the policy mandates of NEP A, Congress intends to 
"force" the use of the best, state-of-the-art methodologies available 
in the making of environmental decisions.92 This would seem to im-
pel the use of such mathematical models as those under study here, 
at least to the greatest extent that this is possible or practicable.93 In 
sum, NEP A is a broad statutory precedent for the maximum use of 
mathematical models in the environmental decisionmaking process. 
The regulations (NEP A Regulations) promulgated by the Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) applying and interpreting NEP A 
also place at least an indirect duty on the decisionmaker to use quan-
titative and computer models to the greatest extent possible. The 
NEP A Regulations are designed to ensure that the information upon 
which environmental decisions are based "be of high quality," 
because "[a]ccurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, 
and public scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA."94 As 
those provisions note, "[t]he NEPA process is intended to help public 
officials make decisions that are based on an [sic] understanding of 
environmental consequences . . . ." 96 Impact statements are to be 
concise and avoid extraneous data and analysis, but are to "be sup-
ported by evidence that agencies have made the necessary environ-
mental analyses."96 The NEPA Regulations require the gathering 
and use of all data relevant to the decision, unless its cost is exorbi-
tant, and when the cost is high, requires the inclusion of "a worst 
case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of 
its occurrence." 97 A model can be used to produce data where moni-
toring or experimentation is too costly and can also be used for the 
required worst-case analysis. A model can also be used to predict the 
environmental consequences of the project,98 to evaluate the relative 
92. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)(1981). For cases discussing the concept of state of the art in 
environmental law, see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1975); 
So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 680 n.37 (1st Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289,295 
n.6, 301 n.16 (5th Cir. 1974); Ala. v. Corps of Engineers, 411 F. Supp. 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 
1976); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 578, 594 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 
F. Supp. 1289, 1365-66 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other gnds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 
499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974). 
93. See Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1075-78 (3rd Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., 
concurring). 
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1981). 
95. ld. § 1500.1(b). 
96. ld. § 1500.2(b). See id. §§ 1500.4 (reduce paperwork), 1500.5 (reduce delay), 1502.7 
(150-page limit). 
97. ld. § 1502.22(b) and (c). 
98. See id. § 1502.16. 
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merits of the different alternatives,99 to integrate data from the 
natural and social sciences and design rates,100 and to comply with 
the general statutory mandate of a "systematic, interdisciplinary ap-
proach."101 Models can also be used in the detailed identification and 
qualification of environmental effects102 and in the performing of 
cost-benefit analyses where appropriate. lOS Where the EIS is based 
on a model, care must be used that the statement is written in ana-
lytical but clear fashion, that the format is clear, and that the por-
tions of the model most useful to decisionmaking are pointed out.104 
Information on the model may be attached as an appendix to the 
EIS.105 
A number of cases interpreting the Clean Air Act and NEP A 
establish the principle that the sophistication of the models used on 
computers must keep up with the current state of the art.106 EPA, in 
recognition of the need to apply this ecosystem-oriented approach to 
environmental decisions, has adopted a policy in air pollution deci-
sions which favors modeling results over monitoring data where the 
two conflict, at least where there is a question as to the adequacy of 
the monitoring data.107 EPA takes the position that modeling data is 
normally superior to "air quality monitoring data which is usually 
not sufficiently comprehensive to cover any given area." 108 The use 
of EPA's models to project future conditions for which no monitor-
ing data can be used has also been upheld. 109 
Beyond these legal mandates, increasingly complicated and 
intractable environmental problems will compel the greater use of 
quantitative models by environmental decisionmakers. Many experts 
99. See id. S§ 150.214, 1501.2(c). 
100. See id. S§ 1502.6, 1502.8. 
101. See id. § 1501.2(a). 
102. See id. § 1501.2(b). 
103. See id. § 1502.23. 
104. Id. § 1500.4(b), (d), (e), (f) and regulations cited therein. 
105. Compare id. § 1502.18 (appendix) with id. § 1502.21 (incorporation by reference). 
106. See supra cases cited in note 92. 
107. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,998 (1978). This regulatory statement of EPA's policy was upheld in 
Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 19 (6th Cir. 1980). 
108. Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costie, 632 F.2d 14, 19 (6th Cir. 1980). The issue in Cincinnati 
Gas was the use of modeling data to classify an area as a nonattainment area under 42 U.S.C. § 
7501(2). The Sixth Circuit left open the question of whether it would be arbitrary and 
capricious for EPA to base the nonattainment designation on modeling data in the face of con-
tradictory adequate monitoring data. 
109. Models must be used to project future air quality when a nonattainment designation 
under the Clean Air Act is based on future air quality standard violations which do not now ex-
ist. See, e.g., Columbus and So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1980); 
P.P.G. Ind. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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are of the opinion that, if we are ever to deal with our environmental 
problems, we are going to have to utilize the information handling 
capabilities of the more complex of these quantitative models, partic-
ularly those run on computers.110 Computers are used to incorporate 
large amounts of environmental data into a "simulation model" of an 
environmental system (an "ecosystem" 111); such modeling efforts 
have been referred to generically as "ecomodels."112 The rising 
population and standard of living and the cumulative effects of our 
society's obliviousness to the pollution problem will all make the 
problem of pollution more severe in the future, thus further increas-
ing the need for quantitative tools to deal with the problem of pollu-
tion.113 Likewise, improvements in data gathering and modeling 
capabilities will make the use of models increasingly attractive.114 
The ideal that is pursued has been termed "ecomanagement"116 or 
"environmental management"116 to indicate a level of sophistication 
in administration of environmental matters that would be commen-
surate with a hypothetically complete (i.e., perfect) understanding of 
110. "[T)here will be a revolution in the study of ecosystems in the next 150 years due to the 
use oftheoretical ecology, including computer models." Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 20, at 403 
n.82 (citing Theoretical Ecology: Beginnings of a Predictive Science, 183 SCI. 400 (1974». See 
M. BUNDY, MANAGING KNOWLEDGE TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT 3-4 (1970). Computers are said 
to be "powerful" by virtue of their capability of handling large amounts of data and variables. 
Eastin, supra note 2, at 610. "[I)t is often the case that the factors entering into [a modeling) 
problem are so many that only elaborate data processing procedures can yield significant 
answers. In such case, a mathematical model forms an immediate bridge to the use of large-
scale electronic data processors." Id. at 619 (citations omitted); Mayda, supra note 2, at 27-28. 
111. "An ecosystem results from the integration of all of the living and nonliving factors of 
the environment for a defined segment of space and time. It is a complex of organisms and en-
vironment forming a functional whole." D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 162. Of course, such a 
concept and its applications have practical limits. See id. at 151. 
112. "[A)n ecomodel [is) 'an intelligible statement of the manner in which our observations 
and [projections) hang together' and make it possible to correct policy propositions not borne 
out by application .... " Mayda, supra note 2, at 31 (footnotes omitted). See supra text and 
notes at notes 7-13. 
113. W. RAMSAY & G. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 114-16 ("ecological crisis" will precipi-
tate the use of models even in the face of the difficulties in quantifying and environmental 
amenities). 
114. See, e.g., G. HAGEVIK, supra note 10, at 192. In addition to providing its own model, the 
federal government will evaluate a model which it did not itself produce. See, e.g., TRANSPORTA-
TION SYSTEMS CENTER, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS DIVISION, DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, EVALUATION 
OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MODELS AND SIMULATIONS (1971) (Report No. DOT-TSC-FAA-71-7, 
prepared for the FAA). 
115. "The neologism 'ecomanagement' stands for comprehensive management of environ-
ment and other resources, based on ecological principles and applying systems analysis and 
modeling techniques." Mayda, supra note 2, at 21 n.1. See W. MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 5, 
8; D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 162; W. RAMSAY & G. ANDERSON, supra note 14. 
116. See Hahn, Providing Environmental Science Services, 28 PUB. AD. REV. 326 (1968). 
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our ecosystem and which would not be achieved to the exclusion of 
public input.1I7 Most commentators agree that this is an unattainable 
goal, but is one to which our society should aspire in its efforts to 
deal with environmental problems. lIS These commentators suggest 
an increasingly interdisciplinary1I9 and ecosystem-oriented120 ap-
proach to the increasing problems with pollution. This approach en-
tails the application of systems planning to the environmental deci-
sionmaking process.121 
B. Problems Presented to the Administrative 
Decisionmaker by the Use of Quantitative Models 
The problem arising from the use of an environmental model is 
twofold. First, its use may actually increase the likelihood that a 
117. Mayda states that: 
a model makes it possible to see graphically even remote cause-effect relationships 
and to investigate the ramifications when parameters are changed because of 
changed priorities. Since such a model is constructed in computer terms, all the alter-
native effects and their total benefit-cost aspect can be rapidly determined and fed 
back to the policy makers. As distinguished from the crude precept of periodic revi· 
sion of projections every so many years, which often turns into a political issue with 
the usual concomitants, a model makes possible the consideration of each program as 
a step in an ongoing sequence, with a built-in means of evaluation and a continuous 
opportunity to correct specific projects. 
Mayda, supra note 2, at 31. 
Of particular interest is his implication that his effort will somehow depoliticize the choices 
made. There exists in such an attitude the danger that the public will come to find such "elitist 
decision-making ... inadequate." Baram, supra note 20, at 82. This techno-scientific ap-
proach is exacerbated by the differences in perceptions between the "general public" and 
those of "experts." See D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 102. This tendency led the author to 
observe that "[a]t present, the environmental agencies appear to be of the management type, 
on a closed-system basis." [d. at 48. However, it is stressed that "an open system should be 
developed." [d. (emphasis his). 
118. See G. HAGEVIK, supra note 10, at 179; J. CONNER & E. LOEHMAN, ECONOMICS AND 
DECISIONMAKlNG FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 215 (1975). These commentators point out that 
models will likely playa large part in overcoming the present "serious dearth of physical and 
biological data." [d. For instance, satellites "can provide computerized sensory data for classi-
fying, analyzing, inventorying and monitoring photographic images .... When such material 
is combined with other photographs and data in an interdisciplinary approach, it is obvious 
that new dimensions are added to the understanding of the ecosystem." D. HENNING, supra 
note 60, at 163. 
119. See D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 152. See also supra text at note 84. 
120. "[T]he ecosystem approach encompasses and changes multiple-use and resource plan-
ning by introducing more specific criteria and ecological principles. It places natural resources 
and environmental manipulation in the proper perspective for more intensive and precise en-
vironmental administration and planning." D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 165. It "is essential-
ly a total system approach. It therefore includes in its purview many things omitted in a less 
comprehensive system." Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a Criterionjor Public Land Policy, 10 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 203, 205 (1970). 
121. G. HAGEVIK, supra note 10, at 192-93; Hahn, supra note 116, at 340; Dale, Systems 
Analysis and Ecology, 2 ECOLOGY 52 (1970). 
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substantively incorrect decision will be reached. This greater proba-
bility of error generally can be traced to the inability of environmen-
tal decisionmakers to deal with certain aspects of the use of models 
in making such decisions. Second, the use of a model increases the 
danger that wrong environmental decisions may not be detected and 
corrected by the reviewing courts. 122 
Certain intrinsic aspects of environmental decisions, particularly 
those resting on models, make those decisions especially difficult for 
a court to review. First, because of the policy choices and uncertain-
ty involved in such decisions, some discretion must necessarily be 
committed to the decisionmaker under vague statutory standards. 
Second, the decisions often rest on an inadequate data base. Third, 
because of the value-laden nature of such environmental data and be-
cause of the relative crudeness of scientific ecological knowledge, 
such decisions necessarily rest on subjective assumptions and metho-
dologies, such as the assignment of value to clean water in a cost-
benefit analysis. Fourth, the complexities of the subject matter and 
the level of expertise of the decisionmaker combine to make it diffi-
cult for the decisionmaker to properly interpret the evidence pre-
sented (modeling and otherwise) so as to assure that his choices im-
plement the proper environmental policies. Fifth, these decisions are 
often inadequately presented as numbers or graphs; this manner of 
presentation discourages examination of the underlying choices that 
are made. Each of the aspects is discussed in greater detail below. 
1. Vague Statutory Standards 
The standards contained in environmental statutes are vague and 
generally do little to specify the methodologies to be used by deci-
sionmakers.123 For instance, environmental statutes often require 
only such effort as is "practicable" or "available." The discretion 
that this ambiguity allows an administrative agency has led courts to 
hold that such policy decisions are essentially legislative in 
character. 124 
122. See Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 446. 
123. See D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 15, 20, 99-100. See also Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 
20, at 376; Note, The Environmental Policy Act and Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 799, 808 n.42 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Policy-Level Decisionmaking]. 
124. So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 670 n.37 (1st Cir. 1974) ("the choice of how to 
reduce hydrocarbon emissions is a legislative-type judgment"). On the basis of this doctrine, 
the court upheld the agency's rejection of a particular kind of abatement methodology as being 
"generally recognized as beyond the current state of the art." Id. See Picher, Alternatives 
Under NEPA: The Functions of Objectives in an Environmental Impact Statement, 11 HARV. 
J. LEGIS. 595, 597-98 (1974). Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 20, at 372 nA. 
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2. Inadequate Data Base 
Because of the pressing need of our environmental problems and 
the mandatory, action-forcing nature of many of the environmental 
statutes, many environmental decisions are made in the face of an in-
sufficient data base.126 This lack of data can often be attributed in 
large part to the practical difficulties of data collection. 126 This pauci-
ty of data may also be attributed to the relevant newness of the com-
plex field of environmental science and ecology.127 A computer 
model can be used to overcome or at least alleviate difficulties in 
decisionmaking caused by this lack of data. 128 Nonetheless, a lack of 
data can hamper the accurate application of a model. l29 
3. Complexity of the Underlying Science 
The complex nature of environmental science increases the likeli-
hood that a decision will be incorrect. 13o The field is a technical one, 
calling on such esoteric disciplines as biology, ecology, computer pro-
gramming, statistics, and social science. An ecosystem-based ap-
proach to environmental decisionmaking, also known as environ-
mental management, would involve the correlation and coordination 
of many diverse fields l31 in much the same way that ecology must 
encompass the use, correlation, and coordination of more compart-
mentalized scientific disciplines.132 The multidisciplinary field of 
ecology integrates biological data with social science datal33 and 
125. BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637,652 (1st Cir. 1979); Hercules, Inc. v. 
EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d lOll, 1025-26 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 740-42 (D.C. Cir. 1974); MAD v. 
Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 548 (D.C. Md. 1975). See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 688 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting) (1980). 
126. See, e.g., Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811 (9th Cir. 1980). 
127. Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660, 664-65 (6th Cir. 1978). 
128. See, e.g., Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1161 (6th Cir. 1978). 
129. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 1152 n.16 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) (noting that the less sophisticated rollback model was used instead 
of the more sophisticated dispersion model because of a lack of information). See also, Clev. 
Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 1978) (noting that the increased 
precision of the more sophisticated RAM model requires tremendous amounts of data). 
130. See generally D. HENNING, supra note 61, at 3-21; Faulk, The Global Environment and 
International Law: Challenge and Response, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 385 (1975); Gelpe & Tarlock, 
supra note 20. 
131. See supra text at notes 115-21. 
132. See W. MATIHEWS, supra note 15, at 13. In fact, the decisionmaking process that incor-
porates this knowledge can itself be characterized as a model. See Hufschmidt, Environmental 
Planning, X AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 6-8 (1966). 
133. See D. HENNING, supra note 61, at 44; G. HAGEVIK, supra note 10, at 33-34; Hahn, 
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other types of information. This synthesizing effort is necessary to 
comprehend the complex interrelationships involved in the structure 
of an ecosystem.l34 Advances in the information-storage and data-
analysis capabilities of computers have facilitated this trend, and 
have thereby made the use of such computers more attractive as a 
scientific basis upon which to ground an administrative decision. The 
science underlying a model, such as in the field of ecology, attempts 
to integrate all of these divergent fields. 
4. Limitations of the Environmental Decisionmaker 
The environmental decisionmaker is not likely to have received any 
extensive formal training in the fields involved in ecology or environ-
mental management. Even an environmental specialist with exten-
sive knowledge in one scientific discipline is not likely to be trained to 
make the value judgments often involved in such decisions, such as 
the choices involved in fairly allocating the burden of compliance 
amongst all parties subject to regulation. l3s Thus, environmental 
decisionmaking requires the involvement of experts. 
The very presence of these experts also contributes to the prob-
ability of error in the decisionmaking process. There is often a 
tendency on the part of these experts-whether permanent agency 
staff, or private contractors hired by the agency, or private parties 
coming before the agency-to give an inadequate disclosure of the 
actual methodologies used and the limitations of the results that 
their studies produce.l36 Such results or conclusions may take the 
form of a report whose only substance is contained in a single graph 
or table. l37 Alternatively, the expert's results may be in the form of a 
voluminous accumulation of statistical data with little explication of 
supra note 116, at 340. See generally DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
(1973); Barnett, Environmental Policy and Management, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT (1967). 
134. Caldwell, supra note 15, at 218. See CONNER & LOEHMAN, supra note 118, at 205. It is 
for this reason that computer ecomodels are employed to help in the effort. See Mayda, supra 
note 2, at 31-32. 
135. D. HENNING, supra note 61, at 54. 
136. See Delaware River Facifinding, supra note 14, at 495. 
137. See, e.g., id. at 403-31. Of course, a court is normally reviewing the administrative rec-
ord of which such reports would only be a part. If the administrative agency has taken the 
results from such a study and incorporated it into a report of its own, then it is difficult for a 
court to then judge the completeness of the report. In this case, the incompleteness of the ex-
pert's reports may well be reflected in the incompleteness of the administrative agencies' 
reports produced from them. "An independent study which examined EIS's prepared by state 
1982] PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 277 
the conclusions to be drawn therefrom or with little explication of 
how the stated conclusions were reached.1ss 
These experts' opinions may be distorted by various biases that af-
fect both their methodologies and opinions. Experts are often hired 
by parties preparing for an adversary hearing, with the obvious 
attendant danger that the model's results and the conclusions may 
be manipulated in order to better support the employer's position.1s9 
Moreover, this bias need not be intentional or conscious. Indeed, 
there is a greater likelihood of unintentional bias: in this area of 
statistical analysis the results are highly susceptible to unconsciously 
held biases which often take the form of strongly held professional 
opinions or intellectual outlooks toward a problem.140 Regulations 
governing the content of draft and final impact statements require 
expert analysis be at an understandable level and in an understand-
able form. It is questionable whether such requirements address the 
inherent susceptibility of expert opinion to manipulative distortion. 
and local authorities concluded that the main inadequacy was the lack of data .... " Note, 
State Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements for Federally Aided Highway Pro-
grams, 4 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 597, 606 (1976) (citations omitted). See, e.g., City of Romulus v. 
County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 588-89 and n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1975). This is also true for sup-
porting documents for state implementation plans. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F .2d 289, 302, 
303 n.20, 308 n.31 (5th Cir. 1974). 
138. For instance, the Texas SIP litigation involved a review of 10,000 pages of material. 
Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1974). This tendency towards verboseness 
may be exacerbated by the courts reviewing the modeling effort. As one commentator notes, 
"it appears that some courts, searching for a yardstick to measure adequacy, have tacitly con-
sidered the length of the alternatives section of the impact statement to be an indication of the 
discussion's comprehensiveness for full disclosure purposes." Chamouis, The National En-
vironmental Protection Act of1969: What Alternative Must An Agency Discuss?, 12 COLUM. J. 
L. & Soc. PROB. 231, 234 (1976). Of course, the real issue is not the amount of material that is 
presented, but the way it is presented. This aspect of the process has also been attacked by 
observers. For instance, the Ackerman study found "that the style of the [expert's] analysis 
did not invite the policymaker to confront [the] fundamental questions .... " Delaware River 
Factjinding, supra note 14, at 481. 
139. See Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmen-
tal Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1318 & n.23 (1974), and sources cited therein; Lanning, State 
Management of the Environment Part One: A Continuing Evaluation of the Michigan Ex-
perience, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 186, 310-311 (1974). See also Part Two of that article, id., at 
466 (1975). 
140. This problem can arise from the conceptual rigidity that often accompanies the posses-
sion of expertise, see Freedman, Ewpertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363,369 (1976), particularly if the expertise in a scientific field, see Spengler, Machine-Made 
Justice: Some Implications, 28 L. & CONT. PROB., 36, 40 (1963). The other facet of the problem 
is that these experts are "frozen" into viewpoints that are very different from the public to 
which the system is to respond. D. HENNING, supra note 61, at 102; Freedman, supra note 140, 
at 370. 
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5. Inadequate and Unclear Presentation of Data 
The effectiveness of environmental models has also been ham-
pered by the difficulties of properly coordinating experts in the 
modeling effort and in communicating the results of their efforts to 
the decisionmaker in an understandable form.141 For example, the 
results may appear to be unimpeachable because of the expert's 
failure to articulate underlying principles.142 The environmental 
decisionmaker generally does not have the sophistication needed to 
deal with many of the intricate facts and methodologies upon which 
the decision is based. 143 He may have some training in one or more of 
the fields involved in the environmental decision.144 No decision-
maker, however, can be trained sufficiently to deal with all of the 
aspects of this technical, complex, and rapidly developing subject.146 
Therefore, the decisionmaker must rely on his staff of specialists 
(if he has one) and the parties' experts to "translate" 146 their work 
into a language that he can intelligently act upon. The result is that 
the decisionmaker is highly dependent on these experts to master 
the complexity of the subject matter.147 Nevertheless, the decision's 
141. Delaware River Factjinding, supra, note 14, at 481. For instance, the study pointed 
out that if the experts "had taken pains to articulate the factors that make the achievement of 
meaningful environmental improvement uncertain, its analysis would have induced decision-
makers to explore the basic premises of pollution control policy in a far more probing 
way .... " [d. "The practical use of results from the modeling of environmental systems has 
always been limited by . . . the difficulty of communicating results of technical analytic ef-
forts in a form understandable by decision-makers." W. MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 61. 
142. G. HAGEVIK, supra note 10, at 200. 
143. See Freedman, supra note 140, at 370-71. 
144. It has been noted that decisionmakers are more likely to possess "routinized ex-
perience ... than expertness." Freedman, supra note 140, at 371. But see Soc. for the Pro-
tection of N.H. Forests v. Site Evaluation Comm., 115 N.H. 172, 337 A.2d 778 (1975). In this 
later case, the state's Supreme Court pointed out that "[t]he site evaluation committee is com-
posed of trained professionals who are specifically authorized by statute to facilitate their task 
with legal and investigative expertise." [d. at 115 N.H. 179,337 A.2d at 786. 
145. "Proficiency is not possible in this 'field' [of environmental management] because 
there is not enough collective knowledge, theory, or wisdom to define or to describe what 
would have to be mastered." W. MATIHEWS, supra note 15, at 5. See id. at 14. Since modeling 
is in itself a highly technical and rapidly developing field, it is unlikely that a generalist deci-
sionmaker could keep abreast of the state-of-the-art developments in the field. See id. at 189; 
Wilkins, supra note 2, at 507-10; D. HENNING, supra note 60, at 321; Gelpe & Tarlock, supra 
note 20, at 396-406. 
146. See Delaware River Factjinding, supra note 14, at 480. See also M. BUNDY, supra note 
110, at 18. 
147. Professor Freedman speaks of the "danger in excessive reliance upon experts" by ad-
ministrative decisionmakers. Freedman, supra note 140, at 366. Nevertheless, the techni-
cal nature of the environmental subject matter-particularly when coupled with that of 
mathematical modeling and electronic data processing-may lead to a "strengthening" of the 
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scientific basis, although apparently a source of potential detriment 
to the decisionmaking process, is often one of the primary factors 
used in justifying the correctness of the agency's action by the 
reviewing court.148 Even though the decisionmaker may not under-
stand the expert's explanation of the workings of an environmental 
model, often he is nonetheless reassured by simplistic explanations 
of the model's results, supported by inadequate documentation. 149 
This tendency of experts to underdocument is matched by the 
tendency of decisionmakers to overgeneralize and to avoid stating 
explicitly the bases of their decision, relying instead on volumes of 
data and statistics.150 Consequently, a reviewing court will be faced 
in this situation with too little documentation and explanation for 
proper review, although it may have a voluminous record before it. 
Moreover, environmental decisions are often "masked" by the 
numbers which embody the decision. 151 This masking phenomenon 
makes it difficult for the decision maker and later the reviewing court 
to establish clearly how the numbers embodying the environmental 
decision (as, for instance, the allowable ambient level or discharge) 
implements or fails to implement the policy of the applicable statutes 
or regulations. For example, it is difficult, although not impossible, 
to establish the concentration of pollutants allowable in water clean 
enough to meet the "fishable" or "swimmable" requirement of the 
FWPCAA (Clean Water Act)152: it is difficult to conceptualize an 
environmental result from such a number. This problem of trans-
lating environmental policy choices into actual ecological results is 
expert's position in the decisionmaking structure. J. PFIFFNER & H. PRESTUS, PUBLIC AD-
MINISTRATION 247 (1967); D. HENNING, supra note 61, at 57. 
148. [d. at 54. See Delaware River Factjinding, supra note 14, at 490 (the decisionmaker 
often deemphasizes the uncertainties underlying its decision). 
149. See Delaware River Factjinding, supra note 14, at 429. 
150. As Professor Baram has stated the problem: 
[flormal computer models appear to be quite scientific. Without adequate understand-
ing of the empirical context, without full realization of the embedded assumptions, 
and without appreciation of the exclusions and omissions, a potential user is easily led 
down the garden path. The enormous difficulty of specifying a model is not to be 
lightly dismissed by the so-called "system engineer" who can model anything, any 
time, any place, for anyone. 
Baram, supra note 20, at 347. 
151. "Dependence on ... quantification [methodologies] creates an aura of rationality 
which hides the difficult value judgments which ought to be explicit so that they can be debated 
on their merits." Policy-Level Decisionmaking, supra note 123, at 819-20. 
152. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1376 (Law. Co-op. 1982). See, e.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. 
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 
392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975). The courts' efforts to pierce this inability to conceptualize 
the level of environmental quality represented by a decision led the Fourth Circuit to note: 
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compounded by the uncertainties and inexactitudes associated with 
predictions, particularly those involving environmental decisions. 
The ability of decisionmakers conceptually to link the environmental 
policy choices with the data or numbers forming these decisions, and 
the communication of this linkage to the public, affects the ability of 
the public to visualize and respond to the decisions. This ability of the 
public to understand the choices made by its decisionmakers is a 
crucial prerequisite to the public input process in environmental deci-
sionmaking, because the decisionmaker often must draw on the data 
of public opinion in making his decision. 153 
Environmental decisions involving the use of models are often 
challenged, both as to the broad policy choices made and to the par-
ticular application of those choices. Yet, these challenges often are 
not ostensibly directed at the policy resolution reached by the deci-
sionmaker so much as at its deceptively neutral manifestations: the 
environmental model. The result is that the resolution of these chal-
lenges does not address the political and subjective nature of the 
decisionmaking process, but instead turns on the evaluation of the 
appropriateness of the scientific data and methodology relied upon, 
which appear to be accurately and exactly defined.154 Fundamental-
ly, the nature of the decision is still political and subjective, regard-
less of the methodologies used, or the form of presentation of those 
methodologies. Courts, when presented with the use of mathemati-
cal methodologies or computer models in such environmental deci-
sions face the interrelated problems of (1) the roles that courts 
should play in reviewing the use of these models by administrative 
decisionmakers; and (2) the standards and scope of review that have 
[c]ourts require that administrative agencies 'articulate the criteria' employed in 
reaching their result and are no longer content with bare administrative ipse dixits 
based on supposed administrative expertise .... While an agency may have discre-
tion to decide, '[D]iscretion to decide does not include a right to act perfunctorily or 
arbitrarily' and the agency must in its decision 'explicate fully its course of inquiry, its 
analysis and its reasoning.' 
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted). 
153. Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 20, at 372-73. These problems intrinsic to environmental 
predictions are unavoidable and are no reason to not use predictive methodologies in an effort 
to make the best guess possible. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289,319 (5th Cir. 1974). 
154. "Often the conflicts among broad alternatives . . . are not amenable to resolution by 
gathering technical information. The choice may rest on subjective interpretation of the broad 
policy directives highlighted in NEPA's Section 101, and may be essentially political . ... [I]t 
is in these fundamental areas that environmentalists often challenge agency action." Policy-
Level Decisionmaking, supra note 123, at 814-85 (emphasis added). See Maechling, supra note 
2, at 728; Day, Technology Assessment and the Legal Profession, 14 JURIMETRICS 67, 75 (1973). 
But see Cape May County Chapter, Inc. v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971). 
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been and should be applied by those courts, which will be collectively 
referred to as the appropriate "level" of judicial review. The search 
for the proper judicial role and level of review are reexamined below 
in eight of the traditional levels of judicial review for environment 
decisions, and their evolution and development are traced in general 
terms. 
C. Standards and Scope of Judicial Review in 
Environmental Decisionmaking 
1. The Overton Park Standard 
The level of judicial review which the courts state they apply to en-
vironmental decisions based on models is the level of review as for-
mulated in the benchmark case of environmental law, Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.1 55 The fact that courts always 
recite they are applying the Overton Park standard of review does 
not ensure a uniformity in the level of review applied, however, be-
cause the Overton Park standard is an ambiguous one. In Overton 
Park, the United States Supreme Court held that a reviewing court 
should determine whether the environmental action was (1) within 
the scope of the agency's authority; (2) in conformance with the 
statute's procedural requirements; or (3) arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law~ 156 
The problems of review of environmental decisions based on 
models as described in part III.B., above, exacerbate the variability 
of the level of judicial review said to be applied under the Overton 
Park rubric. Problems in judicial review of environmental decisions 
involving models can be reduced to a question of explicitly defining 
the proper level of judicial review to be applied when courts recite 
they are applying the Overton Park standard. Most of the cases con-
cerning the validity of environmental models involve substantive 
review under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the third 
prong of the Overton Park test. 157 The arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review has not been consistently applied to produce the 
155. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The approach taken in Overton Park was foreshadowed by the 
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. FPC, 354 
F.2d 608 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), affd on remand 453 F.2d 463 (1971). See W. 
RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (1977). 
156. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971). 
157. Professor Kramer has stated that this third inquiry of substantive review under the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard in most cases constitutes' 'the heart of the judicial review proc-
ess." Kramer, supra note 5, at 244. 
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same scope and standards of judicial review, particularly when ap-
plied to environmental decisions involving models. 
2. Ambiguity and Internal Inconsistency in the Arbitrary and Capri-
cious Level of Substantive Judicial Review 
The arbitrary and capricious portion of the Overton Park standard 
is an ambiguous one. Although the phrase "arbitrary and capricious" 
is a term of art in judicial review, it does little to assist the court in 
determining the proper scope or standards of judicial review. This is 
reflected in the numerous different synonyms or characterizations 
which have been used in the judicial review of environmental deci-
sions. lss Determining the proper scope and standards under the arbi-
trary and capricious level of judicial review is also complicated by the 
fact that the arbitrary and capricious standard actually is composed 
of a number of differing sub-levels of review, some of which are 
mutually contradictory. 
Under Overton Park, the level of factual inquiry is to be searching, 
probing and careful. Courts seem unable to resist intermingling sub-
stantive review under the arbitrary and capricious prong of the 
Overton Park test with procedural review under that standard, 
although in theory those substantive and procedural review levels 
are very different. Courts consistently hold agencies to strict compli-
ance with procedural requirements. Is9 In contrast, the ultimate level 
of substantive review is deferential and forbids the reviewing court 
from substituting its judgment for that of the agency, as discussed 
further below. 
In order to examine the proper scope and standards of judicial 
review of environmental decisions, this article will examine the 
statutes upon which such review is based, and will outline the devel-
opment of the review of such environmental decisions. In order to il-
lustrate the diverse formulations of the current level of substantive 
review of environmental decisions, the various synonyms and other 
reformulations used in attempting to describe the level of judicial 
review used in environmental decisions involving models are exam-
ined in part III.C.5., below. This discussion will provide a perspective 
for the detailed discussion of some of those cases which follows in 
part IV. 
158. See infra text and notes at notes 183-205. 
159. As the First Circuit has said, "[tlhough our review of an agency's final decision is a 
common one, we must be strict in reviewing an agency's compliance with procedural rules." 
BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641 (1979); Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 
lOll, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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3. Statutory Bases for Judicial Review 
There are three statutory sources for the scope and standard of 
judicial review of environmental decisions: (1) the federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA);160 (2) NEPA;161 and (3) specific stat-
utes relating to environmental pollution.162 Oftentimes, more than 
one of the foregoing statutes must be considered in reviewing an en-
vironmental decision, because these review provisions generally are 
not exclusive of one another .163 There are exceptions to this rule of 
160. 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 101,551-559,701-706 (Law. Co-op. 1980). The provisions most relevant 
to judicial review of environmental decisions are the provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) relating to administrative procedure, id. §§ 551-559, and the provisions of 
the APA relating to judicial review, id. §§ 701-706. The provisions which are most relevant to 
the establishment of standards under AP A, id. § § 553, 554, 556, 706, have not changed in any 
substantial respect since those provisions were first codified in 1966 by Public Law 89-554, 80 
Stat. 378, as amended by Pub. L. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (June 5, 1967). In fact, the basic structure 
of the APA has changed very little since its original enactment in 1946. Compare Pub. L. 
404-79th Congress, approved June 11, 1946,60 Stat. 237-244 §§ 4 (rulemaking, now § 553), 5 
(adjudication, now § 554), and 10(e) (scope of review, now § 706). 
161. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4321-4370 (Law. Co-op. 1982). The original version of NEPA was effec-
tive January 1,1970, see Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853, and was amended in minor ways effec-
tive August 9, 1975, see Pub. L. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424. See generally Annot., Construction and 
Application of§§ 101-105 of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.s.C.S. §§ 4331, 
4335) Requiring All Federal Agencies to Consider Environmental Factors in their Planning 
and Decisionmaking, 17 A.L.R. FED. 33 (1973); H. GREEN, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT IN THE COURTS (1972). 
162. E.g., Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401-7642 (Law. Co-op. 1982) [herein-
after cited as CAA]; Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (FWPCAA), 33 
U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1376 (Law. Co-op. 1980); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 
2601-2629 (Law. Co-op. 1982) [hereinafter cited as TSCA]; Solid Waste Disposal Act, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 6901-6987 (Law. Co-op. 1982); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 
U.S.C.S. §§ 4901-4918 (Law. Co-op. 1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 
300f-300j-10 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, as 
amended, 7 U.S.C.S. §§ 136-136y (Law. Co-op. 1980 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as FIFRA]; 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1261-1275 (Law. Co-op. 1982); Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 6201-6422 (Law. Co-op. 1982); Outer Continental 
Shelf Land Act, 43 U.S.C.S. § 1347 (Law. Co-op. 1980); 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1901-1911 (Law. Co-op. 
1982 Supp.) (ocean oil pollution); Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 
7101-7375 (Law. Co-op. 1982); Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 
8501-8541 (Law. Co-op. 1982); Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42 
U.S.C.S. §§ 7911-7942 (Law. Co-op. 1982); Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 
1962-1962d-18 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuary Act of 1972, 
as amended, 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 401-467(e) (Law. Co-op. 1980), and 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1431-1434 
(Law. Co-op. 1982 Supp.). See also W. RODGERS, supra note 155, at 822-34 (listing other 
substantive environmental laws which supplement NEP A). 
163. See, e.g., Mont. Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mont. 1977) (applying both the 
APA and the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act); NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (applying both the APA and the citizen suit provision of FWPCAA). Judicial review 
is available under the AP A and applicable substantive environmental laws, unless the substan-
tive laws are exclusive in their jurisdiction, see infra text and notes at 164-69, or unless there 
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nonexclusivity to be found in the judicial review provisions of such 
statutes as the Clean Air Act,164 the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act (FWPCA) (now the Clean Water Act as of amendment in 
1977),165 the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),166 the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),167 the Noise Control Act of 
1972,168 and the Safe Drinking Water Act. 169 Only the FWPCA has 
been amended to exclude most actions taken thereunder from the 
coverage of NEP A.170 In any event, the particular statute relied on 
is likely to be irrelevant in determining the proper scope and stand-
ards of review: Overton Park is said to have established for environ-
mental cases the appropriate level of judicial review, regardless of 
the specific statutes or reformulations relied on. l71 Nearly all cases 
cite Overton Park as authority. Because of this claimed uniformity 
one should be able to speak of a single level of judicial review for such 
cases without regard for the specific statutes being applied,172 
although this generalization does little to encompass the variety of 
characterizations given that level of review, as discussed in part 
III.C.5., below. 
4. Evolution of Judicial Review Standards 
Problems as to the proper standard of judicial review arose in the 
earliest environmental cases because of a lack of explicit provisions 
regarding judicial review and substantive inquiry.173 As a result, the 
exists another "adequate remedy in a court," 5 u.s.c.s. § 704 (Law. Co-op. 1980). See W. 
Penn. Power Co. v. Train, 538 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1976); GM 
Corp. v. Volpe, 321 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Del.), affd, 457 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1970). 
164. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7607(b) (Law. Co-op. 1982). See Harrison v. PPG Ind., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 
(1980). 
165. 33 U.S.C.S. § 1369(b) (Law. Co-op. 1980). 
166. 15 U.S.C.S. § 2618(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
167. 42 U.S.C.S. § 6976(1) (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
168. 42 U.S.C.S. § 4915(a) (Law. Co-op. 1982). 
169. 42 U.S.C.S. § 30Oj-7(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1978). 
170. See 33 U.S.C.S. § 1371(c) (Law. Co-op. 1980). 
171. Commentators suggest that the Overton Park case may have abolished any distinctions 
that may have existed between the substantial evidence level of review and the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review. See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the 
Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970). It is also suggested that 
NEP A may impose more stringent standards of review-or at least additional standards of 
review-than do those other statutes. W. RODGERS, supra note 155, at 716-17. 
172. This claimed uniformity in formulation of the appropriate scope and standards of 
judicial review does not mean that courts have uniformly applied those standards. In fact, 
courts have not uniformly applied those standards, particularly in cases involving models. See 
infra notes 198-205 and cases cited therein. Such nonuniformity cannot be explained by the 
differing statutes involved. 
173. See Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review under 
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level of judicial review for environmental decisions went through an 
evolutionary process, particularly during the first few years after 
the implementation of NEPA. Initially, review was limited to issues 
that were "solely procedural."174 As time passed, courts began to 
realize that it was necessary to engage in some level of substantive 
review. 175 
This evolution of the concept of substantive review was paralleled 
by the evolution of meanings of the phrases "arbitrary and capri-
cious" and "substantial evidence": the differences in the meanings 
of the phrases diminished over time. 176 These two standards of sub-
stantive review are contained in § 706 of the AP A which defines the 
scope of review to be applied under that Act. 177 The Supreme Court 
in Overton Park held that the substantial evidence test was to be ap-
NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REV. 735, 736 (1975) (citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as Least Adverse 
Alternative]; Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 449. 
174. See Least Adverse Alternative, supra note 173, at 735 n.2, 742-47; Wharton, Judicially 
Enforceable Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 415, 423-34 (1976); Note, The 
Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
782 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Agency Rulemaking Procedural Requirements]; Yarrington, 
Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D.L. REV. 279 (1974). 
175. See Least Adverse Alternative, supra note 173, at 735. 
176. See Comment, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed 
Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750 (1950). See also F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 3 (1973). 
177. The two so-called substantive review provisions of AP A are contained in sub-
paragraphs (2)(A) and (2)(E) of § 706 of the Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A), (2)(E), which states in 
full: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The 
reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 
557 of this title [5 U.S.C.S. §§ 556 and 557] or otherwise reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial 
de novo by the reviewing court. 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken ofthe rule of pre judi-
cial error. 
Id. § 706. 
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plied only in narrow, specifically limited situations, which the Court 
restricted to certain informal rulemaking proceedings or public ad-
judicatory hearings.178 As a general matter, the substantial evidence 
standard applies if an agency action (either an adjudication or a rule) 
is required by statute to be made on the record after an opportunity 
for an agency hearing.179 This substantial evidence test has been 
held applicable to some environmental decisions, such as cases in-
volving "scientific rulemaking"180 and permits issued under the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.181 Currently, 
however, there is little difference in review under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard and the substantial evidence test. 
178. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971). The Court said 
that "[r]eview under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency action is 
taken pursuant to rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act itself, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553 ... , or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 
556, 557 .... " [d. The substantial evidence test is sometimes known as the Universal Camera 
standard, as named after one of the earliest leading cases defining substantial evidence in the 
area of review of administrative decisions. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 
(1951). See generally Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 
HARV. L. REV. 1233 (1951). Some environmental cases involving scientific rulemaking have ap-
plied the substantial evidence test. See infra note 180 and cases cited therein. 
179. See, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 553(c) (rulemaking), 554(a) (adjudications) (Law. Co-op. 1980), both 
of which use the language "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportuni-
ty for an agency hearing." See also id. § 706(2)(E), quoted supra note 171, and § 556(d) (forbid-
ding the imposition of a sanction unless "supported by and in accordance with the reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence"). As the Supreme Court stated, "the basic requirement 
for substantial-evidence review" is that the relevant statute require a hearing "designed to 
produce a record that is to be the basis for agency action." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
180. See, e.g., EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82, 85, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Indus. Union 
Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974». The EDF opinion listed the characteristic of 
scientific rulemaking as involving extensive and often conflicting evidence, issues on the fron-
tier of scientific knowledge and limited knowledge and much uncertainty, thus necessitating a 
policy judgment by the agency. In EDF, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that 
the substantial evidence test required that EPA's conclusions must be such that, in light of all 
the evidence of the record as a whole, a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support 
the conclusion. 598 F.2d at 82. The court held that the agency must justify the rule by the 
"weight of the evidence." [d. at 90. Other courts have upheld the application of the substantial 
evidence rule to scientific rulemaking. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 106-07, 
109 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794,812 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(effluent limitations under FWPCA; most upheld, but some remanded for use of inapplicable 
data); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-27 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. v. 
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 31 & n.26, 43, 53 n.124 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) 
(upholding EPA's rejection of non-catalysts control technologies for automobile emissions). 
The United States Supreme Court has in dicta in a recent case endorsed this substantial evi-
dence standard for scientific rulemaking. See Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 655-56 n.62 (1980); accord, id. at 666-67 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment); id. at 706 (Marshall, Brennan, White, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). 
181. E.g., Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977). In that case, the Seventh Cir-
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Several recent cases by the United States Supreme Court may 
have cast doubt on the continued viability of substantive review 
under NEP A, 182 although Overton Park will likely continue to be 
cited as the standard for the judicial review of environmental deci-
sions. The problem will remain of extracting the appropriate scope 
and standards of judicial review for environmental decisions from 
the plethora of the descriptive phrases used by the courts to attempt 
to describe that standard of review. 
5. The Differing Reformulations of the Overton Park Standard of 
Review as Applied to Environmental Models 
The various reformulations or characterizations of the different 
aspects of the appropriate level of judicial review can be divided into 
three groups: (1) what to look for; (2) how deep to look; and (3) how 
far the decisionmaker should be permitted to stray from statutory 
standards before being returned. As stated in other terms, the first 
group of characterizations of the judicial review standard conceptu-
ally relates to an examination of the mental processes of the decision-
making agency. The second group of these characterizations at-
tempts to delineate the extent of the factual examination that a 
reviewing court should undertake, both within and outside of the 
record. The third group of those characterizations is composed of at-
tempts by courts to further describe the ultimate level of judicial 
review which is appropriate to maintain the proper relationship be-
tween the court and the administrative agency. 
a. The Mental Process Reformulations 
In the first group of characterizations of the standard of review 
are reformulations which examine the mental processes of the ad-
ministrative decisionmaker. This is not likely to be an examination of 
the mental processes of a real person, because under normal circum-
stances such mental processes cannot be inquired into.183 Courts ex-
amine the "whole record" 184 to ensure that the administrative deci-
cuit held that a permit should be classified as a license under the AP A, which would subject it 
to special review provisions under that Act. See 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 551(8), (9) and 558(c) (Law. Co-
op. 1980). But see Taylor v. District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 567 F.2d 1332, 
1337 (5th Cir. 1978) (the proper standard is whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion"). 
182. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
183. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
184. The "whole record" requirement of the APA rises from the final sentence of the 
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sionmaker has engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking" 185 and exer-
cised "reasoned discretion."186 The court will also look to ensure 
that there was a rational basis or reasoned scientific basis to substan-
tiate a "rational decision" 187 and that the agency has provided an 
adequate, satisfactory, or reasoned explanation for its decision.188 If 
such an explanation is not provided by the agency, the court will fur-
ther examine the whole record to see if a course of reasoning or 
review statute, which states that in making the determinations of arbitrariness, 
capriciousness, or the like, "the court shall review the whole record or those parts of its cited 
by a party .... " 5 U.S.C.S. § 706 (Law. Co-op. 1980). 
185. See, e.g., Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794,803,812 (9th Cir. 1980) (over-
turn if based on facts "entirely fictional or utterly without scientific support"); Bunker Hill v. 
EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1292 (6th Cir. 1977); Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123,132 (1st 
Cir. 1976) ("reasoned determination"); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), vacated as moot, 434 U.S. 809 (1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 
375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), eert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), afrd, 513 F.2d 506 (per curiam), eert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1092 (1976). 
186. See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286,1294 (9th Cir. 1977); Ethyl Corp. v. 
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 39 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), eert. denied, 426 U.S. 1 (1976); Duquesne Light Co. 
v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1192-93 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated 427 U.S. 903 (1976); Portland Cement 
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), eert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); 
affd, 513 F.2d 506 (per curiam), eert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 
1092 (1976); Buck County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805, 818 
(E.D. Pa. 1975). 
187. See, e.g., Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1980)("reasoned scien-
tific basis" and "scientific and technical basis"); BASF Wyandotte v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 
652 (1st Cir. 1977) (facts relied on have some basis in the record); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 
590 F.2d 1011, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150,1161 (6th 
Cir. 1978); Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 130 (1st Cir. 1976) ("informed 
judgment"); CPC Int'nl, Inc. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 1032, 1048-50 (8th Cir. 1975) (must explain 
bases); So. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 & n.5 (lstCir. 1974)(must be rationally 
supported); Amoco Oil v. EPA, 501 F.2d 702, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974); MAD v. Train, 400 F. 
Supp. 533, 563, 574 (D. Md. 1975) (reasonable conclusion in light of present science); id. at 564, 
574 (rational conclusion). 
188. See, e.g., PPG Ind., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1980); Asarco, Inc. v. 
EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1980) (satisfactory explanation); BASF Wyandotte Co. v. 
Costle, 598 F.2d 637,652 (1st Cir. 1979); Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1026, 1054 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (adequate explanation); No. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143, 1148 
(6th Cir. 1978). As the Sixth Circuit said in PPG, the court need not take the agency's word 
that the agency reasonably analyzed its data. 630 F.2d at 466; Bunker Hill v. EPA, 572 F.2d 
1286, 1297 (6th Cir. 1977) (adequate explanation; called the "usual standard"); Appalachian 
Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1356-57 (4th Cir. 1976); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 
981 (4th Cir. 1976) (adequate explanation); Hooker Chern. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 639 (2d Cir. 
1976) (adequate explanation); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1047 (3d Cir. 
1975) (must articulate the standards); CPC Int'nl, Inc. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 1032, 1048-50 (8th 
Cir. 1975) (must explain relevant factors and bases); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 
492, 507 n.20, 514-20, 529, 535-40 (8th Cir. 1975) (must give adequate reasons and explana-
tions); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 727, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (adequate reasons and ex-
planation). As the Sixth Circuit said in PPG, the court need not take the agency's word that 
the agency reasonably analyzed its data. 630 F.2d at 466. 
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course of inquiry can be discerned. l89 Courts also have a reasonable 
man standard for reviewing such technical decisions and making in-
ferences from the administrative record. l90 
Although there may be only subtle semantic differences amongst 
these phrases, and although the use of anyone phrase in the place of 
another may make no difference as to the ultimate outcome of the 
case, the phrases implicitly focus on differing aspects of the environ-
mental decision. The reasoned decisionmaking and rational basis 
reformulations of the standards appear to focus more on the factual 
portions of a decision, whereas the reasoned discretion and rational 
decision reformulations of the standard appear to focus more on the 
policy-type elements of a decision. 
The final mental process formulation of the review standard is the 
"relevant factors" statement of the review standard, which requires 
the decisionmaker to consider in good faith all relevant factors 
underlying the decision. l9l The relevant factors formulation appears 
to be the most substantive of the characterizations because it con-
notes a more searching review into the various elements (such as 
data and methodology) of the decision, rather than a broad overview 
189. See, e.g., Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153,1161 (9th Cir. 1980) (course of inquiry); 
BASF Wyandotte v. Costie, 598 F.2d 637, 651-52 (1st Cir. 1979) (explain process); Am. 
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 
F.2d 1027,1047 (3d Cir. 1975); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289,297 (5th Cir. 1974)(course of in-
quiry, analysis, and reasoning). Courts held that if the course of reasoning-though unstated-
can nonetheless be discerned to be proper then the decision should be upheld. E.g., Am. Iron & 
Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1047 (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight 
Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974». 
190. See, e.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637,647-48,651 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(quoting Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1978»; Coal. for 
Responsible Regional Develop. v. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1977) (rule of 
reason); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 237, 247 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (reasonably prepared reader); 
Conserv. Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 790 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (responsible ex-
ecutive). 
191. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1970); Asarco, 
Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980); BASF Wyandotte v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 
558-59 (1st Cir. 1978); Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 
Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1294 (9th Cir. 1977); No. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 
572 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1978); Coal. for Responsible Regional Develop. v. Coleman, 555 
F.2d 298,299-300 (4th Cir. 1977); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976); Hooker 
Chern. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 639 (2d Cir. 1976); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1186, 
1192-93 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 907 (1976); CPC Int'nl, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 
1048-50 (8th Cir. 1975) (must explain relevant factors); So. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 
646,655 (1st Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 296-97 (1st Cir. 1974); Life of the Land 
v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1974), em. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Conserv. 
Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 783 (M.D.N.C. 1977); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. 
Supp. 533, 541, 547, 572, 574 (D. Md. 1975). 
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of the reasoning used by the agency. Similarly, courts do not allow 
post hoc rationalizations of agency reasoning from these factors.192 
b. The Scope-of-Inquiry Characterizations 
The second category of formulations of the review standard at-
tempts to characterize the scope of the judicial review effort, in par-
ticular, the appropriate extent of factual inquiry. The most common 
formulations of the various scope formulations of the standard are 
those which require a "hard look" 193 or "substantial inquiry" 194 of 
the whole record. Other formulations of the standard require a 
"rigorous examination" of the decision195 and a "searching," "thor-
ough," "in-depth," "careful," or "probing" review thereof,196 al-
though the courts simultaneously note that their inquiry should be a 
narrow one.197 
c. The Ultimate-Review-Level Reformulations 
The third group of formulations of the standard describes the ulti-
mate level of judicial review. The most common formulation is that 
192. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. EPA, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1970); Colum-
bus & So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 910,912 (6th Cir. 1980); Bunker Hill v. EPA, 572 
F.2d 1286, 1292 (6th Cir. 1977); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 574 (D. Md. 1975). 
193. See, e.g., Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Proce-
dures, 422 U.S. 289, 322, 326 n.28 (1974) (dictum); Coal. for Responsible Regional Develop. v. 
Coleman, 555 F.2d 398, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1977); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 237, 247 (S.D. 
Ohio 1978); Conserv. Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 782 (M.D.N.C. 1977); 
Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805, 813, 818 (E.D. Pa. 
1975). 
194. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1970); Asarco, 
Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 
1028 (10th Cir. 1976); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 (5th Cir. 1974); Conserv. Council of 
N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 781-82 (M.D.N.C. 1977); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 
533, 573 (D. Md. 1975); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on 
other gnds. sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); Cape Henry Bird 
Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 410-11 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973). 
195. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1192-93 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 
427 U.S. 902 (1976). 
196. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 ("thorough, 
probing, in-depth review" and "searching and careful," though "narrow"); No. Ohio Lung 
Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1978) (searching and careful, though narrow); 
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 1976) (probing; more so than 
substantial evidence test); So. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974) (in-
quiries into facts to be searching and careful). 
197. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 437 U.S. 519, 550 (1977); 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1970); BASF Wyandotte v. 
Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641 (1st Cir. 1979) (strict procedural review, but narrow substantive 
review); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 579 F.2d 846, 854 (4th Cir. 1978); No. Ohio Lung 
Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1978) (searching and careful though narrow); 
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the decision cannot be arbitrary and capricious,198 which is the 
language used in the AP A 199 and the Clean Air Act.200 In addition, 
the courts will overturn an agency decision which embodies an 
"abuse of discretion," 201 which the courts appear to equate with the 
Coal. for Responsible Regional Develop. v. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1977); 
EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 300 n.17 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 921 
(1973), and authorities therein; Conserv. Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 782 
(M.D.N.C. 1977); Int'nl Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(Bazelon, J., concurring). The BASF court expressly affirmed the appropriateness of a narrow 
standard of substantive review where the case involves numerical and quantitative elements. 
See 598 F.2d at 644-45, 647-48. Vermont Yankee established the proposition that, although 
courts should apply a stringent review of procedural requirements under NEP A, courts are 
not free to impose additional procedural requirements beyond those provided in the AP A. See 
437 U.S. 519, 524-25, 545-48. 
198. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 n.8 (1979) 
(per curiam); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414, 416 (1970); Asar-
co, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1155, 1159-61 (9th Cir. 1980); Ohio Envt'l Council v. EPA, 593 
F.2d 24, 32 (6th Cir. 1979); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir. 
1978); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286,1294 (9th Cir. 1977) (SIP); Clev. Elec. Co. v. 
EPA, 572 F.2d 1150,1161 (6th Cir. 1978); No. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143, 1148 
(6th Cir. 1978) (SIP); Coal. for Responsible Regional Develop. v. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398, 
399-400 (4th Cir. 1977); Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128-29 (1st Cir. 1976)(SIP); 
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-35 and n.74, 37 and n.79(D.C. Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 941 (1976); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1123, 1135-36 and n.58 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), vacated as moot, 434 U.S. 809 (1977); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F .2d 1023, 1028 
(10th Cir. 1976) (by implication); Nat. Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 787 
(D.C. Cir. 1976); City of Santa Rosa v. EPA, 534 F.2d 150, 154 (9th Cir. 1976); NRDC v. EPA, 
529 F.2d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 1976) (SIP); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149-53 
and n.16 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 
F.2d 1027,1047 (3d Cir. 1975); Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1975); 
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F .2d 1186, 1192, 1199 (3d Cir. 1975) (SIP), vacated on other 
gnds, 427 U.S. 902; CPC Int'nl, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1044 (8th Cir. 1975); So. Ter-
minal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,655 (1st Cir. 1974); Amoco Oil Company v. EPA, 501 F.2d 
727, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 296-97, 299 n.13, 301, 306, 308, 
313-15,318 (5th Cir. 1974); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 469 (9th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (clearly insufficient weight to environmental values); Del. 
Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Admin., 480 F.2d 972, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1973); Evans v. Train, 460 
F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Ohio v. EPA, 460 F. Supp. 248, 254 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Conserv. 
Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 781-82, 792 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Mid-Shiawassee 
County Concerned Citizens v. Train, 408 F. Supp. 650, 653 (rejecting the reasonableness 
standard), 660 (D. Mich. 1976); Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96, 98-99 (S.D. 
Iowa 1976); Mont. Wildlife Fed. v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 489, 490 (D. Mont. 1976); Buck's 
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805, 812-13 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 
MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 547 (D. Md. 1975) (demonstrably capricious); Cape Henry 
Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 409 (W.D. Va.), affd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973); Con-
cerned about Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
199. 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1980). 
200. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1982), which applies to such actions by EPA 
as rules, regulations, or SIP's. This subparagraph (d) implies that review under the subpara-
graph (A) arbitrary and capricious standard is substantive because it contains a separate provi-
sion for overturning arbitrary or capricious procedural errors. 
201. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414, 416 (1970); 
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AP A standard. Courts recite that they defer to the decision of the 
agency to ensure that the court not risk substituting its judgment for 
that of the agency. 202 One phrase sometimes used speaks in terms of 
ensuring a "minimal level of meaningful review." 203 As discussed 
further below, this latter phrase of a minimal level of meaningful 
review best describes the most appropriate level of judicial review. 
Although the cases do not make the differentiation, the language 
of arbitrariness or capriciousness is most often used for the review of 
factual elements and bases of a decision, whereas the abuse of discre-
tion standard is most often applied to portions of a decision which en-
tail discretionary, policy-type aspects of the decision. This conclusion 
is supported by the language of the AP A and the Clean Air Act, both 
BASF Wyandotte v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641, 644, 648, 652 (1st Cir. 1979); Ohio Envt'l 
Coun. v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24, 32 (6th Cir. 1979); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 
1024-25,1053,1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Clev. Elec. Illum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1161 
(6th Cir. 1978); No. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. 
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,34 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), eert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Del. Citizens for 
Clean Air, Inc. v. Admin., 480 F.2d 972, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1973); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 
237,241 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Ohio v. EPA, 460 F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Bucks County 
Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 808, 812-13 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
202. For instances of judicial deference see, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 255 
(1976); Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 87 (1975); BASF Wyandotte Co. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 
637,655 (1st Cir.1979), and cases cited therein, id. at 647; EDF v. EPA, 598F.2d 62, 80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978); Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Indus. Union Dep't v. 
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,474-75 n.18 (1974). The decision is entitled to a "presumption of regu-
larity." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1970); Am. Iron & 
Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1047 (3d Cir. 1975); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 
1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1975); So. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(discretion to choose is EPA's). See also infra text and notes at notes 225-48 dealing with the 
bases for this judicial deference to agencies' decisions. 
Courts are sensitive to the need to accord legislative-like decisions of agencies a strong 
presumption of validity and regularity. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1977); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
416 (1970), Alaska v. Andrews, 580 F.2d 465,473-74 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Clev. Elec. Illum. Co. v. 
EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1161 (6th Cir. 1978); No. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143,1148 
(6th Cir. 1978); Coal. for Responsible Develop. v. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398, 399-400 (4th Cir. 
1977); Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 129 (1st Cir. 1976); Duquesne Light Co. v. 
EPA, 526 F.2d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1975) (not "substitute its evaluation"); So. Terminal Corp. 
v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974); Bucks CountyBd. ofComm'rs v. Interstate Energy 
Co., 403 F. Supp. 805, 812-13 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Conserv. Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. 
Supp. 775, 782 (M.D.N.C. 1977). One court has noted that courts must "substitute their judg-
ment" for that of the decisionmaker in some aspect of the environmental decision. Asarco, Inc. 
v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980). 
203. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 498 F.2d 299, 321-22 (5th Cir.1974)(Clark, Boyle, JJ., concur-
ring). See also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1063 (3d Cir. 1975); EDF v. 
Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123,1138-40 (5th Cir. 1974); Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 
F.2d 123, 131 (1st Cir. 1976) (not "clearly wrong"); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74 
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc), eert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 
492, 507 n.20, 514-20, 529, 535-40 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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of which use the phrase "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre-
tion."204 The logical conclusion to be drawn from this language is 
that the different words were inserted by Congress to express differ-
ent approaches to substantive review by the courts. This semantic 
distinction is important in environmental decisions, especially those 
involving models, where fact and policy are inextricably intertwined, 
because a court's use of emphasis of one formulation over another 
reflects the part of the decision-fact or policy-which the court ex-
amined. The other ultimate level characterizations of the appropriate 
level of review is that the decision not be "clearly erroneous," or in-
volve "clear error" or "clear errors of judgment." 205 
D. Problems Presented to the Reviewing Court by the 
Use of Environmental Models 
As discussed in Part III.B., above, the use of environmental 
models creates a number of problems for the administrative decision-
maker which are carried forward as added difficulties for a review-
ing court. Additionally, there are aspects of the institutions of the en-
vironmental agencies and the courts and their relationship that fur-
ther contribute to the difficulties of judicial review in cases relying 
on environmental models, thereby making them "hard cases" to 
review.206 Such institutional problems include the self-perceived lack 
of scientific expertise on the part of judges, the lack of judicial access 
to technical resources to assist in the analysis of the technical issues 
involved in such decisions, the limits on the court's ability to supple-
ment or go outside the record, and the traditional deference which 
the courts give to administrative decisions. 
1. Judges' Lack of Scientific Expertise 
One problem in attempting to find an appropriate level of judicial 
review for environmental decisions is the limited scientific training 
or expertise of judges hearing the case, whether such limit is actual 
204. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2XA) (Law. Co-op. 1980); Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 7607(b), (c), (d) (Law. Co-op. 1980). 
205. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1970); Weyer-
hauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 
1286,1294 (9th Cir. 1977); No. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143,1148 (6th Cir. 1978); 
Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 434 U.S. 809 
(1977); So. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 544 F.2d 646,655,662-67 (1st Cir. 1974); Conserv. Council 
of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 782, 792-97 (M.D.N.C. 1977); MAD v. Train, 400 F. 
Supp. 533, 541, 547, 570, 572, 574 (D. Md. 1975). 
206. Kramer, supra note 5, at 264. 
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or merely perceived. Judges often note that the issues involved in 
such cases are beyond the limits of their training or expertise,207 and 
usually refer to themselves as "generalists." 208 The review of en-
vironmental decisions involving the use of computer models is par-
ticularly difficult for the typical judge, who "looks at the prospect of 
manipulating a computer program with undisguised terror." 209 In 
order to engage in a minimal level of meaningful judicial review, 
however, it is necessary for judges to acquire a reasonable level of 
understanding of the state of scientific knowledge upon which a deci-
sion is based.210 
2. Judges' Lack of Access to Scientific Resources 
Related to the problem of the judges' lack of scientific expertise is 
their lack of access to adequate scientific resources. Courts have 
noted that they do not yet have access to scientific aids.211 In similar 
cases courts have also noted that they could have made good use of 
the services of a special master in sorting out the voluminous records 
and technical issues involved,212 although this problem may have 
been alleviated, at least in part, by the recent passage of the 
207. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 688, 705-06 (Mar-
shall, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("Courts are ill-equipped to resolve" such issues in-
volving a "high level of technical complexity" involving the judges "in matters to which they 
are unaccustomed by training or experience"); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 
637,648 (1st Cir. 1979) Gudges are not lab technicians and "cannot play the role of Superchem-
ist"); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 Gudges generally are not trained as chemists, biolo-
gists, or statisticians) (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc); id. at 66-67 & n.7 (Bazelon, C.J., and 
McGowan, J., concurring) ("substantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by 
technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable," resulting in "homespun scientific 
aphorisms"); id. at 70, 104-10, 110 (Wilkey, Jamuss, Robb, JJ., dissenting) Gudges' lack of 
scientific background or access to expertise, such as court-appointed expert); Duquesne Light 
Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 427 U.S. 902 (1975) (ex-
pertise to assimilate and understand all of the technical information underlying clean-up 
technology assessment); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 306-08 nn.27, 30 (5th Cir. 1974) (ap-
plicability of data derived from industries is complex matter "beyond our ken, absent the 
assistance of the parties"); Int'nl Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 622, 645 n.112 
(Court's lack of understanding might relate to the judges' lack of scientific training), 647-48 
(complexity of the technical matters involved) (D.C. Cir. 1973); id. at 650-52 (Bazelon, C.J., 
concurring) (court's lack of scientific knowledge). See also infra cases cited in notes 230, 231. 
208. See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. 
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68-69 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976). 
209. Delaware River Factjinding, supra note 14, at 428; accord, id. at 496; Leventhal, 
supra, note 1, at 511-12,532. See also Int'nl Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 647 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). 
210. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 507 n.20 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
211. See Int'nl Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
212. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289,307-08 n.30 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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Magistrate's Act.213 The courts have already made use of appointed 
experts to assist them in the evaluation of voluminous, technical evi-
dence.214 
3. Voluminous Records 
In reviewing environmental decisions judges are also often pre-
sented with a record which is either so voluminous215 or so meager216 
as not to be useful. Frequently, the record is unclear and badly 
organized as well.217 The courts have attempted to deal with the 
problems by methods such as the use of condensed or technical ap-
pendices.218 As will be discussed below, the use of such condensed 
reports is not only indicative of the complexity of such cases, it ac-
tually serves to preclude a meaningful level of review by masking 
basic flaws in methodology by simplifying results. 
4. Judges' Inability to Supplement the Record 
A related problem is the lack of flexibility given to judges in supple-
menting and going outside the record. Normally, courts are confined 
to examining the administrative record before the decisionmaker at 
the time of the decision.219 Nevertheless, reviewing courts have 
acknowledged that it is proper to go outside of the record to examine 
the decisionmaking methodologies used, "especially when highly 
213. See supra note 3. See also Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 779 (1975). Judge Leventhal's seminal article in 1974 took the form of much of 
the earlier approaches to environmental decisionmaking in techno-environmental cases. See 
Leventhal, supra, note 1. 
214. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,104-05 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 941 (1976) (citing Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc». 
215. See, e.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 646 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(2,OOO-page record and three briefings); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91,121,126 n.63, 129 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("loosely organized rulemaking record of enormous detail and staggering com-
plexity-thousands of pages of highly technical testimony"); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 
(5th Cir. 1974) ("the record's length is on the order of 10,000 pages, and is both technical and 
poorly organized"); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 468 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1964) (record of 2,000 pages of technical material). This problem with 
the record on review parallels the similar problem fixed by the administrative decisionmakers 
of voluminous and loosely organized records. See supra text and notes at notes 141-50. 
216. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289,303 n.20, 304 n.23, 308 n.31, 321-22 (5th Cir. 
1974) (Clark, Boyle, JJ., concurring). 
217. See, e.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637,658 (1st Cir. 1979); Mision 
Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 126 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 303 
n.21 (5th Cir. 1974). 
218. See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1295 n.16 (9th Cir. 1977); Clev. Elec. 
IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1163 (6th Cir. 1978); Int'nl Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 
F.2d 615, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
219. See Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1980). The Asarco court, in 
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technical matters are involved." 220 This examination beyond the 
review record may sometimes be necessitated by the normal inability 
of the reviewing court to examine the mental process by which the 
decisionmaker reached his decision,221 although such inquiry may be 
permitted under certain rare circumstances for "effective judicial 
review."222 Reviewing courts at present have no ability to gather 
any necessary extra facts on their own, although the passage of the 
Magistrates Act223 may have alleviated this problem, at least in part. 
Additionally, the first court that reviews many environmental deci-
sions is the circuit court of appeals, with no intermediate court be-
tween it and the administrative decisionmaker to help alleviate this 
paucity of facts by a remand for further factfinding. 224 Further, the 
courts usually have no staff to assist them in the gathering or analy-
sis of the facts when analyzing the problem.225 
discussing Overton Park noted that the reviewing court is permitted to go outside the record, 
because: 
[a] satisfactory explanation of agency action is essential for adequate judicial review, 
because the focus of judicial review is not on the wisdom of the agency's decision, but 
on whether the process employed by the agency to reach its decision took into consid-
eration all relevant factors. 
[J]udicial consideration of evidence relevant to the substantive merits of the agency 
action but not included in the administrative record raises fundamentally different 
concerns. When a reviewing court considers evidence that was not before the agency, 
it inevitably leads the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the agen-
cy. This is true even if such judicial review is not strictly de novo in the sense that the 
court also considers the administrative record. Nevertheless, . . . it is both 
unrealistic and unwise to 'straightjacket' the reviewing court with the administrative 
record. It will often be impossible, especially when highly technical matters are in-
volved, for the court to determine whether the agency took into consideration all rele-
vant factors unless it looks outside the record to determine what matters the agency 
should have considered but did not. The court cannot adequately discharge its duty to 
engage in a 'substantial inquiry' if it is required to take the agency's word that it con-
sidered all relevant matters. 
616 F.2d at 1159-60. Accord Cin. Gas and Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660,664 (6th Cir. 1978); 
Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 473 n.14 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 
(1974); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495,506-08 (4th Cir. 1973). 
220. See, e.g., Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1980). Accord, Du-
quesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir.), vacated on other gnds, 427 U.S. 902 
(1975); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 (5th Cir. 1974). 
221. "Possibly barring fraud and other extreme circumstances, the mental process by which 
the Administrator reaches his decision, if it is explained in the record, is not a proper subject 
for discovery." So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,675 (1st Cir. 1974) (citing United States v. 
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)). 
222. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (citing 
Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955)). 
223. See supra text at note 3. 
224. E.g., So. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 665 (1st Cir. 1974). 
225. See, e.g., Leventhal, supra note 1; Whitney, The Casefor Creating a Special Environ-
mental Court Syste:m-A Further Comment, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (1973). 
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5. Judicial Deference to Administrative Expertise 
A final problem presented to a court reviewing an environmental 
decision arises from the legal doctrine which requires courts to defer 
to agency expertise. This doctrine of deference is more than simply a 
formulation of one aspect of the appropriate scope and standards of 
judicial review. 226 As found in the relevant statutes,227 it also reflects 
the judicial policy decision to maintain the proper relationship and 
role of the reviewing court vis-a-vis the administrative agency. Two 
sources of the court's deference to administrative decisions have 
already been mentioned: (1) the comparative scientific expertise of 
the administrative decisionmaker and the reviewing judge;228 and (2) 
the complex, technical nature of the environmental subject matter 
being reviewed.229 Additional justifications for the judicial deference 
accorded administrative decisions in environmental law are adminis-
trative convenience and the discretion which must be accorded ad-
ministrative decisionmakers to deal with the problems of environ-
mental pollution. These four bases for judicial deference to ad-
ministrative decisions are briefly discussed further below. 
Traditionally, reviewing courts justify judicial deference to 
administrative decisions based on the demonstrated or presumed ex-
pertise of the administrative agency, 230 as well as the judges' percep-
tion of their own lack of expertise. 231 As previously discussed, how-
ever, the administrative decisionmakers may not be as "expert," nor 
226. Compare supra cases cited at note 202. 
227. See supra statutes cited at notes 160-69, 199, 200. 
228. Compare supra text and note at note 135 (dealing with the scientific expertise of the 
administrative decisionmakers), with text and notes at notes 207-09 (dealing with the scientific 
expertise of judges). 
229. See supra text and notes at notes 130-34 (relating to the complicated nature of the 
sciences involved in environmental decisionmaking); text and notes at notes 110-14 (relating to 
the need to apply even more sophisticated scientific methodologies to the problem of environ-
mental pollution). 
230. See, e.g., Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123,127,129 (1st Cir. 1976) (rebuttable 
presumption of regularity, based on use of a computer model involved "an area where EPA's 
'expertise is heavily implicated' ") (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 434 U.S. 809 (1977); FMC 
Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 986 (4th Cir. 1976) (choice of statistical methodologies up to 
EPA); AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See supra note 202 (cases 
cited for proposition that agencies are entitled to deference on review). 
231. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 22528 (per curiam), 
228,229-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 
435 U.S. 519 (1978); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (deferring to 
EPA's choice of scientific test data); EDF v. EPA, 590 F.2d 62,78 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (court must 
venture into the realm of science to decide issues); Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 
1024-25 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ensuring scientific evidence supports conclusions drawn); id. 
at 1026 n.13 Gudges' lack of scientific training); id. at 1031 (notwithstanding lack of training, 
judges cannot ignore errors); Cin. Gas and Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 
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the judges so lacking in expertise, as to justify more than a minimal 
amount of judicial deference. This is particularly true for environ-
mental decisions based on computer models and other mathematical 
methodologies, which will likely involve the use of experts.232 A re-
viewing court is no less able than an administrative agency to com-
municate with the experts involved in the environmental decision (in-
cluding the modeling experts) and to evaluate independently the 
work and conclusions of those experts if the reviewing court feels the 
case so demands, although this statement must be qualified some-
what.233 
The second source of the courts' institutional deference to environ-
mental decisions is the complex nature of the environmental decision 
and its underlying bases, such as a model. 234 It is necessarily a risky 
and uncertain business to use modeling projections to make and 
justify an environmental decision.235 This uncertainty is exacerbated 
by a lack of sufficient monitoring and laboratory data236 to justify a 
1977) Oack of expertise in a technical subject and a limited authority, but nonetheless remand-
ing for lack of reasoned discretion); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th 
Cir. 1976); Nat. Asphalt Paving Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 783-86 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Am. 
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1047, 1050, 1055, 1075-77 (3d Cir. 1975)(Adams, J., 
concurring); Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1975); Reserve Mining Co. 
v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,507 n.20 (8th Cir. 1975); Soc. of Plastics Ind. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 
1308 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (deferred to agency for new science); So. Ter-
minal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655-56; Int'nl Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 
647-49, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the result). See also supra cases 
cited at notes 207, 230. 
232. See supra text and notes at notes 135-40. 
233. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.S. § 706 (Law. Co-op. 1980), which provides for judicial review of "the 
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party." The Supreme Court has formulated this 
whole record test generally to limit review to the administrative record already in existence, 
and not some new record made initially in the reviewing court. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 
142 (1973) (decisionmaker's failure to adequately explain his decision "is not a deficiency in 
factfinding procedures such as to warrant the de novo hearing ordered in this case"). By con-
trast, where the factual record is inadequate, or where no record is made, the court may sup-
plement the administrative record by obtaining "from the agency, either by affidavits or 
testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove 
necessary." Id. at 143. Under the APA, where the agency's decision arises out of an adjudica-
tory proceeding but is based on inadequate factfinding procedures and is thus "unwarranted 
by the facts," 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(F), the court may engage in de novo review of the decision 
and its underlying data. There are also specific statutory provisions allowing the introduction 
of additional evidence in the review of certain environmental decisions by a party desiring to 
do so. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. § 7607(c) (Law. Co-op. 1981); 33 U.S.C.S. § 1369(c) (Law. Co-op. 
1980); 15 U.S.C.S. § 2618(b) (Law. Co-op. 1982); 42 U.S.C.S. § 6976(2) (Law. Co-op. 1982); 42 
U.S.C.S. § 4915(b) (Law. Co-op. 1982); 42 U.S.C.S. § 300j-7(c) (Law. Co-op. 1981). These stat-
utes only allow such showings at the request of a party and do not grant any power to the court 
to do so on its own motion. 
234. See supra text and notes at notes 130-34. 
235. See supra text and notes at notes 106-21. 
236. See supra text and notes at notes 125-29. 
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decision to a scientific certainty.237 In such an apparently arcane 
area judges are even more willing to defer to the administrator: the 
correlation appears to be, the more complex or technical the subject, 
the more likely judges are to defer any in-depth review, at least in 
the area of the cases reviewed in this article. 
The third basis for judicial deference to administrative decisions 
is based on considerations of administrative convenience.238 Courts 
are not equipped to attempt to manage environmental problems and 
237. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
941 (1976) (distinguishing between scientific and legal certainty and scientific and legal facts). 
In his opinion, Judge Wright stated that it is inherent in the nature of legal factfinding that the 
decisionmaker does not have to rely solely on proved scientific fact, which he defined as one 
that "is at least 95 percent certain," that is, a fact that a scientist will certify that "the proba-
bility of error, by standard statistical measurement, is less than 5 percent." [d. Environmental 
decisionmaking agencies must operate under a flexible decisionmaking standard that will 
allow the agency "to assess risk, to measure probabilities [and] to make subjective 
judgments." [d. Judge Wright stated that courts have at least the same factfinding powers as 
a jury, particularly when they are engaged in rulemaking and contrasted this with the "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal law, which he observed may demand a scientific-like 
95 percent certainty. [d. Judge Wright stated that the decisionmaker "may apply his expertise 
to draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely substantiated, relationships between 
facts, from trends among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, from proba-
tive preliminary data not yet certifiable as 'fact: and the like." [d. at 28. 
The deferential standard of proof arose, at least in part, out of a particular language of the 
"will endanger" language of the applicable provision of the Clean Air Act. Judge Wright also 
based the deferential non-scientific fact standard on the nature of the problems underlying 
techno-environmental decisions where "questions are particularly prone to uncertainty," and 
where "speculation, conflicts in evidence, and theoretical extrapolation typify their very ac-
tion." [d. Judge Wright extended his deferential standard in the environmental field to other 
cases involving scientific and technological issues similar to those involved in techno-environ-
mental decisions, the characteristics of which are that they are (1) based on a statute that is 
"precautionary in nature" or "mandatory in its command to act;" (2) based on a statute that is 
designed to protect the public health; (3) is necessarily based upon evidence that is "difficult to 
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific nature;" and (4) the 
decision is made by an "expert administrator." [d. at 24 & nn. 56, 57. In such cases, Judge 
Wright states that legal proof is less rigorous than scientific proof, and that in such cases the 
courts "will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect." [d. 
238. E.g., Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91,116 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upheld EPA's approach 
to the problem as a rational, reasonable compromise based on "administrative convenience"). 
See also id. at 106-10; Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F .2d 794, 812 (9th Cir. 1980); BASF 
Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 644, 654, 655-56, 659-61 (1st Cir. 1979); EDF v. 
EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 68 n.17, 72-73, 78-80, 85, 88, 89 n.l00 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 
541 F.2d 1, 37, 49 n.102, 104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 
660-664-66 (6th Cir. 1978); Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 
1978); NRDC v. EPA, 529 F.2d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 1976); Ohio v. EPA, 460 F. Supp. 248, 251 
(S.D. Ohio 1978); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 233, 244 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Conserv. Council of 
N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775, 783, 791-92 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Mid-Shiawassee County 
Concerned Citizens v. Train, 408 F. Supp. 650, 656-60 (D.C. Mich. 1976); Buck County v. Del. 
River Basin Comm'n, 403 F. Supp. 805, 818-19 (E.D. Pa. 1975); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 
533, 538-40, 547-55, 559-68, 570-72, 574 (D. Md. 1975); EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 358 F. 
Supp. 916, 927-30 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). 
300 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:251 
are, thus, wary of interfering with the work of existing environ-
mental agencies. This institutionally based deference has been used 
to overlook such administrative errors as the use of an uncalibrated 
model,239 insufficient data,240 and the use of a questionable meth-
odology.241 
The fourth source of institutional judicial discretion accorded to 
environmental decisions is the omnipresence of policy questions in 
such decisions.242 These policy questions involved in environmental 
decisions are "legislative-type judgments,"243 which "are not sus-
ceptible to the same type of identification or refutation by reference 
to the record as are some factual questions." 244 The factual issues in-
volved in environmental decisions "are frequently not subject to any 
definitive resolution."245 In such decisions, the policy judgments are 
inextricably intertwined with factual issues surrounding the deci-
sionmaking methodologies, thus making it difficult to determine 
what is properly reviewable by the court and what is non-
reviewable.246 Policy judgments are intertwined, both because of the 
239. E.g., Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128-29 (1st Cir. 1976). 
240. E.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1054 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Nat. 
Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Int'nl Harvester v. 
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 624-26, 642-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
241. E.g., Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
242. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that such 
decisions on the frontiers of scientific knowledge involve "a quintessential policy judgment 
within the EPA's discretion"). See also Superior Oil Co. v. FERC, 563 F.2d 191, 201 (5th Cir. 
1977) (areas of new scientific knowledge necessarily involve greater policy choices); Nat'l 
Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775,783 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Soc. of Plastics Ind. v. 
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (new scientific area 
requires greater policymaking deference); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 494, 507 n.20 
(8th Cir. 1975); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1975). 
243. See, e.g., So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,680 n.37 (1st Cir. 1974). Accord, Ethyl 
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 20-21 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
244. Ind. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 449 F.2d 467,475 (1974), quoted in Nat. Asphalt Pave-
ment Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
245. Ind. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Marshall, Brennan, 
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). In that dissent, Justice Marshall quoted Mr. Justice Clark's state-
ment that in such cases, "[ojften 'the factual finger points, it does not conclude.' " [d. (quoting 
Soc. of Plastics Ind., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 
(1975». 
246. As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals: 
Looking to the future, and commanded by Congress to make policy, a rule-making 
agency necessarily deals less with 'evidentiary' disputes, than with normative con-
flicts, projections from imperfect data, experiments and simulations, educated predic-
tions, differing assessments of possible risks, and the like. The process is quasi-legis-
lative in character, and one will search it in vain for those intermediate 'findings' of 
fact which mark the midway point in an adjudicator's linear march from raw evidence 
to single, ultimate conclusion. 
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lack of adequate data underlying those decisions,247 as well as by the 
recognition that environmental decisions often involve technologies 
and methodologies on the "frontiers of scientific knowledge." 248 
A great deal of discretionary authority is normally granted by 
statute to agencies making environmental decisions. Under the 
legislative history of the APA, if a statute is "drawn in such broad 
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply. . . ," then there 
is only limited review under the APA.249 Under section 701 of the 
AP A, that Act does not apply to the extent that the statute under 
which the decision is made precludes judicial review or the agency 
action is committed to agency discretion by law. 250 If a decision is 
committed to agency discretion under section 702 of the AP A, 
judicial review is not precluded entirely, but still exists only for an 
abuse of discretion or fundamental jurisdictional or constitutional 
problems.251 Moreover, if Congress attempts to delegate too much 
discretionary authority in such environmental decisions, the United 
States Supreme Court has intimated that such an attempt would be 
unconstitutiona1.262 Thus, the discretion that can be accorded to en-
Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 772, 734-35 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoted in So. Terminal v. EPA, 
504 F.2d 646, 655 n.6 (1st Cir. 1974). 
247. See supra text and notes at notes 141-50. 
248. See, e.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637,644-45 (1st Cir. 1979); Her-
cules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91,106,108 (D.C. Cir. 1978); EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d 662, 82 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 26 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976); Soc. of the Plastics Ind. v. 
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 
499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
249. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. 
REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)). The Supreme Court called this exemption from 
judicial review a "very narrow exception." [d. Accord, Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859; Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 
1977), reh'g denied, 560 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978); Ariz. Power Auth. v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231 
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835; Ariz. Power Pooling Assn. v. Morton, 527 F.2d 721 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911. 
250. 5 U.S.C.S. § 701(a) (Law. Co-op. 1980). There have been several environmental deci-
sions precluding review of discretionary decisions. E.g., Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus, 362 F. 
Supp. 360, 366 (W.D. Ky.), affd, 497 F.2d 1171 (6th Cir.), affd, 462 U.S. 167. However, envi-
ronmental statutes have not been construed to delegate such discretion so as to preclude 
review. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); EDF 
v. Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Army, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); McDowell v. Schlesing-
er, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975). Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). 
251. If the action is committed to agency discretion, judicial review is precluded only to the 
extent that such discretion exists. Jones v. Freeman, 400 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1968). 
Review is still available for arbitrariness or for an abuse of discretion. See supra cases cited at 
notes 200, 201. 
252. See Ind. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 664 n.l (1980) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and in judgment) (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
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vironmental agencies is limited, despite the apparently broad 
legislative delegation of authority which is granted in practice. 
Cases involving challenges to environmental models take the form 
of allegations of insufficient underlying evidence. The cases normal-
ly raise questions of (1) whether the model from the evidence ade-
quately supports the decision; or (2) whether the evidence used in the 
model justifies the model's use. Oftentimes, the cases involve both 
questions. The cases involving the Clean Air Act form the largest 
body of case law concerning environmental models, particularly com-
puter models. The cases involve the use of those models (1) to estab-
lish emission limitations as a part of a State Implementation Plan 
(SIP) (a State Implementation Plan is the method by which a state 
implements the Clean Air Act); and (2) to designate nonattainment 
areas within the state. Although there have been opinions from the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, the 
largest body of case law comes out of the Sixth Circuit. The eleven 
cases which have come out of the Sixth Circuit to date are all con-
cerned with the Ohio SIP and form a virtual treatise on the use of 
models in implementation plans. These Sixth Circuit opinions will be 
treated separately from the cases from other circuits. 
Allegations of insufficient underlying evidence in such environ-
mental decisions do not often succeed because of the deference ac-
corded to such decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard 
applied to them,253 as contrasted with the more deferential substan-
tial evidence and "rule of reason" or reasonableness254 tests. As seen 
below, cases involving challenges to models often bifurcate the 
discussion by discussing separately the alleged errors in the method-
ology of the model and the data used in the model. Nonetheless, both 
the modeling results and the data used in the model constitute 
"evidence" to justify the administrative decision. The fundamental 
questions on judicial review are simply the proper scope of review 
(how far the court should inquire into alleged errors in modeling 
methodology or data used in the model) and standards of review (to 
what extent the court should overlook apparent errors in the under-
lying data or modeling results). Again, this question of the proper 
495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935». Accord, 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in the judgment). 
253. See supra cases cited at notes 200, 20l. 
254. See, e.g., EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82-83 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(citing FCC v. Nat'l Citizens 
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 755 (1978»; United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 
822,833 (7th Cir. 1977) (NPDES permit); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1028 
(10th Cir. 1976) (differentiating Overton Park's probing standard from Universal Camera's 
substantial evidence standard). 
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scope and standards of judicial review, as it relates to environmental 
models, can be reduced to an evaluation of whether valid underlying 
evidence sufficient to uphold the decision has been produced. 
At present, the amount of evidence required to uphold such a deci-
sion is comparatively small in light of the complexity of the subject 
matter. There is authority, however, that environmental models may 
be successfully challenged based on a showing of insufficient valid 
evidence and data to underlie the decision.255 These cases, along with 
numerous others where substantial but unsuccessful challenges were 
raised to models, are discussed below to illustrate the varying scopes 
and standards of review applied to the evaluation of environmental 
models. 
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF AGENCY USE OF MODELS 
UNDER ESTABLISHED STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Cases involving environmental models can be broken down into 
four categories. The first category is comprised of cases involving 
emission standards and nonattainment designations under the Clean 
Air Act. The second category of cases deals with the use of models in 
the creation of an impact statement under NEP A. The third cate-
gory of cases consists of regulations promulgated on the basis of the 
models; these include regulations under the Clean Air Act, 
FWPCAA, TSCA, OSHA, and other environmental statutes. The 
fourth category involves more adjudicatory-type cases, such as those 
involving permits and licenses under the various environmental 
statutes listed in the preceding category. Because computer models 
have been more extensively used and judicially reviewed in the Clean 
Air Act and NEP A cases, this paper will limit its discussion to those 
two categories. 
255. See, e.g., Ind. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 622 n.16, 652-53, 656 
(1980); Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1980) (EPA failed to show struc-
tural deficiencies in the stack and failed to show how the new particulates were being formed 
in the stack); Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 815 (9th Cir. 1980); Appalachian 
Power Co. v. EPA, 579 F.2d 846, 854 (4th Cir. 1973); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 
1299 n.26, 301, 1301 and n.31 (9th Cir. 1977); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 
1365 (4th Cir. 1976); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1038 (10th Cir. 1976); 
Hooker Chern. and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir. 1976); Am. Iron & Steel 
Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1062-63 (3d Cir. 1975); id., at 1073, 1076-77 (Adams, J., concur-
ring); So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 663 (1st Cir. 1974); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 45 
F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Intn'l Harvester Co. v. 
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,641-49 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 
495, 506-07 (4th Cir. 1973); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 588-89 
(E.D. Mich. 1975). 
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A. Emission Limitations And Nonattainment Designations 
Under The Clean A ir Act 
One of the earliest cases that closely evaluates the use of models in 
environmental decisionmaking is the case of Texas v. EPA ,256 which 
remains perhaps the leading case in the area. In Texas v. EPA, the 
Fifth Circuit upheld EPA's rejection of the SIp257 proposed by 
Texas, and upheld the substitute SIP promulgated by EPA to 
achieve the necessary reduction in hydrocarbon (HC) emission to 
achieve the ambient air quality standard for photochemical oxidants 
(i.e., smog) mandated by the Clean Air Act.258 Although the court 
upheld EPA's use of a straight rollback model,259 the court held that 
the agency's application of the model was defective by virtue of its 
use of incorrect data, assumptions, and adjustment factors.260 Con-
sequently, the court held invalid certain parts of EPA's plan and 
delayed implementation of other portions pending further considera-
tion by the agency.261 Significantly, the court in several instances 
performed its own calculations. Based on those calculations, the 
court established its own requirements based on the figures gener-
ally most favorable to Texas' position. 262 
256. 499 F.2d 289 (1974). The Second Circuit had earlier overturned EPA's refusal of New 
York's SIP, although EPA had used a computer diffusion model which was more sophisticated 
than the state's rollback model. NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974). Because EPA 
failed to explain its actions, the court rejected EPA's conclusions as "unpersuasive and unreal-
istic." Id. at 526. 
257. Implementation plans are required under § 7410 of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 7410 (Law. Co-op. 1982). The EPA Administrator is directed by § 7410(a)(2) to disapprove 
the plan if he finds it will not assure the attainment of national ambient air quality standards. 
258. 499 F.2d at 301. The EPA's use of this modeling method made the court uneasy even 
though the methodology appears to have been the best available at the time, largely because it 
was based on "simplistic assumption[sj" with "a starting point the common-sensical proposi-
tion that pollutants will be reduced proportionally to reductions in their chemical precursors." 
[d. Unfortunately, as previously discussed herein, physical relationships are usually not based 
on such Iinearities. The shortcomings of the model are discussed in So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 
F.2d 646, 662-63 (1st Cir. 1974). See infra text and notes at notes 284-307. 
259. The straight rollback model is a computer model which predicts reductions in oxidant 
pollutants based on hypothetical reduction in reactive hydrocarbon emissions. The Fifth Cir-
cuit stated that the rollback or reduction models "show for each current maximum level of oxi-
dant pollution, the percentage reduction in hydrocarbon emissions that is necessary to achieve 
the oxidant air quality standard. These models are normally displayed in graphical form." 499 
F.2d 294-95. "The straight rollback model is based on the principal assumption that reductions 
in oxide pollutants will be proportional to reductions in reactive hydrocarbon emissions. 
Hence, the name straight rollback model." Kramer, supra note 5, at 245. The rollback model is 
a type of statistical-empirical model for making projections where there is insufficient informa-
tion for using more accurate Guassian or numerical models. [d. at 238 n.13. 
260. 499 F.2d at 308-09. 
261. [d. at 294. 
262. Id. at 299 nn.12, 14. 
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The court's review of the plan adopted by EPA and of EPA's rejec-
tion of the Texas plan involved two general questions present in 
judicial review of implementation plans. First, what is the correct 
method for predicting the extent of the necessary reduction in photo-
chemical oxidants? Second, would the controls chosen result in the 
necessary reductions of pollution? These two questions were 
answered through a four-step process using computer models to pre-
dict whether proposed pollution controls would produce sufficient 
reduction to ensure that ambient air quality standards were met.263 
The correctness of the choice of models was "the only source of 
dispute as to how great are the necessary reductions" in hydrocar-
bons.264 
The court discussed three models which can be used for determin-
ing the necessary reduction in HC emissions. The first model was a 
"proportional model," which was defined in the Clean Air Act 
regulations by an appended graph.265 The second model was the 
model used by the state, which it claimed was a modification of and 
improvement of the proportional model. 266 The third model, which 
was the one which the court ultimately accepted, was the "straight 
percentage rollback method" or "rollback method" used by EPA.267 
263. See id. at 294-95. The first step in the process is to set the ambient air standard to be 
met. The second step is to determine the functional relationship (i.e., the model) between 
pollutants emitted (such as unburned hydrocarbons) and the resulting levels of pollution (oxi-
dants or smog). The third step is to apply the model to the particular air quality control region 
(AQCR) covered by the implementation plan. This is accomplished by locating a point on the 
graph representing the existing level of oxidant pollution in the particular AQCR being ad-
dressed. The fourth and final step is to move a model to evaluate whether the chosen controls 
will, in fact, produce the desired pollution level. 
264. See 499 F.2d at 295. 
265. See 499 F.2d at 298-300. The model used by EPA was contained in Appendix J to 40 
C.F.R. S 51.14 (1973) and is reproduced in the opinion at 499 F.2d at 295, 300. 
266. 499 F.2d at 298 n.12. The rationale behind the state's modification was that it avoided 
the necessity for relying on a type of pollution (reactive hydrocarbons) for which there then ex-
isted little data. Id. at 298-99 & n.10. It was also apparently on the theoretically solid basis that 
there was no need to take such substances into account because they do not "react" to produce 
smog the way "reactive" hydrocarbons do. See id. at 293 n.1, 298 n.10. 
267. See 40 C.F.R. S§ 51.13(e)(2), 51.14(c)(2) (1978). This form of the rollback model may be 
adaptable for use in projecting pollution by setting the background concentration equal to 
zero. Id. at S 51.14(c)(4)(i). This use of the formula was in apparent violation of the regulations, 
which specifies that the formula is to be used for sulfur oxides and particulates, id. S 
51.13(e)(1), and CO and NOX, id. S 51.14(c)(2), but not for hydrocarbons, which were to be 
determined by the use of a graph reproduced in an appendix to the regulations. See supra note 
266. Such models are now allowed. Id. S 51.14(c)(4). Previously, EPA had permitted the states' 
use of the less stringent rollback model (instead of the Appendix J proportional model) at the 
higher levels of pollution (i.e., all above 0.28 ppm of smog), because of a lack of data to justify 
the harsher and nearly impossible to meet results of Appendix J at those levels. 
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EPA rejected the Texas model, because the state had not come for-
ward with sufficient evidence to justify the less stringent require-
ments of the state's plan,268 and particularly because the state had 
used incorrect data in attempting to support those requirements.269 
The court was then faced with having to sustain EPA's choice of an 
admittedly less sophisticated methodology. The court upheld EPA's 
model as not arbitrary and capricious in light of (1) the necessity of 
using some kind of model; (2) the lack of sophisticated data; (3) the 
deference traditionally given to expert agency judgment in such 
technical fields; (4) the plan's common-sense appeal; and (5) the 
plan's reliance on public input.27o The Fifth Circuit, however, issued 
a clear warning that such a simplistic approach may not suffice in the 
future and that future efforts will likely receive a stricter level of 
scrutiny, regardless of their greater level of sophistication.271 Fur-
ther, the court, because of the scarcity of data underlying EPA's 
model, placed a continuing responsibility on the agency to continue 
to develop newer and more sophisticated information.272 
In Texas v. EPA, the state also asserted that, regardless of the ac-
ceptability of EPA's projections, the additional controls required by 
EPA were unnecessary.273 This issue concerned the quality of the 
data base used to set standards for the chemical processing 
industry.274 The court, after an in-depth analysis of the agency's 
proffered "step-by-step explanation . . . complete with the actual 
268. 499 F.2d at 297-98. 
269. The state of Texas had incorrectly differentiated between reactive and nonreactive 
HC. See id. at 288 nn. 10-12, 301. 
270. 499 F.2d at 301. 
271. The Fifth Circuit stated that "[djecisions which are not arbitrary and capricious in the 
light of existing knowledge may become so by reason of scientific advances." Id. at 301 n.16, 
308 n.31. 
272. Id. By implication, the duty includes the duty to update and improve both the models 
and the underlying data used in them. 
273. 400 F.2d at 301-12 .. 
274. The dispute in the use of the data base turned on Texas' use of a reactivity factor to dif-
ferentiate between reactive and unreactive HCs. Reactivity is a measure of the extent to 
which a pollutant will interact with sunlight to produce a photochemical oxidant. These reac-
tive data were embodied in the choice of a reactivity factor, which "is a number, running from 
o to 1.0, which indicates the degree of reactivity of a source's hydrocarbon emissions." 499 
F .2d at 304. The number was derived from studies of pollution from similar industries in other 
parts of the country. A higher reactivity number would result in class cleanup effort. Id. at 
304-11. The reactivity figure was not based on Texas industries, both because the compre-
hensive study that was made was not available to EPA, id. at 302 n.19, and because of other 
deficiencies, both in that report and the less comprehensive report that was available. Id. at 
302 n.19. Typical problems were insufficient evidentiary support, id. at 303, 304 & n.26; con-
tradiction of other similar studies, id. at 304; double-counting, id. at 303; improper adjustment 
factors, id. at 303 & n.20; and poor presentation, id. at 304 & n.24. Yet, the court was still un-
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numbers," upheld the agency's choice of the chemical industry reac-
tivity factor because in setting it Texas was given "the benefit of the 
doubt."275 By contrast, EPA's data underlying the choice of stand-
ards for the petroleum refining industry were found to be insuffi-
cient. The court found that EPA did not engage in a sufficiently ex-
tensive analysis of the data, based on the court's own review of that 
~ data. Consequently, EPA's choice of factors was found to be ar-
bitrary and capricious.276 
In Texas v. EPA, the court applied the traditional Overton Park 
test of a substantial inquiry into the agency's ten-thousand-page 
record in order to examine "the agency's explication of its course of 
inquiry, its analysis, and its reasoning" in light of the court's in-
dependent evaluation of that record.277 The court said that it was re-
quired to undertake such a time-consuming and difficult task, 
because "[0 ]nly by our own study of the record can we resolve the 
factual disputes between the parties .... "278 The court, however, 
was very careful to recite its abhorrence for passing on the actual ac-
curacy or reliability of or the justification for the agency's choice, 
since "[t]hese are complex matters which are beyond our ken, absent 
the assistance of the parties."279 
In Texas v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit obviously realized that the in-
creased use of, and reliance upon, quantitative models had put a 
willing to find that the Texas figures were incorrect. [d. at 304. It is important to note that the 
Fifth Circuit stood ready to allow the state to show the court to be wrong. [d. at n.22. 
275. 299 F.2d at 306. The agency's explanation was brought out in post-argument con-
ference with the attorneys, which the court noted was "complete with the actual numbers used 
at each site," and which "enabled this court to trace back to the origins of the final result." [d. 
The court overlooked some minor errors, id. at 306 n.29, based on its self-assurance of their 
negligible impact, id. at 307 n.30, as well as the traditional deference to the agency's exper-
tise, id. at 306 n.27. 
276. 499 F.2d at 308-11. It was arbitrary and capricious to use data from Louisiana and Los 
Angeles which were out of date, differed with other similar data, and were based on question-
able assumptions. The court noted that the state's objections and questions were not adequate-
ly answered and that even a small error could produce a disproportionately large burden on 
those regulated. 
277. [d. at 296-97. The court had to get special help in dealing with the complex issues and 
lengthy record from the parties in the pre-trial and post-trial conferences that were held for 
that purpose, id. at 297 n.8, requiring "scores of hours of [the] court's time and which could 
have justified the services ofa special master." [d. at 308 n.31. Although the court tried to pro-
hibit the introduction of new information, see id. at 319, it found the effort impossible to main-
tain, resulting in some judicial hair-splitting in an attempt to justify the necessity of extra-rec-
ord examination. See id. at 307 n.30, 308 n.31. See also id. at 321-22 (Clark, Boyle, JJ., concur-
ring). The court's "course of inquiry" standard is taken from Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 
477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973), and Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138-39 (4th Cir. 1971). 
278. 499 F.2d at 297. 
279. [d. at 306 n.27. See id. at 299 n.13, 301, 306 n.27, 308 n.31. 
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strain on the environmental decisionmaking process which had to be 
accommodated in the judicial review standards applicable to that 
process. First of all, the court did not hesitate to make known its 
feeling that the decisionmaker may not be meeting his duty "to 
develop, review and apply updated and more sophisticated informa-
tion" of both a current and predictive nature, and gave fair warning 
that a failure to meet this duty may merit a reversal: "[d]ecisions 
which are not arbitrary and capricious in the light of existing 
knowledge may become so by dint of scientific advances." 280 Fur-
ther, the court threatened that the special problems presented by the 
nature of the results and form of presentation of those modeling ef-
forts may force it to withdraw the protection traditionally given to 
agency decisions by the use of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.281 This significant prospect may be due to the court's feel-
ing that its own expertise in dealing with issues presented in such 
quantitative model cases had been sufficiently raised by its exposure 
to the Texas v. EPA case that it will be better equipped by "the ex-
perience to know in advance what is required to resolve in court the 
merits of implementation plan disputes."282 An equally plausible 
alternative explanation for the threat is that the Fifth Circuit real-
ized in Texas v. EPA that in future similar cases it must make such 
an in-depth and searching analysis in order to ensure a minimal level 
of meaningful review. 283 
1. The Uneven Progress of Judicial Review 
The second major case involving the use of computer models in en-
vironmental decisionmaking was the First Circuit's decision in South 
Terminal Corp. v. EPA ,284 which was decided at about the same time 
280. [d. at 301 n.16. 
281. [d. at 308 n.31. 
282. 499 F.2d at 308 n.31. 
283. In reviewing the application of the plan to particular air quality control regions, the 
court applied the arbitrary and capricious test, which the court equated with the test of reason-
ableness. [d. at 314. Justices Clark and Boyle, in their concurrence, complained that the 
method of judicial review in such proceedings was deficient in providing no record, since there 
was no hearing below. [d. at 321-22 (Clark, Boyle, JJ., concurring). They felt that some kind of 
factual record was necessary in order that the court be able to undertake a minimally mean-
ingful review. It appears that Justices Clark and Boyle felt that the court of appeals had an 
obligation to review the substantive correctness of EPA's decisions-at some level- and that 
a minimal record was necessary for such review. 
In a later case involving the use of a computer diffusion model to establish emission limita-
tions for the Georgia SIP, the Fifth Circuit did not specify the applicable judicial review stand-
ard, but implied it was the arbitrary and capricious standard. See NRDC v. EPA, 529 F.2d 755, 
760 (5th Cir. 1976), on rWULndjrom, Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, rev'g on other gnds, sub 
nom. NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1975). 
284. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). The case is discussed in Kramer, supra note 5, at 248-49; 
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that the Fifth Circuit handed down Texas v. EPA. In South Termi-
nal, petitioners successfully challenged certain portions of the 
Metropolitan Boston Air Quality Transportation Control Plan (Bos-
ton Plan) which EPA had promulgated to ensure the area's com-
pliance with the Clean Air Act's ambient air quality standards for 
smog and carbon monoxide. Petitioners in South Terminal chal-
lenged the rollback model used, the manner in which the model was 
applied in the case, and the data used in the model. 285 
The First Circuit was not persuaded by petitioners' attack of the 
rollback model as unsophisticated based on its purported failure to 
take into account local topography and meteorology. 286 The court 
also rejected petitioners' attack on the ratio between amounts of 
hydrocarbon emissions and resulting smog pollution, because EPA 
came forward with "plausible reasons" for choosing that ratio. 287 
Silver, Problems in Attempting to Translate Statutory Standards with Emission Limitations 
Under Air and Water Pollution Control Legislation, 22 VILL. L. REV. 1122, 1130, 1132·34 
(1976-77). The plaintiffs in the case were adversely affected entities and individuals who ob-
jected to the transportation plan proposed for Boston by EPA when Massachusetts failed in its 
obligation to develop its own plan. 
285. The court rejected the procedural challenges raised by petitioners of inadequate notice 
and inadequate disclosure of technical documents. See 504 F.2d at 656-60. The First Circuit 
later rejected this same claim of lack of access to documents underlying the SIP model. See Mi-
sion Ind., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1976), discussed supra text and notes at notes 
326-41. 
286. See 504 F.2d at 662-63. Be,cause the case was remanded for other reasons, the court did 
not have to face the question of whether the correct application of the unsophisticated rollback 
model using adequate data would, be arbitrary and capricious, although the court intimated it 
would not. The court noted thal; the EPA support document appeared to consider the in-
fluences of topography and meteorology. The court discredited the contradictory testimony of 
petitioner's expert which stressed the unique topography and meteorology of Boston by noting 
that the expert did not include gasoline in his analysis. The court did not explain what 
relevance, if any, gasoline had for this issue, nor did it otherwise explain why the court felt 
able to resolve expert opinion on such a technical subject presenting "peculiar difficulties for 
nonexperts to evaluate." Id. at 665. The court likewise dismissed the petitioner's expert opin-
ions contesting the need for regional controls by noting that a difference of expert opinion 
does not constitute clear error. Jd. at 662-63. 
287. 504 F.2d at 662. The court did not even briefly describe what those "plausible reasons" 
were, although they presumably were of the same sort as set forth in the portion of Texas v. 
EPA, 499 F.2d 299, 306-08 (5th Cir. 1974), which was cited by the First Circuit. The cited por-
tion of the Texas opinion dealt with the Fifth Circuit's rejection of petitioner's claim there that 
the reactivity factor of 0.6 (on a 1.0 maximum scale) had been incorrectly applied to an "inap-
propriate initial inventory" which excluded nonreactive hydrocarbons. See id. at 306. This 
issue in the Texas case was different from the issue of the correctness of EPA's choice of the 
0.6 factor by averaging reactivity factors (0.52 and 0.47) for different areas of the country and 
increasing the average by 20 percent to give Texas the benefit of the doubt. The Fifth Circuit's 
sketchy description of the EPA's plausible reasons leaves one with the impression that peti-
tioner's challenge in South Terminal was more in the nature of the second question (the choice 
of the factor), rather than the first question (the application of that factor) as implied by the 
court. 
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The First Circuit rejected the claim that the model was incorrectly 
applied,288 although the court did leave open the possibility of further 
challenge of the model on that basis.289 
Petitioners in South Terminal were successful, however, in their 
allegations that there was insufficient evidence to support the con-
trols imposed by EPA. The court held insufficient the datum on 
smog pollution, which consisted of a single reading from a machine 
of questionable accuracy.290 The court also found there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support EPA's determination that carbon monox-
ide ambient air quality standards were not being met in the Boston 
core.291 Finally, in what the court termed the best documented chal-
lenges to EPA's technical data, petitioners successfully showed that 
there was insufficient evidence to support EPA's determination of 
ambient air quality standards in East Boston near Logan Airport. 292 
The court denied petitioners' motion to supplement the record 
with intra-agency memoranda or oral testimony by EPA officials 
before a special master. 293 The First Circuit, with an obvious sense of 
288. See 504 F .2d at 662 n.20. The claimed error was that EPA used a measuring methodol-
ogy for smog that differed from that used in initially establishing the national ambient air 
quality standard. The court rejected this simply by examining the supporting appendix to the 
standard. See 40 C.F.R. § 50.9, App. D, which confirm the court's holding. Assuming that peti-
tioners might have been claiming that the regulations incorrectly stated the measurement 
methodology upon which the standard was based, the court's answer was that this question 
was raised too late and in the wrong forum. 
289. The court stated that if it were shown that differences between measuring methodolo-
gies used in applying the model and in creating the model were substantially different, this 
would "raise a serious question." 504 F.2d at 662 n.20. 
290. Id. at 662. The court verified the possibility of inaccuracy by examining certain com-
puter printouts from the monitoring station which showed nonsensical readings. Although 
EPA attempted to explain these readings away as only the result of instrument calibrations 
and the like, and not the result of instrument inaccuracy or malfunction, the court was not per-
suaded. 
291. Id. at 663. The EPA had based its determination on a single ambient air quality reading 
obtained from a monitor apparently placed closer to the street curb than allowed by EPA 
monitoring guidelines. 
292. Id. at 663-65. The court pointed to three deficiencies: (1) Logan Airport monitoring 
was performed using the unapproved methodology of grab sampling; (2) petitioners came for-
ward with correctly gathered monitoring data that showed no violation; and (3) because there 
was no other data available, EPA used the Kenmore Square data, see supra note 292, in lieu of 
actual monitoring for the area. The court feared that East Boston was being subjected to 
excessive controls based on readings taken in more polluted areas and found this particularly 
disturbing in light of EPA's failure to show the effect of the airport traffic on East Boston, the 
limited applicability of the model's results from Kenmore to the East Boston area with its dif-
fering topography and other characteristics, and the localized nature of carbon monoxide 
pollution. Id. 
293. Id. at 675. The court stated that "[P]ossibly barring fraud and other extreme circum-
stances, the mental process by which the Administrator reached his decision, if explained by 
the record, is not a proper subject for discovery." Id. 
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frustration, noted its inability to remand to a lower district court for 
clarifying findings of fact. 294 The court was thus forced to remand to 
the agency, but laid out some specific directives as to the actions that 
should be taken there.296 Among other things, EPA was directed to 
receive and consider further objections and arguments respecting 
the technical basis for calculating photochemical and carbon monox-
ide pollution, thus reinforcing the conclusion that the court contin-
ued to leave open the possibility of an attack on the modeling 
methodology itself.296 The court stated that such a procedure would 
allow the court, if necessary, to rule expeditiously on the rationality 
of the agency's measurements with the assurance that EPA had ful-
ly confronted the objections and that its explication would be more 
than just post hoc rationalization. 297 
The court applied the traditional level of substantive review: 
whether EPA's approval of the Boston Plan was based on a 
consideration of relevant factors or involved a clear error of judg-
ment.298 The court stressed that it could not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency, particularly where there are involved 
"technical decisions (such as determinations of local photochemical 
oxidant and carbon monoxide levels and the amount of reductions re-
quired to meet national.standards)" which the court stated are issues 
that present peculiar difficulties for nonexperts to evaluate. 299 The 
court's deferential standard of review was justified by the inex-
tricable involvement of policy determinations in EPA's choice of the 
pollution control techniques to be used. 30o Such policy decisions 
traditionally involve the granting of more discretion to the agency 
decisionmaker, and the court's deference to the portion of the agen-
cy's decision relating to control technique mix recognized the 
political conflicts and trade-offs involved in such a decision. 
The standard of review applied to the factual data and determina-
tions underlying EPA's decision was less deferential than that ap-
plied to policy decisions, although it recognized that those determina-
tions present peculiar difficulties for non experts such as judges to 
294. ld. at 665 (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143-32 (1972». 
295. 504 F.2d at 666-67, 682. Further hearings were to be held pursuant to the informal 
rulemaking provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 533 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
296. See id. at 666 & n.23. 
297. ld. at 665-66. 
298. ld. at 665 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971». 
299. 504 F.2d at 665. 
300. ld. at 655 & n.6. See supra note 246. See also Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 
734-35 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
312 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:251 
evaluate.301 The First Circuit followed Overton Park's mandate that 
the court's inquiry into the facts should be searching and careful.302 
The court, however, in recognition of the peculiar problems in judi-
cial review presented by the use of environmental models, went fur-
ther and established a substantive level of judicial review to assure 
"that the Agency's technical conclusions no less than others are 
founded on supportable data and methodology and meet minimal 
standards of rationality."303 The First Circuit clearly recognized the 
dilemma presented to judges by the use of models and other quanti-
tative methodologies in environmental decisionmaking: 
Ail laymen we are in no position to know how much ultimate 
weight to give to these arguments, based as they are on techni-
cal assumptions. We can only say that the objections as to data 
and methodology seem too serious to us simply to pass by; they 
demand investigation and answer. While reviewing courts are 
not to substitute their judgment for an agency's, they are to 
establish parameters of rationality within which the agency 
must operate. A court would abdicate its function were it, when 
confronted with important and seemingly plausible objections 
going to the near of a key technical determination, to presume 
that the agency could never behave irrationally. It has a duty to 
see that the objections are faced in a proper procedural setting 
and satisfactory answers provided demonstrating careful agen-
cy consideration. 304 
The test is only whether the agency behaves rationally, because 
under the Overton Park test applied by the First Circuit, the wisdom 
of the plan in the ordinary sense is outside of the court's province.30s 
The ambiguity and tension present in the First Circuit's descrip-
tion of the appropriate level of substantive judicial review reflect the 
unique problems presented to the courts by the agency's reliance on 
models.306 The court obviously recognized that there was something 
different about the decisions involving quantitative models and other 
similar technical determinations. As a result, the court accepted its 
301. 504 F.2d at 655. 
302. See id. (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971». 
303. 504 F.2d at 655 (citing 504 F.2d at 662-67). 
304. Id. at 655. 
305. Id. at 655 n.5 (citing United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 749 
(1972». 
306. The court's citation of the arbitrary and capricious judicial review provision of the AP A 
implied that the court was applying that standard to all substantive review under the third 
prong of the Overton Park standard. See 504 F.2d at 655. Although the court unambiguously 
held that it had to "decide whether the selected controls are arbitrary or capricious," the court 
was not so clear as to the standard of review applied to the technical modeling decision. 
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responsibility that its inquiry into the facts be as searching and 
careful as is permissible under Overton Park and the AP A. Although 
it may be argued that the review standard in South Terminal goes 
further than the usual Overton Park test, the First Circuit's con-
cerns in its South Terminal opinion certainly show a realization that 
the change brought about in the environmental decisionmaking proc-
ess by the use of models may require a stricter ultimate level of 
substantive review. Nonetheless, later cases by the First Circuit 
have not yet fulfilled that expectation. 307 
The next year, the Third Circuit, in Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 308 
adopted a limited approach to substantive review of environmental 
models under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The Third Cir-
cuit recited the traditional considerations underlying that standard, 
including presumptions of the expertise of the agency and the 
regularity of its decision.309 The Third Circuit recognized the need 
for a vigorous level of judicial scrutiny of the technical bases underly-
ing the SIP; yet, the ultimate standard of review was the deferential 
one in which the court would overturn the agency's decision only if it 
did not reflect the consideration of relevant factors or represented a 
clear error of judgment.31o The ultimate standard of review applied 
by the Third Circuit went no further than to determine that the 
agency exercised "reasoned discretion."311 
The Third Circuit's test of reasoned discretion would be appropri-
ate for policy choices such as the mix of control requirements 
involved in South Terminal. The issue in Duquesne Light, however, 
did not involve such policy questions, but was concerned only with 
the EPA's determination of the existence of feasible cleanup tech-
niques to allow compliance with sulfur dioxide emission limitations 
contained in Pennsylvania's implementation plan. Accordingly, 
307. The First Circuit's later opinion in Mision Ind., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123 (1976), ap-
plied an arbitrary and capricious standard to the review of the model underlying EPA's ap-
proval of the SIP for Puerto Rico. See Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1163 (6th 
Cir. 1978). See also Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir. 
1978); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641, 647-48, 650-52, 655-56, 661 (1st 
Cir. 1979). 
308. 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975), on remand from, 427 U.S. 902, rev'd on other gnds, 481 
F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court vacated the first opinion in light of Union Elec. Co. 
v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), which rejected the assertion that EPA must consider claims of 
economic or technical infeasibility when considering proposed implementation plans. 
309. 522 F.2d at 1192. 
310. [d. (citing Essex Chern. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973), eert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974». 
311. 522 F.2d at 1193 (citing So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,661 (1st Cir. 1973»; Int'nl 
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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there appeared to be little reason to accord EPA any great amount 
of discretion in making such determinations. The Third Circuit's 
reasons for according such discretion, in addition to the presumption 
of agency expertise and the presumption of the regularity of an 
agency decision, were the additional usual rationales of lack of judi-
cial expertise and the institutional consideration of the traditional 
function of the courts.312 Based on these considerations, the court 
stated that it would confine its inquiry to the facts available to the ad-
ministrator at the time of his decision. 
The traditional presumptions underlying the Third Circuit's defer-
ential review in Duquesne Light fail to ensure, and may interfere 
with, a minimal level of meaningful review of environmental deci-
sions based on models. The relative differences in expertise and insti-
tutional restraints between agency and court often are not as great 
as is implied by the presumptions used by the Third Circuit. More-
over, even when there do exist significant differences between agen-
cy and court caused by deficiencies in the court's expertise or re-
sources in dealing with models, those differences can and should be 
resolved within the context of the models. 
The Third Circuit's approach to judicial review of models in Du-
quesne Light also raises the specter of delay in frustration of the 
Clean Air Act's mandate of expeditious action. In fact, the remand 
granted by the Third Circuit in that case was the fourth time the case 
had been sent back to EPA for further hearings. Examples of the 
delay due to remands can be seen in later cases decided by the Third 
Circuit.313 
A year later, the Ninth Circuit, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Train,314 relied on Texas v. EPA in upholding the use of a linear 
312. The court said that H[s]ince the function of the judiciary is not to derive its own conclu-
sions from the mass of data available at any given time, but only to review the EPA's decision, 
and since the judiciary generally lacks the expertise necessary to assimilate such information 
independently, we will confine our inquiry to the facts available to the Administrator at the 
time of his decision." 522 F.2d at 1993. 
313. See, e.g., Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); Am. Iron & Steel 
Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). One district court in the Third Circuit was unable 
to discern the Cirouit's position on substantive review of environmental decisions involving 
technical issues. See Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 
805,812-13 (E.D. Pa. 1975), which applied a "hard look" standard of review, but refused to 
interject itself into the administrative process by resolving differences in expert opinion at the 
administrative level. See id. at 814-18. 
314. 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), em. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976). The portion of the 
Nevada SIP at issue contained Kennecott's smelter plant. Nevada's proposed SIP would have 
allowed Kennecott to operate the plant intermittently to avoid emissions during adverse 
weather conditions; such a method would not require a decrease in total emissions. EPA re-
quired cleanup technologies which lowered the total emissions from the Kennecott plant. 
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rollback model to support EPA's rejection of a portion of Nevada's 
proposed SIP which would have allowed the use of intermittent con-
trols in lieu of continuous emission reduction and dispersal tech-
nologies. The court held that the "rollback method [or model] cannot 
be characterized as arbitrary or capricious in light of existing scien-
tific knowledge."315 The court also pointed out that the more ac-
curate method of using a dispersion model could not have been used, 
because adequate meteorological data were not available, and also 
pointed out that any errors in the rollback model probably favored 
the polluter.316 Therefore, the court upheld EPA's rejection of the 
implementation plan proposed by the state and upheld the substitute 
plan EPA promulgated for Nevada.317 The Ninth Circuit's approach 
in Kennecott Copper failed to take sufficient steps to ensure a 
minimal level of meaningful review of an environmental model. In 
later cases, however, the Ninth Circuit showed more ingenuity in 
dealing with the problems of judicial review of environmental deci-
sions based on models. 318 
The Fifth Circuit, in the 1976 case of NRDC v. EPA (NRDC Il),319 
reviewed the use and construction of diffusion models that were 
newer and more sophisticated than the rollback model earlier con-
sidered by the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. EPA. The issue in NRDC II 
was the propriety of EPA's approval of the Georgia SIP, which in-
cluded a factor or credit with the model's calculations to reflect the 
use of tall smokestacks.320 The model incorporated a factor which 
gave credit for tall stacks up to two and one-half times the height of 
the powerhouse building of the polluting facility.321 This "2.5 rule" 
315. 526 F.2d at 1152 n.16. The court defined "existing scientific knowledge" in terms of a 
Senate document. Air Quality and Stationary Source and Emissions Control, Report by the 
Commission on Natural Resources, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engi-
neers, Natural Research Council, prepared for Sen. Comm. on Public Works, SEN. Doc. 94-4, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 242-45 (1975). 
316. 526 F.2d at 1152 n.16. The court's determination of the inadequacy of the data was ap-
parently based on the court's review of the EPA brief. 
317. A part of the court's holding was also that tall stacks and intermittent dispersion tech-
niques are not acceptable alternatives to control technologies that reduce the amount of pollu-
tion being emitted into the atmosphere. See also Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 17 
(6th Cir. 1975); NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other gnds, 421 U.S. 70 
(1975). This issue was similarly determined in the later Ninth Circuit case of Bunker Hill Co. v. 
EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1290 nn. 2 & 3 (9th Cir. 1977), discussed infra notes 342-50. 
318. See Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977); Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 
F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980). 
319. 529 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1976), on remand from, Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), 
rev'g in part, NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (1973). 
320. 529 F.2d at 758-59. 
321. The use of a tall stack coefficient in a model was based on the assumptions that the use 
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was a compromise adopted by EPA in response to the Fifth Circuit's 
earlier opinion of NRDC v. EPA (NRDC /),322 which had disapproved 
of the use of such a factor in the model underlying the SIP. The Fifth 
Circuit relied on equitable considerations in upholding EPA's com-
promise rule to avoid the harsh results of a retroactive application of 
the earlier decision. The use of this "2.5 rule" was held not to be ar-
bitrary, although NRDC's objections to its use were termed "se-
rious" by the court.323 
A second issue in NRDC II related to the use of computer diffusion 
models to evaluate the SIP without any consideration of tall stacks. 
The court held that under the Clean Air Act a SIP could include the 
use of tall stacks if, and only if, the SIP-absent any "credit" given 
to the tall stacks in the model-would meet National Air Quality 
Standards under the Act. In effect, the court required that the model 
simulate the actual amount of pollutants being emitted into the air 
without regard for the effect created by a tall stack which has lower 
measured pollution at ground level. The court necessarily accepted 
EPA's use of the model, since it ultimately upheld the Georgia SIP, 
although petitioners may not have actually challenged the con-
struction or use of the model. 
Although the Fifth Circuit's review in NRDC II is considerably less 
searching than in its earlier opinion in Texas v. EPA, the technical 
issues were less involved. Although the standard of review applied in 
NRDC II was ambiguous,324 later opinions by the Fifth Circuit have 
confirmed that the court applied an arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard.326 Later cases in other circuits, however, use deferential review 
of tall stacks would result in measured pollution at ground level. Of course, the use of a tall 
stack did not reduce the actual pollution being emitted. Tall stacks simply caused the pollution 
to be dispersed at a higher level and over a larger area. See generally, W. RoDGERS, supra note 
155, at 255-56. 
The opinion uses the language of "credits" to reflect the assumed pollution reductions from 
the tall stacks. The "2.5 rule" used by EPA gave only a partial credit to those stacks which ex-
ceeded two and one-half times the height of their power houses, because the model likely 
predicted higher levels of pollution than actually measured by ground-level monitors. Prior to 
the adoption of the 2.5 rule EPA apparently had allowed full credit for the diluting effect of 
smoke stacks in existence for the first implementation plans filed in January of 1972. See Ken-
necott Copper Corp. v. Train, 527 F.2d 1149, 1152 n.16 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
935 (1976). The 2.5 rule was chosen on the basis of the median stack height which existed in 
the power industry before the passage of the Clean Air Act. NRDC v. EPA, 529 F .2d 755, 760 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
322. 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1973), re'/J'd in part on other gnds, sub nom., Train v. NRDC, 421 
U.S. 60 (1975). 
323. See 529 F.2d at 759-60. 
324. See 529 F.2d at 760. 
325. See Taylor v. Dist. Engineer, 567 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978). In areas of en-
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standards more akin to the standard in NRDC II than Texas v. EPA. 
Thus, Texas v. EPA may be seen as a high-water mark in the devel-
opment of the judicial review of environmental models. 
The First Circuit, in Mision Industrial, Inc. v. EPA,326 applied a 
deferential standard of review and declined to apply the more prob-
ing standard used by the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. EPA. In Mision, 
the court upheld the EPA's use of a computer diffusion model327 as a 
"satisfactory predictive tool" on which to base EPA's revision of 
Puerto Rico's SIP. In Mision, petitioners unsuccessfully challenged 
the revision of the SIP on the "grounds that the predicting method-
ology used in drafting the plan permitted too great a likelihood for 
error and that as a result the plan fail [ ed] to provide for attainment 
of national air quality standards." 328 First, petitioners argued that 
the random error which was an intrinsic part of the model was so 
great as to prevent its use as a predictive method. The EPA ad-
mitted that the model could have a random error as high as 150 per-
cent for annual, and 200 percent for short-term, concentrations of 
sulfur dioxide. The court accepted the EPA administrator's 
statements that such errors were extreme and occurred only in 
isolated instances and were just as likely to result in overprediction 
as in underprediction.329 
vironmentallaw involving new scientific knowledge, the Fifth Circuit remains willing to defer 
to the agency's knowledge and expertise. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. FERC, 563 F.2d 111 
(5th Cir. 1977). The environmental cases involving technical issues under NEPA decided by 
district courts in the Fifth Circuit apply a searching and careful version of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of judicial review. See, e.g., Inman Park Restoration v. Urban Mass 
Transp. Ad., 414 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Ala. v. Corps of Engineers, 411 F. Supp. 1261 
(N.D. Ala. 1976); City of No. Miami v. Train, 377 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Sierra Club v. 
Froehlke, 369 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other gruis, sub nom., Sierra Club v. 
Callaway, 799 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974). 
326. 547 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1976). Mision is also discussed in Kramer, supra note 5, 250-5l. 
327. Professor Kramer notes that "[dJiffusion models attempt to describe and predict the 
physical and chemical behavior of pollutants in the ambient air. A computer diffusion model is 
merely a mathematical model which has been placed on a computer program that describes the 
'spatial and temporal history of contaminants released into the atmosphere.' .. Kramer, supra 
note 5, at 242 n.36 (quoting J. SEINFELD, AIR POLLUTION 260,261-351 (1975». See U.S. EPA, 
GUIDELINES ON AIR QUALITY MODELS, A1-A34 (1978). The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals has stated that diffusion models required to be used in the PSD program are 
"mathematical techniques for simulating the diffusion into the atmosphere of a new source's 
emissions under various meteorological conditions and operating levels. The purpose of such 
models is to predict pollutant concentrations at any point in the neighborhood of the source." 
Ala. Power Co. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 323, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted) (citing EPA, 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DocUMENT-EPA REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTING THE SIGNIFICANT 
DETERIORATION OF AIR QUALITY, 29-30 (1975». 
328. See 529 F.2d at 760. 
329. 547 F.2d at 128-29. 
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Second, petitioners pointed out that the SIP failed to take into ac-
count sulfur pollution from sources other than the industrial plants 
covered in the plan. If that were true, petitioners in effect would 
have to bear the burden of cleaning pollution from those other 
sources. Without pointing to any substantiating data, the court ac-
cepted the administrator's representation that such sources were 
adequately compensated for by the 20 percent margin for error built 
into the model. The court did not attempt to reconcile the fact that 
such error could just as easily work to petitioners' disadvantage and 
would, therefore, not offset any such inadequacies in the data 
base.33o 
The third alleged deficiency in the diffusion model used to create 
the Puerto Rican SIP was that the model did not accurately portray 
actual Puerto Rican meteorological conditions. Petitioners con-
tended that the rough terrain of Puerto Rico resulted in greater 
turbulence than was assumed in the construction of the model. If the 
petitioners' claim were true, the model apparently would under-
estimate the dispersal of pollutants due to such turbulence. The EPA 
did not directly dispute that allegation, but answered that the model 
was applied more conservatively than if terrain turbulence had 
somehow been compensated for. 33l 
The fourth alleged deficiency was that the model did not use on-
site weather conditions as a basis for its projection, but instead used 
weather data gathered at only three locations on the island. In effect, 
the Puerto Rican agency assumed that the data acquired at these 
three sites was representative of the island and extrapolated from 
that data based on worst-case assumptions. The court noted that 
EP A took an active role in assuring that the weather data was prop-
erly applied, although the court gave as its only example of such 
review EPA's request for an explanation of how the worst-case con-
dition was derived. 332 
The final, and apparently most serious attack on the model was 
petitioners' allegation that it was not calibrated, in that no monitor-
ing data had been used to ensure the accuracy of the predictive rela-
tionship between sulfur content in the air and air quality.333 The 
EPA admitted that such calibration based on incomplete data is not 
good practice, but stated that conservative assumptions and calcula-
330. 547 F.2d at 128 nA. 
331. [d. at 128. See supra text and note at note 292 (First Circuit's treatment of this ques-
tion in SlYUth Terminal). 
332. See supra note 331. 
333. 547 F.2d at 128-29. 
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tions were applied to compensate for lack of precision.334 The First 
Circuit in Mision relied on Sierra Club v. EPA 336 to hold that the 
court should defer to EPA's expertise in choosing the computer 
model used, since this was an area where EPA's "expertise is heavi-
ly implicated." 336 Without refuting any of the serious challenges to 
the model, the First Circuit recited the litany that the court could not 
substitute its judgment for that of the administrator. Although the 
court did not explicitly recite its standard of review, later opinions 
have stated that the First Circuit was applying the arbitrary and 
capricious standard in Mision. 337 
The First Circuit bolstered its decision in Mision by noting that 
petitioners' criticisms as to the substance of the methodology used 
were communicated in detail to the EPA administrator during the 
federal comment period.338 This recitation by the court is not con-
vincing in light of the deficiencies in the petitioners' access to usable 
materials.339 In particular, the court noted that there was some force 
to the petitioners' complaint that the materials made available prior 
to the hearings were self-serving rhetoric and confused compilations 
of additions and deletions to the original plan. The most serious omis-
sion from the record was the computer printout showing the basis 
for the sulfur-in-fuel limitations assigned to each source under the 
model. The court accepted the necessity of timely access to that 
printout in order to verify that the sulfur-in-fuel content limitations 
applied to each individual source were necessary to meet applicable 
ambient air quality standards under the computer model. 
The issue of verification of the underlying model is central to the 
larger issue of review of the SIP to assure its substantial correct-
ness. Since courts of appeals usually recite that they cannot inde-
pendently verify the model's correctness, it is vital that petitioners 
be able to perform such verification themselves. The First Circuit in 
Mision held that the presumption of regularity normally accorded to 
administrative decisions is rebuttable.340 Even so, the court found no 
334. 547 F.2d at 129. 
335. 540 F.2d 1114, vacated as moot, 434 U.S. 809 (1977). 
336. 547 F.2d at 129. 
337. See Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1163 (6th Cir. 1978). 
338. 547 F.2d at 129. 
339. [d. at 126. 
340. [d. at 127. The issue in Mision was whether the presumption was rebutted by proce-
dural errors. That is, the court examined whether petitioners were so prejudiced by the "run 
around" they received in attempting to gain access to necessary, but unavailable, computer 
printouts that it "materially impair[ed] their ability to comment at the public hearing [on the 
cost], and the ability of the hearing itself to serve the purpose Congress intended." [d. 
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basis in the record for any alleged prejudice to petitioners by virtue 
of the unavailability of the computer printout and dismissed the 
shortcoming as harmless error. 341 
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit, in Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA,342 rejected 
the SIP promulgated by EPA after the agency had rejected the plan 
proposed by the State of Idaho. The Ninth Circuit held that EPA 
failed to show that the control technology necessary to meet the re-
quirements of the EPA plan was feasible as required by the Clean 
Air Act.343 The court reached a differing conclusion from EPA's 
resolution of the conflict between experts, although the agency's 
resolution of the differences in expert opinion may be based on 
EPA's exclusive reliance on expert testimony as opposed to actual 
data from operating examples from cleanup technology.344 The court 
held that if EPA relies only on expert testimony to demonstrate 
technological feasibility the agency bears a significant burden of 
proof, in that the expert testimony must clearly demonstrate that 
Although the court appeared to have found such prejudice, the court held that the presumption 
of regularity was not rebutted, because the prejudice was harmless. See infra note 341. 
341. See 547 F.2d 127-28. The court noted that the petitioners were provided prior to the 
hearing with the formulas used in the computer diffusion model and appendix listing the maxi-
mum allowed percentage of sulfur-in-fuel for each regulated source, together with the control 
technique (variation in permitted sulfur-in-fuel limitations at each source) and the ultimate 
results (the numerical results) from the application of the model. The court held that peti-
tioners were not prejudiced by their inability to verify the application of the results of the 
model. Petitioners did not contend that the results of the application of the model were incon-
sistent with model used, but it is clear from the opinion the lack of inconsistency was shown in 
facts learned after the hearings. The court further noted that, because the data turned out to 
be a useless "miscollated mass stack of papers," petitioners could have gleaned nothing from 
the data which would have been useful to them in examining EPA's choices. [d. 
342. 572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's earlier opinion in 
Kennecott Copper see supra text at notes 314-18. 
343. See 572 F.2d at 1302-03. At the very least, EPA failed to explain adequately the data 
and methodology it relied on. See id. at 1302 n.36, 1291, 1293 n.ll, 1295. 
344. The court stated that EPA's expert witness "failed to respond fully and satisfactorily" 
to the objections raised by petitioner's experts. [d. at 1291 n.8. Additionally, the court noted 
several instances where EPA failed to contradict statements by the petitioner's experts that 
cleanup methodologies were not technically acceptable in that EPA failed to explain signifi-
cant apparent discrepancies in its data relating to that technological sufficiency. See id. at 
1296-97. Apparently the EPA did not satisfactorily respond to the eight questions presented 
to it by the court. See id. at 1299 n.26. As a result, significant doubt was cast on the feasibility 
of the cleanup technologies. [d. at 1300. The court rejected attacks made by EPA on the 
evidence, based on assertion that the petitioner's evidence was based on incorrect assump-
tions. [d. at 1301 n.S1. In sum, the court appeared to be resolving disputes between eXperts, at 
least in some sense of that word, although most courts hold that it is not proper for judges to 
engage in such activities. Apparently relying on the doctrine of deference, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that on the record it was impossible to resolve the controversies involved and, there-
fore, it had to remand further hearings. [d. at 1301. 
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the technology is available and must convincingly answer any cogent 
criticism by opposing experts.345 
In remanding the case for further hearings, the Ninth Circuit in 
Bunker Hill applied Overton Park in holding that EPA had failed to 
exercise the required "reasoned discretion." 346 The court rejected 
the requirement of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing and stated that 
the decision could not be based on post hoc rationalization.347 In spite 
of this standard of review, the court displayed considerable willing-
ness to explore and supplement the administrative record, to which 
it is normally bound.348 The court also held that, although cross-
examination is not always required, petitioners would be allowed, 
based on the court's review of the data and methodology, to cross-
examine the experts of EPA. 349 One wonders whether the future will 
find the Ninth Circuit willing to tolerate such "knowledgeable 
blunders" 350 in the models and other technical bases underlying such 
environmental decisions. 
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,351 
further demonstrates the uneven progress of the courts in respond-
ing to the special problems created by the use of models in en-
345. EPA's expert evidence had been drawn in large part from the Browder's Study, which 
the court found met the requirement that it be more than "purely theoretical or ex-
perimental." Id. 
346. Id. The court felt constrained to note that applying this standard of review did not shift 
the ultimate burden of proof to EPA. I d. at 1305-06. 
347. Such post hoc rationalizations were condemned in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). See supra cases cited at note 192. In Overton Park the 
Supreme Court held that affidavits presented after the close of the administrative hearing 
record were improperly considered by the lower courts, because they were not included in the 
record to be reviewed under the APA. In Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 
910,912 (6th Cir. 1980), the Sixth Circuit refused to allow EPA to publish technical documents 
to correct errors found in an earlier Sixth Circuit opinion, Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 
F.2d 660, 662-65 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1978), as discussed infra text and 
notes at notes 384-85, stating that such a post hoc attempt to justify EPA's action was improp-
er under the APA. However, the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 299, 307 n.30 (5th 
Cir. 1974), relied on Overton Park in stating it felt constrained to consider EPA's explana-
tions, as opposed to justifications, because "they are not the post hoc rationalizations of agen-
cy actions which 'have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for review.' " Id. (em-
phasis in original.) Accord Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1163 n.4 (6th Cir. 
1978). 
348. This willingness was based on the "considerable doubt" raised in the court's mind by 
its full review of the record. 572 F.2d at 1291, 1302. The court presented questions to EPA, to 
which EPA and the petitioners responded in supplemental briefs and a supplemental record. 
[d. at 1291 n.8, 1299 n.26. The court also allowed the use of a joint condensed appendix. [d. at 
1295 n.16. The court even looked to a telegram not admitted into the record. [d. at 1299 n.25. 
349. [d. at 1305. 
350. See Matsumoto v. Brinegar, 568 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1978). 
351. 579 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1978). 
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vironmental decisionmaking. In Appalachian Power, petitioners un-
successfully argued that the emission standards established in the 
West Virginia SIP were unnecessarily stringent in that they 
reflected a "worst-case approach"352 and because the controls were 
applied selectively to only a few regions.353 The Fourth Circuit prop-
erly gave short shrift to petitioner's argument that certain areas 
were being burdened to a greater extent than others, noting that 
courts should not interfere in this kind of policy judgment.364 U nfor-
tunately, the court's formulation of the standards of judicial review 
to be applied to the technical bases underlying EP A's decision fails 
to ensure a minimal level of meaningful review.355 The Fourth Cir-
cuit's level of review required only a statement of reasons underlying 
the decision, such that the rationale of the agency's decision may be 
reasonably discerned.356 This statement of review applied in Ap-
palachian Power appears more deferential than the standard 
established under Overton Park and is, in any event, far too deferen-
tial without further justifying circumstances. 
2. Cases Reviewing Ohio's SIP 
The much-beleaguered Ohio SIP has to date resulted in a total of 
thirteen opinions by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, eight of 
352. [d. at 853-54. This worst case attack by petitioners refers to the modeling technique of 
looking for violations of ambient air quality standards by using as data inputs for the model 
those data (such as plant operating conditions, wind conditions, and terrain) which the modeler 
suspects (or has shown) to give the highest projected levels of pollution. The term "worst case" 
is somewhat of a misnomer, because it is the accepted better practice to ignore the highest 
level of projected pollution by the model. Instead, the modeler uses the model's results "based 
upon full capacity operational data of all emissions sources in a given area on a hypothetical 
second-worst day in the year," a practice which the Sixth Circuit has held not to be arbitrary 
and capricious in itself. Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 801 (6th Cir. 1980) and 
cases cited therein. Accord NRDC v. EPA, 529 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1976); MAD v. Trainor, 400 
F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1975), affd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). The model is used to set the ap-
plicable emission limitation "according to the predicted second-worst day in terms of pollution 
results shown." Clev. Elec. mum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150,1160 (6th Cir. 1978). Typically, 
the highest reading from a monitor for a given period is also disregarded because of the poten-
tial for an occasional erroneous reading. See So. Terminal v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,662 (1st Cir. 
1974). See also Envt'l Study & Protection v. PAC, 464 F. Supp. 143, 147 (D. Conn. 1978). 
353. 579 F.2d at 854. 
354. [d. See supra text at note 313. 
355. The court's response to petitioner's "worst case" objections was: "[i]t is unnecessary 
for us to pass on the validity of [petitioner's] objections to the assumptions made from the data 
on which [the state agency] relied; it is sufficient for purposes of our review that the peti-
tioners demonstrated indisputably their understanding of agency's methodology, basis and 
data used in formulating its plan and of what the regulations in the proposed plan, if adopted, 
provided, so far as their operations were concerned." 578 F.2d at 854. 
356. 579 F.2d at 854 (citing United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel, 406 U.S. 742, 758 
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which involve challenges to the use of models in environmental deci-
sionmaking.367 Two types of computer models were used to establish 
emission limitations for the Ohio SIP because no single model could 
be applied to all areas of the country regardless of topography or 
meteorology. One model, the MAXT-24 model,36s was used to simu-
late isolated sources in rural and complex-terrain areas. Another 
model, the RAM model,369 was used to simulate multiple sources 
located in relatively close proximity to one another, as would com-
monly be found in an urban area. A third type of model, called 
SYMAP, was also involved in the creation of the SIP. The SYMAP 
program was used to correlate monitoring data to produce a 
graphical representation of that data to assist in delineating the 
boundaries of nonattainment areas. 360 
Although there are some differences between the construction and 
use of the MAXT-24 and RAM models as discussed below, the models 
in many respects strongly resemble one another and contrast sharp-
ly with earlier relatively simplistic models previously used to esti-
(1972); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34, 73, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976». 
357. See Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1980); Cin. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Costle (CGE III), 632 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1980); GM Corp. v. Costle, 631 F.2d 466 
(6th Cir. 1980); PPG Ind. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980); Rep. Steel Corp. v. Costle, 
621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); Ohio Envt'l Council v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1979); Cin. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. EPA (CGE II), 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); 
Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.) clarified, Cin. Gas & Elec. IlIum. Co. v. 
EPA (CGE I), 578 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). See also No. Ohio 
Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1978); Buckeye Power Co. v. EPA, 525 F.2d 80 
(6th Cir. 1975); Buckeye Power Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1962). In a related case, the 
Sixth Circuit upheld the right of EPA to proceed directly against Ohio to require enforcement 
of an EPA-promulgated provision added to the Ohio SIP requiring that automobiles not be 
registered if they have not passed mandated inspection and maintenance tests. United States 
v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980). 
358. MAXT-24 is an abbreviation for Second Maximum Twenty-Four Hour Dispersion 
Model with Terrain Adjustments. Another abbreviation applied to such a model is CRSTER. 
See Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660,663 (6th Cir. 1978). 
359. RAM is an abbreviation for Real-Time Air-Quality-Simulation Model. 
360. The use of the SYMAP program was upheld in GM Corp. v. Costle, 631 F.2d 466 (6th 
Cir. 1980), as discussed infra text and notes at notes 414-15. The graph of monitoring data 
produced by SYMAP was used to delineate the boundaries of designated nonattainment areas 
by using "actual monitored air quality data to produce isopleths which represent the cut points 
between levels of TSP (total suspended particulate) concentrations. The isopleths are then 
roughly conformed to geographic or political boundaries and the proper designations are ap-
plied to each area." [d. at 469. An isopleth is "a graph showing variations in occurrence or fre-
quency of a phenomenon, especially in meteorology, with reference to two variables, such as 
time and space." 1 WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 1111 (1973). In non-scientific terms, the SYMAP 
model performs certain calculations on the monitoring data to draw a line (the isopleth) 
through data points with equal value in the same way that a person creates a picture by draw-
ing lines between numbered dots in a dot puzzle. 
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mate ambient air quality standards for air quality control regions. S61 
Both MAXT-24 and RAM models are so-called Gaussian models that 
must be run on a computer. S62 Both models incorporate a solid ascer-
tainable data base composed of the established design capacity of the 
power plants, sulfur content of the fuel used in those plants, height 
of the plant's smokestack, weather data, and the nature of the sur-
rounding terrain. The computers are required to perform the 
"massive analytical task" of performing calculations on the "[t]re-
mendous amounts of data" on each source "so that the computer 
analysis reflects actual conditions."s6s Both the RAM and MAXT-24 
models are run based on the assumptions that the plants being 
modeled operate at full capacity twenty-four hours a day. Based on 
these conditions and the factors used in the model, S64 computer runs 
are made for each day of the year, and the ultimate standards are set 
according to the predicted second-worst day in terms of pollution 
results shown. S66 
361. See Kramer, supra note 5 at 240 n.23, 242 n.36. 
362. A Gaussian model is so called because it relies on a Gaussian plume dispersal, which is a 
mathematical formula to describe how a cylindrical discharge of pollutant (a plume) will 
disperse when emitted from a tall, cylindrical source like a smokestack. See id. at 238 n.13, 254 
n.104 & sources cited therein. Both the RAM and MAXT-24 models assumed "vertical and 
horizontal dispersion of the pollution plume." Cin. Gas & Elec. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 18 (6th 
Cir. 1980). The model assumed both that the pollutant would disperse upwards out of the 
smokestack and disperse laterally as predicted by the laws of fluid dynamics. Such a model is 
also known as a diffusion model. See id. at 242 n.36, 254 n.103 & sources cited therein. See, 
e.g., Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1980); Clev. Elec. mum. Co. v. 
EPA, 572 F .2d 1150, 1160, 1162-63 (6th Cir. 1960). See also Kramer, supra note 5, at 254. Dif-
fusion models were described by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as "mathematical 
techniques for simulating the diffusion into the atmosphere of a new source's emissions under 
various meteorological conditions and operating levels. The purpose of such models is to 
predict pollutant concentrations at any point in the neighborhood of the source." Ala. Power 
Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
363. Clev. Elec. mum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1161 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting from the 
EPA Brief). The court then used the example cited in EPA's Brief: 
[d. 
For example, a gaseous pollutant emitted over a grassy field will disperse much dif-
ferently than if the pollutant is emitted over a large urban area. There the dispersion 
will be affected not only by the local weather conditions but also by the greater tur-
bulence caused by the different types of surface areas and hot sources throughout a 
city. 
The court concluded that the RAM employed "a wider, more complete and more accurate 
data base than any prior model yet employed in devising a sulfur dioxide control strategy for a 
state or county." [d. at 1162, quoted in Rep. Steel Corp. v. Castle, 621 F.2d 797, 805 (6th Cir. 
1980). The court concluded that the same was true for the MAXT-24 model. See Cin. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 632 F.2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1980). 
364. See supra text and note at note 336. 
365. Clev. Elec. mum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1160 (6th Cir. 1980). Accord Cin. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Castle, 632 F.2d 14, 17 (6th Cir. 1980). See also supra text and note at note 325 
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There are, however, some important differences between the 
RAM and MAXT-24 models. As noted above, the MAXT-24 model is 
designed for use in predicting pollution from single sources in rural 
areas,366 whereas the RAM model can be applied to any individual 
sources of pollution to derive specific estimates of permissible pollu-
tant emission rates for each.367 The MAXT-24 cannot be used to pro-
vide estimates of comparative contributions of pollutants from each 
of the individual plants.368 By contrast, the RAM model can derive 
specific estimates of comparative amounts of pollutants from each of 
a number of multiple sources. 369 Both the MAXT-24 and RAM 
models, however, establish with some degree of certainty the 
amount of pollutants that an individual source contributes to the am-
bient air.370 
Thus, more sophisticated models such as RAM and MAXT-24 pro-
vide a solution-with some degree of certainty-to the problem of 
determining the relative contribution of pollutants to the ambient air 
by a single source.371 This is a necessary factual determination which 
must be made prior to the policy decision determining the amount of 
cleanup that an individual source must make vis-a-vis other sources 
in its area. The issue may also become an important one to the extent 
that a state air pollution authority may attempt to charge individual 
sources with violations of ambient air quality standards,372 which 
would raise substantial questions regarding the ability of such 
(discussion of the worst case approach typically taken by modelers). 
366. Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F .2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Cin. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660, 661·62 (6th Cir. 1978». 
367. Rep. Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 805 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Clev. Elec. IlIum. 
Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1162 (6th Cir. 1978». 
368. Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Cin. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660,661-62 (6th Cir. 1978». 
369. Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Cin. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660,661-62 (6th Cir. 1978». 
370. The inability of the MAXT-24 model to provide relative contributions from multiple 
sources does not reflect on its ability to demonstrate causation when properly applied to an 
isolated source. By definition, the MAXT-24 projects only the pollution from the source being 
modeled, with any pollution from other sources being subsumed into the background pollution 
factored into the model. 
371. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 239-43. 
372. The EPA may not enforce an ambient air quality standard against a private party 
because such a standard is not a "requirement of an applicable implementation," as required 
under the federal enforcement statute, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(I)(A). See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(I), 
(b)(I). Accord Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation, 1976 AM. B. 
F. J., 365, 399-400. If ambient air quality standards are being violated, the appropriate course 
is for EPA to give notice and, if necessary, initiate an action against the state under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413(a)(2). See United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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models to demonstrate causation with sufficient certainty to uphold 
any enforcement action.373 
The opinions by the Sixth Circuit Court concerning the Ohio SIP 
and nonattainment designations based on models constitute a sub-
stantial body of law on the issues of the general validity of the models 
used; the correctness of adjustments made in the models to reflect 
the terrain being modeled; the extent to which the model can be 
relied on without calibration; and the ways in which monitoring data 
can be used to support or discredit modeling data. The Sixth Circuit 
modeling cases clearly and uniformly hold that, because the Clean 
Air Act authorizes the use of computer modeling, the use of such 
models is not per se arbitrary and capricious.374 Nevertheless, while 
rejecting "general objections to the procedures and formulas [Le., 
models] employed by the EPA," those courts "reserve[d] for later 
decision those attacks ... wherein petitioners assert that the agen-
cy has made specific mistakes or arrived at results claimed to be 
demonstrably erroneous."376 That is, the Sixth Circuit has indicated 
it will be less deferential in examining the particular method of ap-
plying those models. 
The first of the Sixth Circuit opinions dealing with modeling, 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. EPA,376 addressed the ques-
tion of whether EPA erred in designating certain power plants as ur-
ban rather than rural. The correctness of that designation is vital in 
determining whether it is appropriate to use the RAM model, which 
is designed to be employed in urban areas, or the MAXT-24 model, 
373. If an attempt were made to enforce ambient air quality standards against private par-
ties by the use of modeling or monitoring data a substantial causation question would arise. See 
supra note 372. Although the new MAXT-24 and RAM models do allow the establishment of 
some degree of causation, it is unlikely that such models could be shown to be sufficiently 
reliable to justify the finding of a violation of such standard under the Act. After all, "the con-
tent of the standards cannot be divorced from the methodology by which compliance is ad-
judged." W. RODGERS, supra note 155, at 297. Certainly, the present state of the art in model-
ing or monitoring will not allow violations to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, as 
would be required to uphold a criminal violation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c). 
374. Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 910,912 (6th Cir. 1980); Cin. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1980); PPG Ind., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462, 
464-65 (6th Cir. 1980); Rep. Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 805-06 (6th Cir. 1980); Cin. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660, 662 (6th Cir. 1978); Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 
F.2d 1150, 1161 (6th Cir.1978).AccordNo. Ohio Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th 
Cir. 1978). See also GM Corp. v. Costle, 631 F.2d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 1980), which held that the 
use of the SYMAP model to designate nonattainment areas was not arbitrary or capricious in 
itself. 
375. Rep. Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797, 806 (6th Cir. 1980). 
376. 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.), clarified in Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 666 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). 
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which is designed to be used in rural areas.377 The Sixth Circuit in 
Cleveland Electric inspected the geographical location of the plants 
in question and the population distribution in the nearby vicinity and 
upheld the urban designation.378 The court also rejected petitioners' 
challenge to the RAM model's urban dispersion coefficients,379 which 
are multiplying numbers used in the mathematical formula for the 
Gaussian plume dispersion being modeled. 380 
Petitioners in Cleveland Electric did, however, successfully chal-
lenge the coefficients used in the models to represent the assumed 
weather conditions.381 The EPA had chosen the set of assumptions 
representing the least stable weather conditions.382 The court was 
not persuaded to force EPA to use the less burdensome Class B set 
of coefficients;383 the court remanded the issue to EPA for further 
377. See supra text and notes at notes 366-69. 
378. 572 F.2d at 1165 (6th Cir. 1978). See Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 578 F.2d at 667 
(6th Cir. 1978). 
379. See 572 F.2d at 1165; 578 F.2d at 667. 
380. See supra note 362 describing the Gaussian mathematical formula. A coefficient is 
defined as "a number ... put before and multiplying another. In ax, a is the coefficient of 
x . ... " 1 WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 405 (1973). 
381. This success came on petition for review. See Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 
666,667 (6th Cir. 1978) (citing Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660, 662-63 (6th Cir. 
1978». These coefficients were a set of coefficients representing assumed weather conditions. 
The set of coefficients used was one of six sets labeled "Class A" through "Class F," each 
representing different assumed weather conditions, with Class A representing the least stable 
conditions, collectively referred to as Pasquill-Gifford Coefficients. See Kramer, supra note 5, 
at 254-55. 
382. The court in Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1978), stated that 
such Class A coefficients are associated with gusty winds and are part of "the set of assump-
tions which is based on the most direct and quickest impact of the pollution plume upon ground 
level with the least prior dispersal." [d. at 662. EPA's choice of these Class A coefficients 
represented the worst case assumptions for the regulated facilities, in the sense that those 
coefficients result in the highest levels of projected pollution for any given set of data. This 
worst case is to be distinguished from the practice of choosing the second highest of the 
model's results (produced by choosing the appropriate model, adjusting it for assumed terrain 
and weather conditions, and plugging in emission data, done for every day of the year) as a 
basis for setting emission limitations. See supra note 325. 
383. The court stated that: 
petitioners in this instance (contrary to the general attack on the six coefficients 
employed in RAM [as involved in Cleveland Electric]) are not objecting to the use of 
the coefficients; they are attacking the accuracy of one set of them-the Class A set 
associated with the 'gusty winds.' Specifically they claim that the Class A assumption 
is fallacious in that it assumes a longer period of downward draft than occurs in fact 
and fails to make allowance for the lateral dispersal which would accompany such a 
vertical wind at the point of impact. 
578 F.2d at 662. 
Petitioners then supported the challenge with studies of their own, directed the court's at-
tention to a conference launched by EPA, and pointed out the importance of the issue in deter-
mining the emission limits for one-third of the affected power plants. 
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study.384 The court, however, recited an impressive array of criteria 
and authorities rejecting the appropriateness of the Class A coeffi-
cients used by EPA, 386 clearly indicating that the court felt peti-
tioners had carried the day; yet the court was careful to note that its 
remand did not mandate the use of the less burdensome Class B coef-
ficients.386 
This holding as to the appropriate weather coefficients was reaf-
firmed in the most recent of the Ohio SIP cases, Columbus and 
Southern Ohio Electric Co. v. Costle. 387 The EPA had studied the 
points raised in Cleveland Electric and concluded that the Class B 
coefficients would underproject future amounts of pollutants. Thus, 
EPA published a notice in the Federal Register that the agency pro-
posed to re-adopt the Class A coefficients, unless public comments 
could demonstrate otherwise.388 The EPA informed the court that it 
intended to place the comments and EPA's response to them in the 
record before the court.389 The court in Columbus and Southern ob-
viously felt that its remand in Cleveland Electric mandated an en-
tirely new monitoring effort. The Sixth Circuit in Columbus and 
Southern noted with disapproval that the decision addressed therein 
was based "on the same modeling which this court has already found 
to be unsupported by the EPA's own records."390 The court con-
demned EPA's efforts as an invalid attempt at post hoc rationaliza-
384. See id. at 664. 
385. The court's willingness to reject the use of the coefficient was based on the number of 
factors: (1) the particular coefficient chosen was very important because it was a determining 
factor in establishing emission limits for almost one-third of the plants in Ohio, id. at 662; (2) 
three private consultants recommended the use of a Class B coefficient in its place, id. at 663; 
(3) the conference called at EPA's request recommended the adoption of the Class B coeffi-
cient, id.; and (4) EPA admitted "that there was a growing concern among atmospheric model-
ing scientists about the issue" of the use of coefficients for those conditions, id. at 663. In so 
holding, the court rejected suggestions that the coefficients were useful under all cir-
cumstances because they were based on a now "time-tested" study from the 1950's, id. at 662; 
rejected the lack of experimental or field data to justify changing the dispersion curve coeffi-
cient, id. at 663; rejected the defense of petitioners' failure to submit any data to justify the 
change in coefficients, id.; and rejected the claim that EPA should be allowed to use the coeffi-
cient until newly filed data prove them incorrect. [d. 
386. [d. at 664. 
387. 638 F.2d 910,911-12 (6th Cir. 1980). It is interesting to note that the Sixth Circuit here 
said it found the coefficients to "lack a rational basis in the administrative record," id. at 911, 
whereas it earlier used the phrase "arbitrary and capricious." See Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing, Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 660, 
663-64 (6th Cir. 1980». 
388. See 44 Fed. Reg. 7798, discussed in Kramer, supra note 5, at 255 n.110. 
389. See 638 F.2d at 911-12 (quoting the EPA Brief). 
390. 638 F.2d at 911. The court also stated that "[t]he present record gives no indication 
that the reconsideration mandated by this Court has ever been undertaken." [d. 
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tion for its actions, although the opinion did not set forth clearly the 
reasons for this harsh condemnation. 391 
In Columbus and Southern, the Sixth Circuit allowed attacks on 
nonattainment designations "only by showing that EPA's prediction 
of future levels of pollution [using models] are unsupported by the 
record."392 The court, however, did not specify acceptable data, nor 
did it specify the appropriate burden of proof, but stated only that 
"[m]onitoring data tending to show past attainment of air quality 
standards without an air quality control region do not per se show 
the unreliability of EPA's predictions, although such data might 
show EPA's modeling techniques were flawed." 393 That is, the Sixth 
Circuit stated, without benefit of technical support, that a model can 
be shown to be "flawed" (in that it has in the past given incorrect 
predictions, as measured against actual monitored conditions), and 
yet still be considered "reliable." For most models, this statement is 
most likely incorrect: inaccurate predictions do and should be suffi-
cient to show the model's unreliability, at least until its reliability is 
demonstrated in some other way. 
As a technical matter, this holding is correct, in the sense that 
models are "reliable" (i.e., are giving predictions likely to be correct) 
only within certain defined ranges. As an example, a dispersion 
model may give correct readings for a breezeless day, but it is in-
capable of predicting the dispersion for very high wind conditions. 
The statement by the Sixth Circuit can be taken to mean that, all 
other things being equal, a petitioner must show more than a 
divergence of past predictions and results; yet, it should be enough if 
that petitioner shows that such divergence is or will be repeated in 
the future and that this "flaw" will be relied on in the agency's deci-
sion. 
In Cincinnati Gas and Electric v. EPA 11,394 petitioners also chal-
lenged the adjustments in the model, purportedly for the purpose of 
391. Obviously, EPA (as well as this author) had understood that the earlier remand was to 
examine further the technical bases underlying the Class A coefficients. The court did not 
dispute the fact that EPA was studying those bases further, nor could it have been evaluating 
the extent of that further study since EPA's statements make clear that the results of that 
study were not yet before the court. See supra note 364. It thus appears that the Sixth Circuit 
felt that it had mandated a completely new modeling effort by its holding in CGE II. See Cin. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 666, 667 (6th Cir. 1978). 
392. 638 F.2d at 912. 
393. Id. 
394. 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978). EPA had refused to accept the alternative adjustment 
method suggested by petitioners (the so-called "half grounded displacement theory" which 
petitioners characterized as a widely recognized means of accounting for such a situation). 
EPA's method of adjustment, rather than using a generally accepted method of adjustment, 
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making the models more accurately reflect actual conditions in hilly 
terrain in areas where the models tended to underpredict. The court 
noted that, while the record before the court did not establish con-
clusively that the terrain adjustment was a satisfactory solution, the 
record did not offer any evidence to the contrary; therefore, the 
court held that it could not find the terrain adjustment to be arbi-
trary or capricious.396 
The Sixth Circuit Ohio SIP cases also address the proper use of 
monitoring data to calibrate, validate, or discredit modeling results. 
The resolution of the interplay between monitoring data and model-
ing results takes on new importance in light of recent court decisions 
approving their interchangeable use in the PSD396 and nonattain-
ment397 programs under the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 
and to the establishment of emission limitations under the Act.398 
The issue of relating monitoring data to modeling results for the 
Ohio SIP was first raised in the Cleveland Electric case.399 The 
EPA's monitoring data for the affected areas in Ohio were higher 
than the results predicted by the RAM model. Petitioners unsuccess-
fully attempted to use this data to demonstrate the inaccuracies of 
was composed of a validation study comparing modeling results to actual monitoring data. See 
id. at 664-65. As the court said" the "validation studies compared model predictions of S02 
ground level concentrations to actual air quality monitoring data." [d. at 665. EPA's adjust-
ment was to assume that the terrain features were always no higher than the stack height of 
the source stack in question, which is the effective stack height of the MAXT-24 model. [d. at 
664-65. EPA explained its course of reasoning by noting that the terrain data was limited 
based on the observation that the model overpredicted "when air quality monitors were at 
elevations higher than the top of the stack." [d. at 665. After the model was adjusted based on 
particular data used, "[t]his was deemed to be appropriate adjustment because the validation 
studies showed a high degree of correlation between model predictions and sample readouts 
from monitors positioned on terrain lower than stack height in elevation ... ," and "the model 
accurately predicted the ground level concentrations observed by the monitors." [d. 
395. See id. at 665. The court quoted from the EPA Brief to the effect that petitioners did 
not provide any validation studies for their proposed terrain adjustment for the model, but also 
noted that EPA had been forced to admit that it likewise had not performed any validation 
studies and had to disown a statement in an earlier brief that had implied that EPA had per-
formed such studies. 
396. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld EPA's "discretion in the 
choice of methodology-either monitoring or modeling-to be employed in fulfilling" the re-
quirement of performing an air quality projection prior to receiving a permit under 42 
U.S.C.S. § 7475(aX1) (Law. Co-op. 1982). Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 371-72 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). See id. at 350-51. 
397. Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14,19 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing EPA's published 
regulatory policy favoring modeling results over monitoring data, unless there is available 
relevant monitoring data meeting high standards of quality assurance). See 43 Fed. Reg. 
45,998 (1980). 
398. See Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978). 
399. See Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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RAM. The court examined the EPA data, noted that the data fell 
short of showing "predictive perfection," but held "that the EPA's 
use of RAM, if conservative, cannot be held to be arbitrary and capri-
cious."400 A different result might be likely if EPA's figures tended 
to show that the model overpredicted. Petitioners in Cleveland Elec-
tric came forward with two reports, one of which purported to show 
"gross overpredictions by RAM"; however, the court remained un-
convinced of the model's inaccuracy.401 
A related but much more disturbing holding in CGE II was the 
Sixth Circuit finding of "no merit to objections based on failure to 
calibrate the MAXT-24 model." 402 If this holding by the Sixth Circuit 
means what it literally says, then the court has ignored the necessity 
of using monitoring data to initially calibrate, maintain and apply the 
model. 403 This holding by the Sixth Circuit is also in conflict with the 
intent of Congress in passing the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air 
Act, which was described by the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
of Appeals as follows: 
Congress intended that monitoring would impose a certain disci-
pline on the use of modeling techniques, which would be the prin-
400. 572 F.2d at 1163 (citing Mision Ind., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128·29 (1st Cir. 1976); 
Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated on other gnds, 434 U.S. 809 
(1977». Presumably, the court meant that the model was conservative in arguably requiring 
less stringent cleanup efforts than if it were not so conservative. The court's point was that 
less than absolute accuracy in the model's results did not invalidate reliance upon it, particular-
ly when such inaccuracies work to the benefit of those regulated. 
401. See id. at 1163-64. One report was discredited by the court based on undescribed data 
errors found by a "[r]eevaluation" of the model by an unnamed party, which may have been 
the court, or may have been an EPA document submitted after the close of the hearing record 
and strenuously objected to by petitioners. See id. at 1164, 1163 n.4. The other study was 
similarly discredited. In fact, as to it, the court resolved this controversy by weighing the 
monitoring evidence before it and ultimately upholding EPA's data and position. The Sixth 
Circuit later cited in CGE II this portion of Cleveland Electric, holding that it found "no merit 
to objections based on ... failure to reject [the model's] results because of claims of over-
prediction as demonstrated by some monitor readings." 578 F.2d at 665·66. Presumably this 
statement of no merit refers only to the facts in CGE II and would not preclude an attack on 
the model's results by the use of monitoring data. Accord Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. 
Costle, 638 F.2d 910,912 (6th Cir. 1980). This conclusion appears to be borne out in the Sixth 
Circuit's later statement that these arguments in Cleveland Electric and CGE II were "re-
jected in those cases as to the monitoring systems there and then in place." Rep. Steel Corp. v. 
Costle, 621 F.2d 797,805 (6th Cir. 1980). See also Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 
17·19 (6th Cir. 1980). 
402. 578 F.2d at 665·666 (citing Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1163-64 (6th 
Cir. 1978) (numbered paragraph 7». 
403. However, as Professor Silver notes, "lb]efore and after emission reduction models are 
applied, the amount of pollutant in the ambient air must be measured. Such measurement is 
essential for proper application of the model and for enforcement of the limitations set for in· 
dividual polluters." Silver, supra note 284, at 1132. 
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cipal device relied upon for the projection of the impact on air 
quality of emissions from a regulated source. This projects that 
the employment of modeling techniques be held to earth by a 
continual process of confirmation and reassessment, a process 
that enhances confidence in modeling, as a means for realistic 
projection of air quality.404 
The failure to calibrate a model with relevant monitoring data fatally 
undermines the model's credibility and should result in a finding of 
arbitrariness and capriciousness (for an EP A model) or serve as ade-
quate basis for disregarding the model (for a private party's model). 
Assuming that valid monitoring data is essential to accurate model-
ing results, one must then focus on a determination of the proper 
nature, number, and location of the monitors. 
In Ohio Environmental Council v. EPA,405 the Sixth Circuit con-
sidered yet another challenge to the modeling air quality dispersion 
analysis used in the Ohio SIP. The court upheld the revision of the 
SIP in the face of purported violations caused by two specific sources 
in part on the basis that the previously approved MAXT-24 model 
took individual sources into account.406 The court also based its deci-
sion on EPA's verification of certain assumptions underlying the 
model. 407 In light of the modeling analysis used and the temporary 
nature of the revision, EPA's action was found not to be arbitrary or 
capricious.408 
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle,409 the Sixth Circuit considered 
the quality of the monitoring data which a private party must submit 
to overcome EPA's designation of a nonattainment area by the use 
404. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court said that it was 
for this reason that the Clean Air Act's 1977 amendments incorporate a technology forcing ob· 
jective of furthering "the development of sophisticated monitoring techniques, and the collec· 
tion of the data base that would result from monitoring's widespread use." Id. 
405. Ohio Envt'l Council v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1979). The court described the 
analysis in a footnote: 
Dispersion modeling studies consist of two steps. First, an approved device is used to 
monitor the actual effect of emissions from a given source into the ambient air. Next 
a computer calculation is obtained· which is a prediction of the effect the emissions 
from the source in light of known facts and verified assumptions concerning plant 
design, emission rates, surrounding terrain, atmospheric conditions and other factors 
which influence the total effect on air quality of the emissions from a giv~m stationary 
source. 
Id. at 30 n.4. 
406. Id. at 30 (citing Clev. Elec. IlIum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.), clarified, 578 
F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 
660 (6th Cir. 1978». 
407. 593 F.2d at 30. 
408. Id. at 32. 
409. 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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of a computer model. The State of Ohio had earlier designated the at-
tainment area, but was overridden by EPA using modeling 
results.410 The EPA's policy of preferring modeling results to moni-
toring data was said to be based on the assumption that monitoring 
networks are "usually not sufficiently comprehensive to cover any 
given area."411 The court in Republic Steel, however, observed that 
"[t]heoretically, of course, actual air quality tests would have to be 
superior to modeling assumptions if there were sufficient monitors 
to constitute a fair test of the ambient air in a county." 412 The Sixth 
Circuit in Republic Steel raised the question of the minimum number 
of monitors which would be needed for a meaningful sample of the 
ambient air of a county, but held that such a determination could not 
be made from the record before it. Consequently, the court affirmed 
EPA's nonattainment designation involved in Republic Steel. 413 
In General Motors v. Costle,414 the court held that EPA properly 
determined that GM had failed to come forward with adequate 
monitoring data, although the three monitors surrounding the 
General Motors plant showed no violations of ambient air quality 
standards. The EPA ignored these data because the agency con-
cluded that the data were not quality assured. The court also noted 
that EPA's monitors located throughout the county did show a viola-
tion of ambient air quality standards. Therefore, the court held that 
EP A's designation of the county as a nonattainment area was not ar-
bitrary and capricious.415 
In order for a monitoring network to produce quality assured data, 
its monitors, in addition to meeting the technical specifications con-
tained in federal regulations,416 must be of sufficient number, and 
must be placed in correct locations. As for the proper location of 
monitors to ensure the production of quality assured data, the moni-
tors should be placed at the locations which the computer has 
predicted to have the highest levels of pollution, the so-called "hot 
410. See 40 C.F.R. S§ 81.301-81.356 (1981); 43 Fed. Reg. 46,000 (1978); 45 Fed. Reg. 17,597 
(1980). 
411. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,998, quoted in Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14,19 (6th Cir. 
1980). 
412. 621 F.2d 797, 805 (6th Cir. 1980). This is recognized in the EPA guidelines to Air 
Branch Chiefs of EPA regional offices, which states that "[i]f there is a conflict between ade-
quate monitoring data and modeling results, monitoring values should be used." Cin. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 19 (6th Cir. 1980) (emphasis in the original). 
413. 621 F.2d 797, 805 (6th Cir. 1980). 
414. 631 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1980). 
415. Id. at 468. 
416. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R., Part 51, Appendix P (1981). 
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spotS."417 The Sixth Circuit held in Columbus and Southern that 
"polluters in a currently 'clean' region can substantively attack a 
non attainment designation of their region only by a showing that 
EPA's predictions of future pollution levels are unsupported by the 
record ... ," and, thus, are arbitrary and capricious.418 Again, the 
court did not specify the extent of the showing other than to state 
that if EPA fails to reveal the site of the model's receptors and 
disregards the petitioners' data, then the Sixth Circuit would hold 
this to be "peremptory and arbitrary."419 The court had earlier held 
that a bare allegation that petitioners' monitors were placed at the 
model's hot spots "is insufficient to establish that the monitoring 
data is 'adequate' in the sense that it should prevail over the model-
ing results."42o 
Thus, although EPA's monitoring results may be accorded little 
respect by courts,421 even less credence is given to the monitoring 
results produced by private parties. Therefore, any petitioner, in 
order to contest a nonattainment designation, must be prepared to 
engage in a lengthy, carefully constructed, and expensive monitor-
ing effort without any assurance that the court will be convinced by 
its results, no matter how dramatic. 
The holdings of the Sixth Circuit cases on the Ohio SIP generally 
demonstrate that EPA can base nonattainment designations on 
predictions of future violations of air quality standards.422 This 
holding will further facilitate the use of models. Obviously, such 
future violations can be shown by EPA only with a computer; no 
417. See 632 F.2d at 16, 19. The model is not designed to give readings at all points in its 
coverage, but only certain receptor sites, which are the points in the model where it does pro-
duce data. As the court had earlier noted, in order to try to insure that the model's results have 
some reasonable relationship with the physical system being monitored, "the monitor loca-
tions and the receptor sites for the [model's) predictions must correspond." Clev. Elec. IlIum. 
Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1163 (6th Cir. 1978). For a pictorial comparison in monitoring sites 
and hypothetical receptor sites, see Columbus & So. Ohio Electric Co. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 910, 
913-14 (6th Cir. 1980). 
418. Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1980). 
419. [d. The court did not say whether the petitioner would have to establish that its 
monitors were, in fact, placed at the monitor's receptors, but the court implied that petitioners 
would not need to make such a showing. If such is the case, the court should, at a minimum, re-
quire a standard of good faith effort by petitioners and a showing by them that their monitor-
ing network displays substantial compliance with good engineering practice. 
420. Cin. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 14, 19 (6th Cir. 1980). Thereafter, the court, as 
it did in Cleveland Electric, noted that the court was unable to inform itself of the nature of 
petitioners' monitoring network, because of the petitioners' consultant's refusal to provide 
such information based on proprietary interests. 
421. See Silver, supra note 284, at 1132-37. 
422. E.g., Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Costle, 638 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir.1980)(citing 
PPG Ind. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980». 
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monitor can record data on hypothetical future conditions. Likewise, 
petitioners must be prepared to use such models because of the 
limited usefulness of monitoring data under Columbus and Southern. 
In Columbus and Southern, the court held that monitoring data could 
be used to show that EPA's modeling techniques were flawed, but 
noted that the mere fact that such monitoring data show past attain-
ment of air quality standards does not per se show the unreliability of 
EPA's projected violations based on models.423 
The Sixth Circuit cases on the Ohio SIP models will likely serve as 
precedent for many cases involving models under the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and nonattainment programs of the 
Clean Air Act, and may well serve as general authority for other 
cases involving environmental models. The level of judicial review 
employed in these seven Ohio SIP cases appears to show less varia-
tion than previous cases. This may reflect the Sixth Circuit's adjust-
ment to the problems of reviewing environmental models. More like-
ly, this decrease in variation can be attributed to the court's repeated 
exposure to the same basic case. In either event, the arbitrary and 
capricious level of review applied by the Sixth Circuit in these Ohio 
SIP cases appears too deferential to ensure a minimal level of mean-
ingful review. Thus, the Sixth Circuit's sophistication from repeated 
exposure to the Ohio SIP models failed to move the Sixth Circuit 
beyond the shortcomings shown in the SIP cases previously dis-
cussed from the Fifth, First, Third, Ninth, Fourth, and District of 
Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit cases also fail 
to show any significantly greater level of sophistication over those 
earlier cases. 
One final Clean Air Act SIP case of note involving an environmen-
tal model is Environmental Study & Protection v. Pac,424 in which 
petitioners unsuccessfully challenged a model used for indirect 
source review.425 Petitioners sought to force the rescinding of an in-
direct source permit issued by the state environmental agency. Peti-
tioners there urged that the model used to describe a highway proj-
ect underpredicted probable pollution levels, both by virtue of the 
model's construction and its failure to take into account certain fac-
tors, such as background pollution and the effects of nearby 
automobiles on roads adjacent to the highway being modeled. The 
district court in Environmental Study upheld the state's use of the 
423. 638 F.2d at 912. 
424. 464 F. Supp. 143 (D. Conn. 1978), which is discussed in greater detail in Kramer, supra 
note 5, at 263 n.164. 
425. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 7410(a)(5)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1982), which precludes EPA from requir-
336 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:251 
model because it used "worst case" conditions, and EPA later used 
the same model, and also because of the lack of an explicit require-
ment of any model in the process. Professor Kramer has opined that 
Environmental Study' 'placed a heavy burden of proof on petitioners 
to show that the use of [the] model was arbitrary," and that the case 
represents "a much less active role in reviewing discretionary agen-
cy decisionmaking" than that exercised by the Sixth Circuit in the 
Ohio SIP cases, and that such an approach "may reflect a future 
trend." 426 
B. Cases Under NEP A and Similar Environmental Statutes 
The Overton Park standard applied in environmental models deci-
sions had its roots in earlier cases under NEP A. 427 Early NEP A 
cases established that the technical analysis contained in an EIS 
must be readable by a layman. 428 These early NEP A cases also estab-
lished that the environmental agency was not required to engage in a 
"crystal ball inquiry" in making environmental decisions based on 
projections of future conditions,429 but that a governmental action 
not supported by sufficient, reliable scientific data would be held in-
valid under the arbitrary and capricious standard of substantive judi-
cial review.430 Courts were not then inclined to inquire in detail into 
the technical analyses involved in these early NEPA cases, both be-
cause the methodology was specified by Congress and because the 
ing such indirect source review of facilities which may attract mobile sources of pollution. 
426. Kramer, supra note 5, at 264 n.164. 
427. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
428. E.g., EDF v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 809 (E.D. Tenn.), affd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 
1972), dissolved, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), affd 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.) (per 
curiam), application for stay denied, 414 U.S. 1036 (1974). 
429. E.g., NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
430. E.g., Lanthan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 (W.D: Wash. 1972). See NRDC v. Grant, 355 
F. Supp. 280 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 410-11, 423 
(W.D. Va. 1973), affd 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973). Cape Henry applied a similar standard of 
arbitrary and capricious review, as the court stated: 
The [c)ourt believes that its role under NEPA is not only to see that government 
agencies have complied with all the procedural requirements, but also to engage in 
'substantial inquiry' to determine 'whether there has been a clear error of judgment.' 
Courts are allowed to delve into the decisionmaking process on their own to deter-
mine if the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious when viewed in terms of 
the data and information supplied and set forth in the EIS. 
359 F. Supp. at 410. The model that the Cape Henry court was examining was the cost-benefit 
ratio required to be applied to a flood control project which was contained in the EIS for the 
project. See id. 412-14. 
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methodologies' crudeness limited the degree to which decision-
makers could rely upon them.431 
Perhaps the earliest review of an environmental decision based on 
a model was the case of Petterson v. Froehlke,432 which was decided 
before any of the cases discussed above involving the Clean Air Act. 
NEP A became effective after the start of the project involved in Pet-
terson and was thus held inapplicable to the ongoing project.433 The 
issue in Petterson was whether the Corps of Engineers violated its 
own dredging regulations and erred in projecting probable erosion 
and other environmental consequences of a dredging project by the 
use of a mathematical simulation of river currents. Plaintiff unsuc-
cessfully urged that it was necessary to model the erosion by a 
physical mode1434 called a hydraulic simulation. Although perhaps 
not squarely presented with the question of the validity of the 
methodology used in the mathematical model, the court summarily 
dismissed plaintiff's objection to the dredge and fill permit, noting 
that applicable statutes and regulations did not require detailed 
reports in the manner that NEP A required. 435 
Early opinions stated that the purpose of judicial review under 
NEP A was not to ensure a "correct" environmental decision, 
although the courts did acknowledge their responsibilities to review 
substantively the technical methodologies underlying those deci-
sions.436 Courts displayed apparent frustration at having to review 
early crude methodologies: as they said, the more one examined the 
methodologies, the more deficiencies one could find. 437 The courts 
431. See, e.g., Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 414, 419, 422 (W.D. Va. 
1973). The court noted that Congress specified the model to be used (the cost-benefit method) 
and the coefficients to be used in it (the discount rate, which was used to calculate the cost of 
the project). The court also noted that the Corps of Engineers' failure to quantify environmen-
tal values was not fatal because at that time there was no method of calculating such values. 
Id. at 414. Ultimately, the court in Cape Henry placed more emphasis on the judgment and ex-
pertise of the decisionmaker, holding that if the decision "is made in good faith and without 
bias, then the collection of voluminous amount of data is unnecessary." Id. at 422. 
432. 354 F. Supp. 45 (D. Or. 1970), remanded on other gnds, Citizens Comm. for Columbia 
River v. Callaway, 494 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1972) (mootness). 
433. 354 F. Supp. at 48-49. 
434. The physical model is a physically constructed model, usually on a reduced and 
simplified scale, of the conditions being studied, based upon the assumption that this miniature 
reproduction or approximation will act similarly to the actual condition. Cj Kramer, supra 
note 5, at 238 (describing an atmospheric physical model). 
435. 354 F. Supp. at 49. 
436. See, e.g., EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346,351-53 (8th Cir.), inj. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 
(1972) (Brennan, Douglas, JJ., would grant). 
437. E.g., EDF v. Corps of Engineers (Gilham Dam), 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark. 
1972), affd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), inj. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (Blackmun, Douglas, JJ., would 
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were not in a position to expect perfection in the impact statement, 
but only a sufficiently detailed document created with good faith ob-
jectivity.438 
The second NEP A case apparently involving models, Life of the 
Land v. Brinegar,439 affirmed a lower court's denial of plaintiff's re-
quest for an injunction against the proposed expansion of the Hono-
lulu, Hawaii International Airport. Plaintiffs had alleged, among 
other things, that the noise prediction methodologies used in the air-
port EIS were inadequate because they did not use "on-sight" noise 
measurement techniques to gather monitoring data. The court 
pointed out that, in lieu of monitoring data, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration utilized a modeling technique characterized by the court 
as a "well recognized scientific technique, which renders 'on-sight' 
measurement techniques unnecessary."440 The court cited Overton 
Park in upholding the sufficiency of the EIS, while pointing out that 
"[u]ndoubtedly, there exists a plethora of scientific studies which 
could have been used, but were not. . . ." 441 Life of the Land 
stands as an early example of courts' unwillingness to hold that 
NEP A required that predictive techniques be based on models. 
Courts continued to hold that the failure of the EIS to discuss the 
scientific bases for certain socioeconomic, recreational, and other en-
vironmental data and statements was not fatal to the adequacy of 
the impact statement under NEP A. 442 If the record contained ade-
quate but conflicting data, courts declined to interject themselves in-
to the decisionmaking process, stating that it was not within their 
purview to resolve conflicts in expert opinion.443 If the agency 
demonstrated a hard look at relevant factors, then it was the 
grant), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The district court opinion, 
however, contained a very well documented holding in favor of substantive review under 
NEPA. See 342 F. Supp. at 298-301. 
438. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946,950-51 (7th Cir. 1973). Again, the court 
reaffirmed its duty to review substantive merits of the decision, but noted it could not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency. ld. at 952-53. It was about this time that the 
first of the cases involving the Baltimore expressway was decided. See MAD v. Volpe, 361 F. 
Supp. 1360 (D. Md.), affd, 500 F. 2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). 
439. 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
440. 485 F.2d at 472. 
441. ld. 
442. E.g., EDF v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 235 (W.D. Mo. 1973), affd sub nom. EDF v. 
Callaway; 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974). See EDF v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(related case). 
443. E.g., City of No. Miami v. Train, 377 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 1974), cited in 
Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D. Ohio 1978). Accord, Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs 
v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
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agency's prerogative to resolve the scientific disputes as the agency 
saw fit.444 
Cases under NEP A have rejected the suggestion that Section 
102(1XB) of NEP A 445 mandates the development of methods and 
procedures to permit the calculation and comparison of environmen-
tal amenities, and have held that NEP A does not mandate the use of 
computers in the preparation of an impact statement.446 Those 
cases, however, are not authority that NEPA requires of administra-
tive agencies less than the best decisionmaking methodology. Those 
cases (largely involving flood control projects) present a different 
problem from the typical environmental data problem, in that the 
decisionmaker in such cases was Congress, not an administrative 
agency. In those cases, Congress established with some degree of 
specificity the algorithm to be used (the cost-benefit ratio), as well as 
the specific value of some of the values of the variable to be applied. 
This specification of methodology by Congress in cost-benefit 
ratios distinguishes them from the usual environmental modeling 
situation in which the model and its variables' values are set by the 
agency or persons working for the agency. This distinction is impor-
tant for judicial review: obviously, when Congress explicitly defines 
the methodology and makes the concomitant policy changes, judicial 
review should be very deferential, at least as to those portions of the 
decisionmaking process. Where Congress is not the decisionmaker, 
plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to tender evidence to dis-
credit the environmental decisionmaking methodology underlying 
the decision by showing the questionableness of the assumptions and 
mathematics underlying the agency decision. Although courts may 
not yet be ready to require that a computer be used to prepare 
NEP A impact statements, computers were in fact being so em-
ployed. Therefore, courts have had to face the question of the ap-
propriate standards and level of judicial review of those models 
under NEPA. 
The first case under NEP A to examine in detail some of the under-
lying assumptions and data of an environmental model was the case 
of City of Romulus v. County of Wayne. 447 At issue in the Romulus 
444. E.g., Coal. for Responsible Regional Develop. v. Coleman, 555 F.2d 398,400 (4th Cir. 
1977). 
445. See supra text and notes at notes 83-94. 
446. EDF v. Corps of Engineers (Tennessee-Tombigbee waterway), 348 F. Supp. 916, 928 
(N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord, Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 
1111-12 (9th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286-87 & n.14 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
447. 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See id. at 585-89. Although the Eastern District of 
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case was the use of an environmental model to predict air and noise 
pollution levels resulting from the expansion of the Detroit Metropol-
itan Wayne County Airport. Petitioners in Romulus alleged there 
were errors in the data and methodology used in the models, as well 
as problems in interpreting the meaning of the model's results, 
because of the ambiguity present in the noise contours resulting 
from the model. The first challenged modeling effort purported to 
predict the added delay time that an air traveler would encounter in 
waiting to fly out of the airport if the proposed runway were not con-
structed.448 The second modeling effort attempted to predict the 
resulting changes in noise level impacts on the surrounding areas if 
the new runway were or were not built.449 Applying the Overton 
Park arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court found in 
City of Romulus that the EIS did not meet the full and fair disclosure 
requirements of NEPA.450 Consequently, the court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction against the further use of federal funds on the proj-
ect.451 
In the first modeling effort, future passenger air traveler delay 
times were quantitatively predicted for the purpose of calculating 
the benefits of the project as proposed, which were to be weighed 
against its costs (environmental and otherwise) as required under 
NEP A. The benefit to be measured was the reduction in delay time 
that would accrue to future air travelers coming into and leaving the 
airport by virtue of the airport's improved facilities.452 The predic-
tions as to delay times were found to be deficient because of inade-
quacies in the data and in the application of the computer models 
used. The data and models were found to be deficient for four gen-
eral reasons. First, the data used was not the best then avail-
Michigan is in the Sixth Circuit, the court in Romulus did not cite any prior Sixth Circuit 
NEPA cases, e.g., EDF v. TVA, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974), nor did it cite the case involving 
the Ohio SIP which the Sixth Circuit had already handed down, Buckeye Power v. EPA, 481 
F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). Instead, the court looked to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals' opinion in Greater Boston Television Corp:v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 
eert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), as authority for the hard look standard applied in the 
Romulus case. See 392 F. Supp. at 590. 
448. 392 F. Supp. at 585-88. 
449. Id. at 591-94. 
450. See id. at 584, 587. The court said it was applying a procedural review of the contents 
of an EIS under the standards of S 102(2)(C) of NEP A and S 706(A) of the AP A as delineated 
by the Overton Park case. Id. at 583. Although plaintiffs did not request substantive review of 
the decision, id. at 583 n.1, the court felt constrained to note that some courts have "found 
mandate for review of the ultimate substantive agency decision under the sweeping language 
of Section 101 of [NEPAl." Id. at 583. 
451. See id. at 584-86,589 n.7. 
452. See id. at 584-86. 
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able.453 Second, the data used was based on unsupported (and 
unsupportable) assumptions.454 Third, the terms that expressed and 
embodied the model's results were not adequately defined.455 
453. The data used were not actual measurements of present air traffic levels as determined 
from recent tower counts. Id. at 587. Instead, present traffic levels were assumed to be the 
same as those earlier predicted by the Air Transportation Association. The court failed to 
specify how old the predictions were, and cast no light on why the authorities failed "to include 
figures then available as to actual operations .... " Id. at 588 (emphasis in original). The court 
found that the failure to include figures then available in October of 1973, when the EIS was 
submitted, was potentially misleading to the agency decisionmakers, other reviewing agen-
cies, and the public. Id. at 588. Although this failure was said to violate NEPA's purpose of 
making the EIS a complete source or document, the decision can also be attributed to the 
court's realization of the importance of data as a corroboration of the model's results. 
454. The court pointed out at least three incorrect assumptions in the model. First, it ques-
tioned the modeler's assumptions as to a stable "fleet mix" for the years covered by the model. 
Id. at 588. Fleet mix gives a profile of the kinds of planes using the airport according to the 
number of passengers carried. This assumption was of vital importance in calculating the total 
hours of annual delay and the dollar cost of that delay, both of which the model claimed to be 
predicting quantitatively. It appears that delay was calculated on a per-passenger basis as op-
posed to a per-plane basis, since the court found that the fleet mix assumed by the modelers 
"produce[d] a greater dollar delay savings .... " Id. at 588-89. The court condemned this 
assumption, not because it was wrong, but because the court concluded it was inconsistent 
with other data used in the same modeling effort (Le., the fleet mix of general aviation 
aircraft). See id. at 588. The court may have accused the modelers wrongly, if the facts stand 
as the court states them. The fact that categories of non-carrier, general aviation aircraft, and 
carrier aircraft are assumed to change drastically in their composition is not, contrary to the 
court's statements, necessarily inconsistent with a constant percentage of general aviation air-
craft as assumed. See id. at 588. 
The second piece of data that the court found wrongfully assumed or relied on was the 
number of annual operations in the years which were modeled. Id. The third inaccurate, or at 
least inadequately supported assumption found by the court was that the landing strip was 
nearing saturation of its capacity. Id. at 589. The court noted there was evidence that the run-
way was not yet nearing load saturation. Id. at 589. It was not even clear that the ad-
ministrative decisionmakers were aware of, or were sensitive to the assumptions made or their 
importance to the model's results. See id. at 585 n.2. The court solved this problem by im-
puting knowledge of these problems to the decisionmakers: since "[t]he alleged deficiencies of 
omission were known to the staff preparers of the EIS, [they were] presumably [known] to the 
agency decision-makers .... " Id. at 585. The court placed this burden on the decisionmakers 
in spite of the fact that it recognized that "[w]hether agency decision-makers are aware of 
technical deficiencies known to staff preparers of an EIS is open to question." Id. at n.2. This 
response was not only to ensure that the decision was an "informed choice," id. at 585 (citing 
Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971», but 
also to overcome any biases that might be inherent in expert presentations. The court said that 
"[i]t is axiomatic, however, that for an agency review of staff recommendations to be truly in-
dependent, deficiencies which may undermine the conclusions reached in the draft EIS should' 
be known to the ultimate decisionmaker." 392 F. Supp. at 585 n.2 (emphasis added). 
455. The EIS contained four inadequately defined terms or phrases: "delay," "acceptable 
levels of delay," "Practical Hourly Capacity" (PHC), and "saturation." 392 F. Supp. at 589. 
The court noted that the EIS did not make clear "[w]hether delay, for instance, includes taxi 
delay, as well as delay once an aircraft is in position for take-off, or delay in clearance for land-
ing .... " Id. Second, it was not clear whether delay was a self-contained and absolute 
measure of this time or whether it was dependent on the definition of acceptable levels of 
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Fourth, the EIS failed to delineate exactly how the modeling meth-
odologies were applied,456 particularly in view of the inconsistencies 
between the model's assumptions and results.457 
The second modeling effort was designed to predict the resulting 
sound levels in surrounding areas to be caused by future air traffic 
levels. These predictions were made, first assuming no runway 
would be built, and then assuming that the new runway would be 
constructed.458 The results of these two modeling efforts were com-
pared in an attempt to evaluate the effect of the new runway in 
terms of noise. Generally speaking, the court did not question the ap-
plication of the methodologies used to reach the results except in-
sofar as they relied upon data that the court had already found to be 
unacceptable in its discussion of delay time predictions.459 The 
delay, as implied by counsel for the agency. See id. at 589 n.6. Third, although the court felt it 
was obvious that the term saturation would be defined with reference to peak hour traffic 
levels, it found fatal the impact statement's failure to so state. [d. at 589 n.7. Fourth, although 
PHC was apparently defined in the EIS as the maximum number of aircraft that the airport 
could accommodate without violating the criterion "than an acceptable level of delay is four 
minutes per operation," the obvious problem with this definition was that it was not clear 
whether this acceptable level of delay was to be judged on an average basis, or whether it was 
a worst-case maximum not to be exceeded. The exact definition of each and every term 
employed in a modeling effort is important, not only because they are usually mutually in-
terdependent, but "[m]ore fundamentally, ... [they are of] pivotal importance to the conclu-
sions reached." [d. This is because the definitions used, like any other assumptions made in the 
modeling effort, are inextricably intertwined with the validity of the computations made in the 
application of the model. 
456. The EIS did not indicate how delay was computed. [d. at 589. The court said that 
"[a]lthough there is reference to delay [in a section of the EIS unrelated to this methodology] 
neither the information nor the figures there presented explain how the delay has been 
calculated." [d. at 589 n.6. It is not clear whether the court was concluding that the informa-
tion was not included in the EIS, or saying that the decisionmaker and public could not under-
stand the information contained in the report. 
457. In assessing the methodology used to conclude "that the existing runway configuration 
is rapidly approaching saturation," 392 F. Supp. at 589, and that this would be alleviated by 
the fact that "hourly capacity [would] be increased by 50% ... by the addition of the new 
runway," id. at 588, the court found that the conclusions were "not accompanied by support-
ing data," id. at 589, in light of the fact that "much of the data that can be assembled from the 
EIS supports the opposite conclusion." [d. The court made its own calculations to see if the 
modeler's discussion of delay time in total hours on an annual basis could really be related to 
the per-operation delay constraint as the modeler claimed. [d. at 589 (acceptable level of delay 
of four minutes). The court took the level of traffic used by the modelers (which the court found 
to be unsupported) and multiplied it by the acceptable level of delay (four minutes) to see what 
the resulting annual total delay would be. [d. at 589. Such an approach is inconsistent with the 
interrelated nature of variable and function that is embodied in the exponential relationship, 
such as the one here for relating traffic levels and delay time. See id. at 586. 
458. 392 F. Supp. at 591-94. See id. at 585. 
459. The court apparently felt that the agency had applied a state-of-the-art technology. 
The court said that that, although the systems used were not perfect in every respect, the 
decisionmakers were faced with the problems for which "no single method [had] yet been 
1982] PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 343 
court's real objection to the modeling effort was to the form in which 
the model's results were presented, which the court felt obscured or 
masked the environmental decision.460 That is, the numerical and 
graphical forms of the model's results hindered, rather than facili-
tated, an understanding by the decisionmaker of the environmental 
quality to result from the decision based on the model. This masking 
effect also hindered the public's understanding of the decision. 
The term "masking" as used herein refers to the fact that environ-
mental decisions are often expressed in numerical or graphical terms 
that are difficult to interpret and understand. For instance, in Romu-
lus, the predicted numerical noise levels and the graphical represen-
tations of those noise levels were difficult to translate into the 
resulting environmental quality. As a result, it was difficult for the 
decisionmaker to evaluate properly the correctness of its decision 
from a common sense point of view. It is similarly difficult for the 
parties to evaluate and respond to the considerations raised by such 
decisions, and even more difficult for the public to do so. Finally, this 
masking effect presents a similar hindrance to a reviewing court's 
attempt to engage in even a nominal level of meaningful substantive 
review. As an example, in Romulus, it is unlikely that anyone other 
agreed upon to answer all relevant noise questions." [d. at 594. The ASDS (Aircrafts Sound 
Description System) system was said to be "a major improvement over the abstractness" of 
the old system, id., which had been "misunderstood and misapplied." [d. at 592. ASDS was 
also said to be understandable to the layman. [d. at 594. 
The court claimed that it was not resolving conflicts in expert opinion, because "[t]he 
criticism of ASDS expressed by [plaintiff's expert witness, the Director of Sensory Sciences at 
the Stanford Research Institute], and accepted by the Court, goes beyond a mere difference of 
opinion between groups of scientists as to what noise description methodology is more reveal-
ing." [d. at 594 (emphasis added). That is, the court must have found some part of the facts 
that mooted its observation that there were more established composite noise level 
measurements than ASDS (and, by implication, CNR). [d. at 593. The court was referring to 
yet a third sound measurement methodology, Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF), that the EPA 
views as a better indicator of what actual noise levels will be produced and which EPA used to 
convert the FAA's results into what it viewed to be a more understandable form. It is in-
teresting to observe that, in comparing the two methodologies as applied, the court noted that 
"the CNR system itself is not subject to the same criticisms as the ASDS ... ," for reasons 
which are discussed infra. [d. at 594 (emphasis added). By virtue of the court's ambiguous 
language on the subject, it is unclear to what extent it did actually resolve expert opinions 
without so explicitly stating. 
Other commentators have disagreed with the court's conclusion and have stated that "[t]he 
best method now available for describing noise around airports and of predicting human 
response is the Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF)." Port Noise Complaint, supra note 55, at 70, 
72. They note that such a study had already been prepared for the Detroit Wayne Airport at 
the time of the 1970 article. [d. at 72 nA8. See Bishop & Simpson, Noise Exposure Forecast 
Contours for 1967, 1970, and 1975 Operations at Selected Airports (Final Report) (Rep. No. 
FAA NO-70-0 (1970), prepared for the FAA. 
460. See 392 F. Supp. at 593 at n.14. 
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than a fairly sophisticated reader would have been alerted by the 
numerical results to the fact that the models actually predicted noise 
levels that would result in violations of noise guidelines established 
by other federal agencies.461 
In Romulus, the EIS, as required by FAA regulations, presented 
its sound modeling results using two methods: the Aircraft Sound 
Description System (ASDS) and the Composite Noise Rating (CNR) 
system.462 These results were presented in the form of (1) contour 
maps463 that purported to express the degree to which the surround-
ing areas would be affected by noise levels from the airport; and (2) a 
tabulated summary gleaned from the contour maps and aerial photo-
graphs which outlined the noise levels to which structures within the 
contours would be subjected. The court held that deficiencies in these 
methods used to present the results of the modeling efforts invali-
dated the EIS, although the court found that the models and data us-
ing the contours and tabulated summary were "correct" when 
considered alone.464 
The court characterized the computer-generated noise contours as 
"meaningless numbers to the nonscientist with no guidelines to 
analyze the data presented in terms of acceptability for a human en-
vironment." 466 Such ambiguity was held to prevent reviewing par-
ties from ensuring that the actual noise levels that would result 
would be acceptable, in the sense that they would properly cor-
respond to the political choices that had already been embodied in en-
vironmental policy. In Romulus, "significant noise levels" were ig-
nored, even though they would occur over a "long cumulate dura-
461. Id. at 594 & n.15. 
462. Id. at 591. 
463. For an example of such a contour map using the NEF System see Port Noise Com-
plaint, supra note 55, at 75. 
464. The court might be interposing an objection that no quantitative cost-benefit analysis 
was made, as some courts have indicated is required under NEP A. See, e.g., Boxley v. Corps of 
Engineers, 411 F. Supp. 1261, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 1976). The attempt would be one that would 
use land-use and other information on the "sensitivity of the recipient" to particular noise 
levels, see 392 F. Supp. at 592 n.12, .and value the cost of the calculated level that is predicted 
to accrue. The weighing of nighttime exposure levels is one step in this dire~tion. This sort of 
effort is exemplifies of the trend towards sophistication in environmental mathematical efforts 
and may be mandated by NEPA and the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,49 
U.S.C.S. §§ 1701-1720 (Law. Co-op. 1980). The Airway Development Act requires prior to run-
way construction that the agency include and assess "the economic, social and environmental 
effects of the airport location and its consistency with goals and objectives of environmental 
urban planning as have been carried out by the community." See Port Noise Complaint, supra 
note 55, at 95-98. 
465. 392 F. Supp. at 594. 
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tion" involving a wide area that included some areas not subjected to 
such levels previously. 466 
This masking of such serious consequences was attributable in 
some degree to the non-linear nature of the system being modeled. 
That is, the algorithmic nature of noise measurement techniques 
(like the exponential nature of the delay time functions previously 
discussed)467 made the conceptualization of the resulting environ-
mental changes all the more difficult. This problem of the non-
linearity of the noise measurement technique is typical of models: 
often, a small error at an early stage of the modeling process can 
produce unexpectedly large differences in the model's predictions. 
These differences can be so large as to entirely alter the conclusions 
to be drawn from the modeling effort. For instance, in the case of the 
delay time predictions, a different assumption as to what constituted 
delay could have led to the conclusion that the new runway should 
not be built.468 The court in Romulus also noted that the 85 decibel 
A-weighted (85dB(A)) noise level used in the methodology appeared 
to have been chosen to fit the particular situation involved.469 
The Romulus court adopted the view that NEP A requirements of 
full and fair disclosures are "procedural duties [under] Section 102" 
of the Act; however, the court applied those duties as though they 
466. See id. at 593. 
467. See id. The "failure to disclose noise levels above 85dB(A) is the most serious defi-
ciency in the EIS." [d. The ASDS methodology registered whether the sound level exceeded 
85dB(A), and if it did, the length of time of such excess for a given day. The ASDS method-
ology did not measure the extent by which the noise level exceeded 85dB(A). Thus, the model 
failed to differentiate between noise levels which were merely bothersome and those which 
could have serious health consequences. This deficiency could have been cured by the use of 
the CNR methodology, id. at 594, which was not used because the court expressed doubt that 
the lay reader would get any more information if the CNR technique was used. See id. at 
593-94. 
468. See id. at 589, 593. Similar problems were incurred with the non-linear reduction 
model. See Texas v. EPA 285,295 (5th Cir. 1974); MAD v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 565 (D. 
Md. 1975). 
469. 392 F. Supp. at 592. The justifications offered by FAA for their choice ofthe 85dB(A) 
level were basically three: (1) it corresponded to an indoor awakening threshold level; (2) it cor-
responded to the limits of current monitoring capabilities; and (3) it seemed to be particularly 
well suited for use in this case, "because the 85dB(A) contours [as drawn after the fact] cor-
responded approximately with both the altitude and the lateral boundaries of airport traffic 
areas." [d. The exact nature of the court's resolution is again not clear. There was no evidence 
cited in the opinion that contradicted the assertion by FAA that "the quality of noise analysis 
below [85dB(A)] starts to degrade." See id. at 592. Indeed, as the court said, the standard 
"may have significance as a measuring standard." [d. Yet, the court accepted the plaintiffs 
opinion as to its unsatisfactory scientific justification, and justified that acceptance by saying 
that "the rationale for its selection as a maximum level of acceptability for the human environ-
ment was not demonstrated either in the EIS or the testimony." [d. 
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were also substantive, in that they were intended to affect the 
substance of the decision by ensuring that "the ultimate project deci-
sion would be based on all available information." 470 The court exam-
ined whether the EIS failed procedurally to disclose the necessary in-
formation so that a reasoned decision could be given, instead of ex-
amining whether the facts and evidence set forth in the EIS com-
plied with the substantive requirements of section 101 of NEP A, be-
cause plaintiffs did not try to prove that the substantive decision to 
construct a third parallel runway was in error.471 The court left open 
the question of the proper parameters of judicial review of agency 
environmental decision.472 Nevertheless, at least some of plaintiff's 
allegations apparently challenged the correctness or "merits" of the 
environmental decision, prompting the court to address them to the 
extent the court felt it could and should do so under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. The court's application of a substantive level of 
review was manifested in two ways. First, the court's sensitivity to 
inadequacies in the underlying data in the record was much greater 
than a procedural review would require. Second, despite the court's 
disclaimer, it resolved conflicts in expert opinion; in particular, the 
court resolved differing expert opinions on the classifications under-
lying the noise level chosen, which was said to be based on the capa-
bility of available monitoring.473 In Romulus, the court's approach to 
the standards of judicial review appears to reveal the court's feeling 
that the procedural level of NEP A review was too restrictive upon 
the court's legitimate need to examine the technical bases underly-
ing the agency decision. 
The court's basic rationale for the more stringent judicial review 
standard used in Romulus was the decisionmaker's failure to use the 
best modeling and graphical display methodologies available to prop-
erly inform the decisionmaker and general public of the environmen-
tal decision being made.474 Applying general principles of equity, the 
470. 392 F. Supp. at 589. 
471. [d. at 583. 
472. [d. at 583 n.1. 
473. See id. at 586-87, 589 n. 7. The court may simply have been judging the credibility of the 
expert witness, who was an employee of the consulting firm which prepared the capacity sec-
tion of the EIS. [d. at 588. The more likely explanation is that the court accepted the expert's 
testimony that it was possible for an expert such as himself to analyze data and results, but 
that the court felt this did not constitute a sufficiently understandable disclosure of the prob-
lems involved to alert the layman reading the EIS. See id. at 585. 
474. The court did not appear to have any problem with the acceptability of noise modeling 
techniques or the general method of presenting the results in the form of sound contours. See 
id. at 591. It was not fatal that the decisionmaker "admitted that no single method has yet 
been agreed upon to answer all relevant noise questions." [d. at 594, 591 n.10. The court 
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court issued a preliminary injunction to restrain the decision because 
the court concluded that the rationale of the decision was inade-
quately disclosed.475 Thus, although the Romulus court engaged in a 
form of substantive review of the decision's basic model in the sense 
of examining some of the technical bases underlying the model, its 
standard of review still would not ensure that the model's bases were 
subjected to a minimal level of meaningful review; it would only 
review the model where necessary to explain or support an eventual 
decision. 
At about the same time that the injunction was granted in Romu-
lus, a Maryland district court issued its opinion in litigation concern-
ing a Baltimore freeway, Movement Against Destruction v. Trainor 
(MAD 11),476 in which Judge Miller engaged in perhaps the most 
searching and careful analysis of modeling data and methodology 
undertaken by a judge to date. MAD II was the second of two com-
panion opinions on the subject, with the court's earlier opinion Move-
ment Against Destruction v. Volpe (MAD 1),477 which also involved 
lengthy and detailed investigations into the validity of the data base 
and computer models underlying the pollution projections used in the 
EISfor the highway. In the context of this central issue the contrast 
between the opinions in MAD I and MAD II reveals the developing 
roles of courts and the evolving levels of judicial review for techno-
environmental decisions. 
As Judge Miller did in MAD II,478 the per curiam opinion in MAD I 
engaged in a "substantial inquiry"479 into the actions of the state 
and federal officials involved to see whether their decisions passed 
muster under the Overton Park test. In both cases, the results were 
the same: plaintiff's request for an injunction against the construc-
tion of the particular highway segment was denied.480 Yet, the ap-
proaches taken in the two opinions written only two years apart ap-
pear to be significantly different. The extensive, technical, and 
rather critical review given to modeling efforts in MAD II can be 
stated that it "does not question the underlying concepts of ASDS, [the Aircrafts Sound 
Description System, see id. at 591 n.9.]. It is a system of measuring aircraft noise. It is the im-
plementation of that concept, use of only one threshold, and the choice of 85dB(A) as that 
threshold that renders that analysis deficient." [d. at 594. 
475. [d. 
476. 400 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1975). 
477. 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md. 1973), afrd, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). 
478. 400 F. Supp. at 556, 558, 573. 
479. 361 F. Supp. at 1396, 1402. 
480. See 400 F. Supp. at 574; 361 F. Supp. at 1402. 
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contrasted to the cursory treatment and deference given to similar 
modeling efforts in the MAD I decision. 
Both MAD I and MAD II faced the same two questions.481 In both 
cases, plaintiffs alleged that the EIS failed to consider all relevant 
factors and was based on such "incompetent evidence"482 that it 
violated the requirements of NEP A, since it represented a "clear er-
ror of judgment."483 In both cases, the Maryland District Court 
stated that its level of review was a limited one.484 In both cases the 
court engaged in a detailed examination of the data and methodolo-
gies used and gave a lengthy explanation485 of its review of them, but 
the court ultimately held in MAD II that the methodologies were 
481. Two substantive issues involved in the cases were (1) the propriety of the approval of 
the EIS for the highway (which involved a substantive review of the data and methodology 
underlying that approval), see 400 F. Supp. at 541-43, 557; 361 F. Supp. at 1380, 1382-83, 
1385-87, 1388-92; and (2) the alleged failure of the agency to fill the requirements of the 3-C 
planning process which is designed to ensure that the highway programs are based on a 
continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by state 
and local communities. See 400 F. Supp. at 538 n.5, 562 n.69, 568-69 & nn. 81, 82, 572-73; 361 
F. Supp. at 1370, 1394-96. The MAD II opinion also addressed the additional issue of whether 
the project was correctly found to be consistent with the SIP then in force. See 400 F. Supp. at 
559-60. 
482. 400 F. Supp. at 540-41,547, 573-74; 361 F. Supp. at 1398-1402. In both MAD I and 
MAD II, the Maryland District Court applied Overton Park and the AP A. 400 F. Supp. at 540; 
361 F. Supp. at 1402 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701). If this threshold question is passed, the court then 
must engage in a substantial inquiry of the decision, which includes a determination of: 
[wJhether the decisions of the governmental officials involved were 'arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion,' that is was the decision based upon a good faith 
consideration of relevant factors and was there no clear error of judgment? While the 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the 
ultimate standard of review being a narrow one, the reviewing court has an obligation 
to review substantive agency decisions on the merits to determine whether there has 
been a clear error of judgment. 
400 F. Supp. at 541 (citations omitted). 
483. Plaintiffs launched a frontal attack on the models used. As the court said: 
Plaintiffs have argued forcefully that the defendants or their agent used scientifically 
inadequate methodologies and improper factors in the traffic and air quality predic-
tions which form at least part of the foundation for their decisions. Defendants have 
contended that the techniques, methodologies, and factors utilized by them in the 
decisions were made at least within the state of the art. 
400 F. Supp. at 547. 
484. As the court stated: 
It is not the court's function to decide, as a matter of fact, whh;h factor or 
methodology is the more scientifically correct, but decide whether (1) there is any 
reasonable ground for the use of the factor or methodology used, (2) the factor or 
methodology used was used in good faith and not solely for justifying a preconceived 
result, and (3) the use of the factor or methodology produced a result which could 
have justified rationally the various decisions required to have been made under law. 
400 F. Supp. at 574. Accord 361 F. Supp. at 1387, 1396, 1402. 
485. The court in both cases engaged in a substantial inquiry. 400 F. Supp. at 540; 361 F. 
Supp. at 1396, 1402. 
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"within the state of the art," and, therefore, were proper since they 
represented no clear error of judgment.486 
The EIS challenged in MAD II was based on an earlier Baltimore 
Regional Environmental Impact Statement (BREIS). The BREIS 
was produced using several standardized models based on current 
data from federal and state agencies and from private contractor 
reports.487 The models were used in BREIS and the resulting EIS to 
project future vehicular travel levels,488 and expected resulting 
levels of air pollution.489 The air pollution model itself relied upon the 
486. 400 F. Supp. at 574. The court acknowledged that there were some errors by its 
italicization of the word "clear" when it held that the review showed that "there was no clear 
error on the part of the ... Administrator." Id. (emphasis in original). 
487. 400 F. Supp. 562-63. See Friesema & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics and the Envi-
ronmental Impact Process, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 339, 343 (1976). 
BREIS was based on an earlier report by a private contractor (Voorhees). 361 F. Supp. at 
1379. That report was divided into seven tasks: (1) gathering land-use data for the target 
years; (2) adjusting the data to reflect the patterns resulting from the alternatives; (3) travel 
simulation modeling; (4) quantifying background levels of carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocar-
bons (HC), nitrogen-oxides (N02), photochemical oxidants (POX) (smog), and particulates on a 
regional basis; (5) using those background levels together with other vehicular travel data, ac-
tual and simulated, to run models of expected vehicular pollution (using the BAQC emission 
model) and the expected resulting air quality using a dispersion model; (6) modeling sewer and 
storm water run-offs and solid waste disposal problems created by the resulting changes in 
land-use patterns resulting from each of the alternatives as the secondary effects of the proj-
ect; and (7) projecting expected noise levels. The results of the various modeling efforts were 
summarized in such tables as those reproduced by the court. Id. at 575-80. The court concluded 
that "[a]s a gross generalization, it may be said that BREIS concluded that there are economic 
benefits in the short term and the long term from the construction of the [entire]3-A highway 
system and of the other highway and rapid transit improvements contemplated by the GDP 
[the General Development Plan, see id. at 539-40, n.10]. Id. at 539-40. It further concluded that 
"by 1980 and 1995 projected pollutant levels in all categories of pollution will differ only slight-
ly among the transportation alternatives ... ," id. at 540, and that the levels generally will 
meet the SIP requirement of meeting the primary and secondary national air quality stand-
ards. Id. at 541. 
488. See 400 F. Supp. at 548. The court noted that the basic theory of the computer-run 
equations that composed the model was bottomed upon the proposition that history repeats 
itself. Id. That is, the model took past data and projected the changes that the transportation 
system would produce, based on several assumptions. See 400 F. Supp. at 552-53. The court's 
own evaluation of the level of sophistication of the model was that it was within the state of the 
art of travel forecasting. Id. at 549, 554. This conclusion was based upn the court's observation 
that the basic gravity modeling technique was more sophisticated than that which had been 
utilized in the past and that there then existed no single methodology or technique in predic-
tion of future traffic volumes which had been empirically demonstrated to be an infallible one 
under all circumstances. Id. at 548. 
489. See id. at 549. The modeling effort to generate the necessary projections of air quality 
data was a set of procedures involving the use of several models, some of which had as their in-
put the input of other models. Id. at 562. This complexity was further compounded by the dif-
fering characteristics of the pollutants involved. Id. at 561. The effect of CO is largely localized 
to a particular highway or highway segment. Id. at 561 n.66. The result was that the highway 
segment had to be examined at two levels. "The first deals with the air quality impact of the 
highway segment alone. The second is the impact of that highway segment, together with the 
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results of the vehicular traffic model as data inputs, and, therefore, 
the air pollution model could be no more accurate than the vehicular 
modeling effort. Plaintiffs' substantive challenge to the vehicular 
modeling effort can be broken down into three parts: (1) the data 
used in the model; (2) the structure of the model used; and (3) the 
assumptions on which the model was based.490 Plaintiffs alleged that 
the data used, which was collected in 1962, was so outmoded that the 
traffic projections included in the BREIS based on that data were 
sufficiently incompetent as to demonstrate a clear error of judgment 
by EPA in using them in the final EIS.491 Before dealing specifically 
with the allegations, the court initially noted that the agency ap-
parently acted in good faith and noted that the prediction of the 
future by modeling is necessarily a risky business and necessarily in-
volves a substantial amount of judgment to be exercised by the agen-
cy. The court also noted the relative sophistication of the gravity 
modeling technique employed in the BREIS study to generate these 
traffic modeling projections.492 The court refused to find that the use 
of outmoded data constituted clear error for two reasons: (1) experts 
doubted the value of another such effort; and (2) the extensive valida-
tion checks and adjustments in the model apparently tended to ex-
pose and correct any such errors introduced by apparently out-of-
date data.493 
other transportation facilities, which constitute the urban transportation system as set forth in 
the urban transportation plan." Id. at 561. For the highway segment step, the only pollutant 
that need be considered was CO; this analysis was the so-called microscale study. Id. at 562. 
This microscale analysis was done with a computer-run mathematical model. The data for that 
model came from several sources: measurement of present CO levels resulting from that traf-
fic, measurements of present levels of background CO concentration, and predictions of future 
vehicular traffic levels (which is, itself, the result or output of a model). For a further discus-
sion of the microscale analysis, see infra note 505. 
The second level of analysis of the highway was required to extend beyond the expected im-
pact of the highway segment alone. Id. at 561. This so-called mesoscale analysis considered the 
impact of the entire GDP on a regional basis as required for finding an EIS consistency. Id. at 
562 & n.69. The court found that the mesoscale study reached conclusions relating to predicted 
regional ambient air concentrations in the near and long terms for various alternative 
transportation systems of He, POX, N02 , CO, and particulates. Id. at 564. The results of this 
study were summarized in tables. The mesoscale analysis is discussed infra note 505. 
490. 400 F. Supp. at 547-56. As the court noted, "[e]ssential to the validity of the conclu-
sions of BREIS is the technical reliability of the projections oftraffic volume." 400 F. Supp. at 
548. See id. at 566. The court in assessing the validity of the air pollution models referred back 
to discussion of the validity of the vehicular modeling effort. Id. at 562. 
491. 400 F. Supp. at 548-49. 
492. Id. at 548. See supra note 488. 
493. Id. at 547-52. This "verification process for the models and submodels used in the 
BREIS for traffic compared theoretical simulated projection of VMT for 1970 with ex-
trapolated VMT based on actual counts the same year." Id. at 549. The process consisted of a 
cyclical repetition of the following steps: (1) model run; (2) comparison with known results; (3) 
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The plaintiffs alleged that the structure of the model was defective 
in its assessment and presentation of the environmental impacts of 
the planned highway because it failed to contain a factor for 
"generated" traffic.494 That is, it was asserted that the change in the 
road would serve as a "magnet" to attract traffic. The court rejected 
the challenge on a number of bases. The court noted that the 
methodology utilized in preparing the traffic projections was within 
the state of the art; if the state of the art would allow more, the court 
indicated that it would require more. The court noted that the 
generated traffic phenomenon was not clearly understood and that 
there was no clearly accepted methodology for predicting such traf-
fic. The court also noted that the model actually used implicitly took 
into consideration some of the factors claimed to be involved in the 
generated traffic phenomenon.495 Finally, the court noted that the 
validation checks, which compared predicted results to actual 
results, would ensure that projections were roughly correct and that 
any consistent biases in the projections would be revealed and could 
be corrected or adjusted for in the decisional model. 496 
Plaintiffs' third attack was on the assumptions underlying the 
model, which the court similarly rejected. 497 The court examined the 
reasonableness of the assumptions from the perspective of the time 
in which they were made and held that the test for such assumptions 
is whether they are "made in good faith and with a rational explana-
tion" even if they are "later proved to be incorrect." 498 In fact, some 
of the assumptions underlying the study did turn out to be incorrect. 
adjustment of model parameters to make the model a more accurate reproduction or mimic of 
reality; and (4) adjustment of data to accommodate model adjustments, measurement and col-
lection shortcomings, and inefficiencies in the data base. See id. at 550-51. 
494. "Generated" traffic is a term utilized by professional planners and transportation 
analysts to refer to a phenomenon of combined additional trips on an old road and a generally 
parallel new road which are greater than that additional traffic which can be accounted for 
simply (1) by diversion of existing traffic from other routes in the general vicinity and (2) from 
normal growth of traffic in general over time. 400 F. Supp. at 549. Because the phenomenon 
was not clearly understood and because its use was a matter of reasonable debate among 
transportation planners and analysts, the court concluded there was no showing of "any 
generally accepted methodology among transportation planners and analysts for the inclusion 
of a factor" which would take into account such generated traffic in a manner more explicit 
than the BREIS approach of building it into the model's assumptions. [d. at 549. 
495. 400 F. Supp. at 533. See id. at 552. 
496. [d. at 550-52. 
497. [d. at 552-53. The assumptions were related to the relative cost of mass transit as op-
posed to automotive traffic, the possibility of transportation controls being imposed, supply 
relationship to travel cost and time, and the anticipated completion dates of the mass-transit 
portions of the area-wide transportation plan. 
498. [d. at 553. 
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For instance, the assumption of no imposition of transportation re-
strictions later turned out to be incorrect.499 Additionally, as other 
parts of the opinion made clear, some of the data and relationships 
used in the model turned out in the final analysis not to be entirely 
accurate, as discussed below. The court did not require that all 
assumptions turn out to be proven completely accurate; rather, it 
held only that the use of an assumption must be necessary or desir-
able and that the agency must undertake a diligent research effort to 
establish the validity of the assumption to the extent possible under 
the state of the art at that time, all of which should be done prior to 
the use of the assumption by the decisionmaker. 
In substance then, the court in MAD II struck a balance between 
practicality and desirability. The court recognized that modeling 
results are not that precise since "[p ]rediction of the future . . . is 
necessarily a risky business ... ," particularly since modern knowl-
edge concerning the environment is developing so rapidly.50o In 
MAD II the court felt that the validation efforts of the EPA were 
within the state of the art of the relevant scientific discipline because 
they were more sophisticated than similar efforts utilized in the 
past.501 The court deferred to the substantial amount of judgment 
exercised by those who performed the study and refused to set itself 
up as a "super professional transportation analyst or planner."502 
The carbon monoxide (CO) modeling effort was upheld as within 
the state of the art based on the court's observation that, although 
the proportional model was the least sophisticated modeling proce-
dure of those used, it appeared to be the best available technique 
then accepted by EPA.503 The court, however, found that errors in 
the reduction model caused the specific predictions for photochem-
ical oxidants (POX) to be subject to doubt.504 Two possible sources of 
499. [d. at 554. 
500. See id. at 548, 552, 554. 
501. [d. at 554, 548-49. 
502. [d. at 548-49. 
503. [d. at 564. See id. at 567-68. As the court predicted, see id. at 564 n.74, the EPA now 
allows demonstration of consistency by means of a proportional rollback model, a photo-
chemical dispersion model, an Empirical Kinetics Modeling Approach (E-KMA), or other em-
pirical and statistical models. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.14(c)(7) (1981). 
504. The reduction model was applied by (1) noting the 1970 observed level of POX; (2) 
referring to the reduction model curve at the point which represents this value on the horizon-
tal axis; and (3) reading on the vertical axis the percentage reduction in hydrocarbon emissions 
required to attain the standard. 400 F. Supp. at 566. While there was no direct evidence in the 
record on the point one way or the other, the court had a strong suspicion that the reduction 
model could not be utilized in this manner, either through the method of calculation employed 
in BREIS or through the method of calculation argued for by plaintiff's counsel. [d. at 567 & 
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error in the reduction model as applied were the inaccurate repro-
duction of the curve's endpoint on the graph which represented the 
model, and, according to the court, the "improper use" of the reduc-
tion mode1.505 Additionally, there were errors in the calculations in 
the final EIS which had the effect of giving the wrong conclusions: 
as pointed out in the subsequent BREIS on which the decisionmaker 
relied, the final EIS had been in almost total error in concluding that 
national standards for hydrocarbon (HC) and photochemical ox-
idants (POX) would be met; however, the statement by the decision-
maker noted the error. 506 This was apparently enough to satisfy the 
court. 
The standard of review in both MAD I and MAD II was said to be 
the arbitrary and capricious standard under Overton Park,507 
although the ultimate scope of review appeared more probing in 
MAD II than in MAD I. The court concluded that the results of the 
vehicular modeling effort were of sufficient validity to justify the 
decisionmakers' reliance on them, in spite of the "pass through" ef-
fect by which modeling inaccuracies are compounded by the use of 
those model's results as data for other models.50B In MAD II, the 
n.79. The court did not specify the source of its suspicions. The ambiguity is not resolved in the 
relevant regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.14 (1981). 
In an effort to evaluate the effects of these ostensible serious flaws, the court looked for 
evidence in the record by which to estimate the reliance which the decisionmaker placed on 
these specific results. The court noted that the consistency statement made reference to 
specific numbers, that the agency had been in close contact with the state agency that 
discovered the error in the EIS, and that the decisionmaker based its conclusions on the 
estimated reductions in HC emissions predicted in BREIS and other factors to show consisten-
cy. Id. at 569-70. The other factors that the court cited in making its finding tended to show in-
ter alia that the assumptions made were reasonable, that the predictions did not show too 
serious a violation, and that planned alternative transportation facilities would have a 
mitigating effect. Likewise, the court cited the inherent uncertainty involved in such efforts, 
the awareness of the decisionmakers of some of the flaws and shortcomings of the effort, and 
the fact that the effort was one made in good faith and within "the state of the art." Id. at 541. 
505. Id. at 567. 
506. The graph is reproduced in the opinion. Id. at 565. The endpoint referred to is the inter-
section of the nonlinear graphical line with the bottom horizontal forming the boundary of the 
graph's grid. The court claims to have found this error by comparing the graph to the official 
example from which it is purportedly taken, see 40 C_F .R. Part 51, at 69, App. J. (1976), and by 
comparing it to "the model's very purpose." 400 F. Supp. at 565-67. The court made this in-
quiry and drew its own conclusions as to the nature and magnitude of its effect even though 
"the apparent variance was not even commented upon by plaintiff's counselor witnesses." Id. 
at 567. Compare Texas v. EPA, 497 F.2d 289, 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1974). The supposed shift in 
endpoint may have some slight effect on the correctness of its application. The effect would 
likely be negligible in light of the inaccuracy of the plotting or graphical solution technique_ 
507. 400 F. Supp. at 547, 556, 571-73; 361 F. Supp. at 1387, 1396, 1402. 
508. The court noted that "[e]rrors in traffic volume projections most likely would result in 
errors in conclusions based on traffic volume projections." Id. at 548. See id. at 562. 
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predictions of expected levels of traffic were used in other models to 
predict projected pollution effects on a local basis (by microscale 
analysis)509 and on a regional basis (by mesoscale analysis).510 The 
substantive correctness of the micro scale and mesoscale analyses 
was at the heart of the propriety of accepting the overall sufficiency 
of the EIS. Therefore, unless one accepts a purely procedural review 
as adequate in the case of such environmental decisions, a court must 
examine in some detail the component parts of such analyses and the 
models underlying them in order to ensure a minimally acceptable 
level of substantive correctness for the environmental decision. In 
this light, the court must be prepared to substitute its judgment for 
decisions of the agency on all technical matters, excepting those in-
volving strictly policy matters. The court's review in MAD II, while 
thorough and in depth, failed to ensure the correctness of such non-
policy technical decisions. The court in MAD II upheld the validity of 
all methodologies, except for the reduction model, and overlooked er-
rors introduced into the resulting conclusions based on the decision-
maker's nonreliance on some of the specific numerical levels pre-
dicted.511 Noting that there were only a few instances where the pre-
509. The microscale analysis for the air quality levels at the local level was accomplished by 
the following steps: (1) actual measurements of present traffic levels were compared by the 
use of models to derive a functional relationship of CO pollution to traffic levels; (2) assump-
tions were made as to whether this functional relationship would hold true in the future; and 
(3) projected levels of ambient CO were predicted using as inputs projected traffic levels, vehi-
cle emission factors (by vehicle and speed), wind speed, wind angle, height of the highway 
pavement, receptor height and distance from the road's edge, atmospheric stability, and pollu-
tant molecular weight. The theoretical result of the calculations, after adding the appropriate 
background concentrations, was the predicted one-hour maximum CO concentration at any 
particular receptor site. Stated more generally, "the CO concentrations from ... highway 
generated sources were a factor, i.e., a function of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) multiplied by 
emission equations in turn applied to a mathematical model intended to predict the diffusion of 
gaseous CO based upon atmospheric and other relevant conditions." [d. at 562-64. The results 
were predicted maximum worst case levels at CO over one-hour and eight-hour periods. [d. at 
563-64. See 400 F. Supp. 539 n.9. There was a conflict between the modelers and the EPA as 
to the proper model to be used in this process, although both advocated the use of computer-
generated models based on Gaussian diffusion equations. [d. at 562-64. 
510. The mesoscale analysis was used to project levels of NO, POX, N02 , CO, and par-
ticulates on a regional basis. For the mesoscale analysis, three basic types of modeling efforts 
were involved, depending on the type of pollution examined. For CO pollution levels at the 
regional level, a computer diffusion model similar to the one used at the microscale level was 
employed. A proportional modeling technique was used to predict resulting levels of He, N02 , 
and particulates. In order to predict resulting levels of POX, this proportional modeling ap-
proach had to be combined with a reduction model, necessitated by the fact that POX-unlike 
the other substances-is not emitted directly into the atmosphere, but is produced by the reac-
tion of the He with ordinary sunlight. 400 F. Supp. at 564-67. The modelers' summaries of 
results of the various modeling efforts in tables were reproduced at the end of the opinion. See 
id. at 575-79. 
511. 400 F. Supp. at 568, 571. 
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dicted levels of pollution projected by the model exceeded national 
standards, the court held that the decisionmaker's decision was not 
arbitrary and capricious,612 was made in good faith, had considered 
the relevant factors, and did not constitute a clear error of judgment. 
Besides the air and noise pollution cases involving models, courts 
have also reviewed cases involving models to predict probable water 
pollution levels. These water pollution cases also reflect the inability 
and unwillingness of the courts to apply a meaningful level of sub-
stantive review to the non-policy portions of model-based agency 
decisions. Computer models have been used to predict levels of water 
quality resulting from the damming of a river or the introduction of 
pollutants into an existing body of water from the polluting source, 
such as a sewage plant. For example, in Conservation Council of 
North Carolina v. Froehlke,613 the district court reviewed the deci-
sion by the United States Army Corp of Engineers to proceed with 
the creation of a water reservoir which was based, in part, on mathe-
matical models used to project probable levels of eutrophication of 
the water caused by excessive levels of phosphorous.614 This chal-
lenge to the phosphorous modeling effort was a part of plaintiffs' 
challenge to the adequacy of the EIS under NEP A. 616 Plaintiffs in 
Conservation Council generally did not contest the underlying data 
used in the models.616 Rather, their objections to the project were 
directed toward the conclusions reached by the Corps of Engineers, 
which were based on mathematical models taken from the EPA Na-
tional Eutrophication Survey. 617 
The court in Conservation Council stated that it was applying the 
Overton Park level of substantive review under NEP A to evaluate 
the merits of the decision.618 Although the court acknowledged its 
duty to defer to the discretionary judgment of the decisionmaker, 
the COrpS,619 the court continued to examine and resolve the con-
flicts in expert testimony in favor of defendants.62o In reviewing 
512. Id. at 556, 571, 572, 574. 
513. 435 F. Supp. 775 (M.D.N.C. 1977). 
514. Id. at 783-84, 792-95. 
515. See id. at 781-82, 790. 
516. Id. at 783, 792. 
517. Id. at 783-84,792. 
518. Id. at 781-82, 792-93. 
519. Id. at 782, 793. The court stated it was not to substitute its judgment for, or make the 
ultimate decision for the environmental decisionmaker. 
520. Id. at 793. The court there stated that "disagreement among the experts in the field 
need not invalidate the EIS or the decision to impound," because NEPA does not require 
scientific unanimity or scientific perfection in the EIS. Id. Similarly, the agency "is not re-
quired to accumulate the sum total of scientific knowledge of the environmental elements af-
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such evidentiary conflicts, the court placed the burden of proof on 
the objecting plaintiffs to demonstrate inadequate evidentiary sup-
port or insufficient data, which plaintiffs failed to do. The court 
stated that all of the plaintiffs' objections to the data gathering and 
modeling methodologies were refuted by the greater weight of the 
evidence.521 As the court observed, the Corps apparently used the 
best methodologies then available to conduct "a thorough inter-
disciplinary examination of the environmental and economic benefits 
and detriments of impoundment." 522 In sum, the court left open the 
possibility that a similar decision by the Corps of Engineers could be 
shown to be incorrect by some degree of proof, but the court did not 
explicate what type or magnitude of error was necessary to support 
a finding of a clear error of judgment by the decisionmaker. 
The judicial review of computer models has also been involved in 
decisions allowing the placement of sewage plants and the permit-
ting of discharges from the plants into waterways. Two cases by the 
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio523 upheld 
the use of admittedly inaccurate computer models on the basis that a 
reasonable reader of an agency report would not be misled concern-
ing the reliability of the weight to which modeling is entitled for plan-
ning purposes.524 The standard applied in these two cases was based 
on the amount of disclosure actually made to the decisionmaker and 
the public,525 which is similar to the disclosure standard used in Life 
of the Land v. Brinegar.526 The Ohio cases claimed to be applying the 
Overton Park standard of review, 527 which the district court felt pre-
cluded a substantive review of and a significant level of factual in-
quiry into the data gathering end of the decisionmaking methodol-
ogies involved.528 This approach appears to be ill-founded. Although 
NEP A may not require scientific perfection, or even the most accu-
fected by a proposal, because the decision need show only a good faith consideration of rele-
vant factors." [d. 
521. [d. 
522. [d. at 796. 
523. Brown v. EPA, 460 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 237 
(S.D. Ohio 1978). 
524. 460 F. Supp. at 251; id. at 242. 
525. The district court stated it was applying the arbitrary and capricious standard. [d. at 
253; id_ at 243-44. 
526. 489 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974), discussed supra text 
and notes at notes 439-41. 
527. See supra text and notes at notes 183-205 (discussing the varying formulations of that 
standard). 
528. See 460 F. Supp. at 252-53; id. at 241, 243-44. 
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rate stream model then developed,629 the district court ignored the 
actual mandates of NEP A 630 in abdicating its judicial role as the 
supervisor of administrative decisionmaking methodologies by 
upholding an environmental decision based on an inaccurate com-
puter model which did not even represent a state of the art in the 
subject area of the decision. 
In NEP A cases involving models, the courts' level of review 
generally is not sound or exact enough to ensure a meaningful 
review of the underlying methodologies and data. The MAD II opin-
ion, although ultimately too deferential, applied a sufficiently de-
tailed inquiry indicative of the more detailed inquiry which should be 
done by the courts. However, later cases such as Conservation Coun-
cil of North Carolinav. Froehlke, Brown v. EPA and Evans v. Train 
demonstrate a continued refusal by courts to engage in the 
necessary factual inquiry, as well as an overly deferential level of 
review of model-based agency decisions. 
V. A SUGGESTED ApPROACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS 
BASED ON MODELS TO ENSURE A MINIMUM LEVEL OF 
MEANINGFUL REVIEW 
Because of the diversity of cases involving judicial review of 
models in environmental decisionmaking, it is difficult to draw from 
them broadly applicable conclusions or solutions. Nevertheless, the 
cases do generally reveal that: (1) the role of the court in the deci-
sions has been too restricted; and (2) the standards and scope of 
review applied by the courts has not been sufficiently searching to 
ensure the correctness of the factual underpinnings of agency deci-
sions, since the methodology and data underlying the model or 
models used in the decision generally are not scrutinized. 
Fundamentally, the court's role in its scope of review must be to 
correct errors presented in a "wrong decision." 631 The phrase 
"wrong decision" in the context of an environmental decision based 
on a mathematical or computer model refers only to the factual un-
derpinnings of the case, that is, the validity of the data and methodol-
ogy used in the models as well as other factual, non-modeling aspects 
of the decision. It is important to note that an environmental deci-
sion based on a model cannot be said to be reviewable as a "wrong 
decision" to the extent that it may be based on incorrect policy deci-
529. See id. at 251. 
530. See supra text and notes at notes 83-93. 
531. See Int'nl Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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sions. The reviewing court must properly discern the line between 
reviewable factual underpinnings and nonreviewable policy decisions 
even when both may provide basic assumptions for modeling. It is 
particularly difficult to discern this line in environmental cases in-
volving models, because facts and policy are quite often inextricably 
intertwined. As seen in the cases presented, the construction of the 
model used in the environmental decision invariably involves 
assumptions, compromises, and adjustments, all of which embody 
policy decisions by the administrative agency. The same is true for 
the quality of the data used. For instance, the data may be chosen 
from the cleanest plant or the most sensitive organisms, thereby 
likely to reflect a policy requirement of stringent cleanup re-
quirements. To the extent that the policy contained implicitly in such 
decisions is within the statutory authority of the agency and is in ac-
cord with the laws, policy choice should be deferred to. The burden, 
however, should be on the agency to establish the extent of policy in-
volved in the decision, and all portions of the decision, including the 
model and the basic data comprising the model, should be reviewable 
with a level of substantial inquiry adequate to ensure a minimum 
level of meaningful review and a resulting factually correct decision. 
As a general matter, most opinions involving the review of envi-
ronmental decisions based on models have been too deferential to the 
administrative agency and its expertise. Courts, fearing that they 
might be accused of substituting their judgment for that of the ad-
ministrative agency, have accepted too limited a role in reviewing 
environmental decisions based on models. As seen above, however, it 
is difficult to formulate a uniformly applicable standard of review for 
any case. It appears from the cases reviewed here that proper 
judicial review requires a more flexible approach to such cases than 
is applied to less technical, less complicated decisions. For a par-
ticular case reviewing an environmental decision based on a model, 
the role of the court and the level of scrutiny applied by it must de-
pend on: (1) the nature of the particular decision at issue; (2) the man-
dates of the applicable substantive and review statutes; (3) the 
amount of available data; (4) the quality of that data; (5) the decision-
making methodologies available; (6) the quality of the methodologies 
and data used; (7) the expertise of the administrative agency; (8) the 
procedural posture of the case; and (9) the technical and scientific 
resources available to the court. 
It may be objected that such a case-by-case approach to judicial 
review is, in reality, present in every case and that it possesses an in-
herent tendency to expand judicial inquiry to the eventual arrogation 
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of agency expertise. In the alternative, it may be objected that such a 
case-by-case approach to review amounts to no standard of review at 
all. In either instance it must be remembered that such a flexible ap-
proach to judicial review is suggested for application to a very 
limited class of technical environmental decisions relying on models, 
and only as to those portions of the decisions involving the intertwin-
ing of complex and scientific issues with policy decisions which have 
generally remained untested by the courts. 
The proper role of the court and the appropriate level of judicial 
review is best expressed in the formulation that the court, given 
sufficient resources, should sufficiently involve itself in the model 
data and methodology to ensure a minimal level of meaningful 
review. 532 This approach must rest on courts' realization that a sig-
nificant review of the factual record is required for a "substantial in-
quiry" into an environmental decision based on models.533 In most 
environmental cases involving mathematical and computer models, 
this formulation of the appropriate judicial review standard results 
in an inquiry somewhat more searching than the Overton Park 
standard presently said to be applied to such decisions. On occasion, 
the more flexible approach to judicial review suggested herein may 
require that the court "substitute its judgment" for that of the ad-
ministrative agency where the inquiry reveals fundamental or uncor-
rected flaws in the modeling and decisionmaking process. 
A court properly may substitute its judgment for the agency's in 
several instances: (1) where the agency uses an incorrect model or a 
model that inexplicably falls short of the modeling art; (2) where the 
agency uses unexplained or unjustified assumptions or adjustments 
in the model; (3) where the agency uses data shown to be incorrect or 
inapplicable to the situation; where the agency uses an insufficient 
data base such as by using inexplicably out-of-date data, failing to 
validate and explain the procedures applied to ensure that the model 
was proper for the data base, failing to use monitoring data or other 
procedures to calibrate and validate the model, failing to cite to sup-
porting technical and scientific literature or failing to distinguish ap-
parently inconsistent technical literature, and failing to explain or 
correct apparently incorrect or imprecise methodologies or results; 
(4) where the agency fails to properly structure and summarize the 
532. See Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289,321,322 (5th Cir. 1974) (Clark, Boyle, JJ., concur-
ring). The main opinion applied the arbitrary and capricious standard throughout, id. at 
296-97, but did so in a way more searching than the typical arbitrary and capricious review 
case. 
533. See supra cases cited at note 194. 
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supporting and nonsupporting data and methodology in an under-
standable index or appendix; and (5) where the agency fails to pro-
vide necessary data at a time at which meaningful comments and 
challenges to data and methodology could be raised, or fails to pro-
vide a realistic opportunity for the presentation of such objections. 
The flexible formulation of judicial review suggested herein reflects 
no change from current administrative law doctrines, in that courts 
should continue to avoid reviewing policymaking decisions by ad-
ministrative agencies to the greatest extent possible. The suggested 
standard might be seen as a change, however, to the extent that deci-
sions involving both factual and policy decisions can no longer be in-
sulated from judicial review by the presence of policy decisions inter-
mingled in the environmental decision. To that extent, courts should 
be allowed to "substitute their judgment" for the policy judgment of 
the administrative agency, where the decision being reviewed in-
volves scientific technical issues, has policy elements inextricably in-
tertwined with those technical issues, and is not a decision primarily 
of policy. 
This suggested minimal level of meaningful review would require 
limited modifications of traditional court roles and standards of 
review. Courts should no longer hesitate to resolve scientific contro-
versies or differences of opinion, nor should the courts hesitate to go 
beyond the record to resolve those controversies. Courts also should 
not hesitate to go beyond the record where there are readily ap-
parent errors or inconsistencies in the data or methodology used by 
the decisionmaking body; where contradictory data or methodology 
is brought to the attention of the court by any opposing party 
(whether in the record or not); or where accepted scientific technical 
literature is felt useful or necessary in reviewing the decision. Courts 
should allow cross-examination of witnesses and should not hesitate 
to require full adjudicatory evidentiary hearings, particularly where 
significant errors or deficiencies are present and not explained in the 
record initially produced by the administrative agency. In particular, 
where the first level of judicial review occurs in a court of appeals 
without opportunity for review by a trial court, provision should be 
made for more formal proceedings before a special master or 
magistrate, as opposed to remanding to the administrative agency 
for further proceedings to develop the record. 
Where a remand does not appear to be necessary, a court should 
not hesitate to allow into the record supplemental data, testimony, 
calculations or other evidence by way of post-argument conferences, 
supplemental briefs, supplemental appendices, or submissions from 
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independent technical advisory panels. Where possible, the Magis-
trate's Act should be used both during any judicial review proceed-
ings and any post-review proceedings to collect, analyze, and evalu-
ate the sufficiency and correctness of the scientific and technical 
data and methodology involved in the environmental decision, 
including that involved in the mathematical and computer models. 
Such supplementation of the courts' resources and expertise could 
be equally well provided by technical special masters, technical ad-
visors provided by the administrative decisionmaking body, consult-
ants provided by the challenging parties, independent consultants 
hired by the court, or technically trained staff members hired full-
time by the court. 
At the present time, the problems of judicial review discussed 
herein do not warrant the creation of a Science Court or special en-
vironmental court, as suggested by a number of commentators,534 
although a number of environmental subject matters, such as haz-
ardous and toxic waste regulation, are so specialized and complex 
that they may eventually mandate the creation of a special court to 
deal with problems of insufficiency of data, scientific uncertainty, 
and contested policy decisions. By contrast, the mere presence of a 
model in the environmental decisionmaking process is not sufficient-
ly important to require or allow that the decision be reviewed by a 
special court. Additionally, if one required or allowed only those en-
vironmental decisions which relied significantly on models to be 
reviewed by such a court, it would place the jurisdictional basis of 
that Science Court on the amorphous jurisdictional footing of deter-
mining whether the decisionmaker relied on a model. At the present 
time, the better solution is to provide reviewing courts with suffi-
cient technical resources and flexibility in review standards to en-
sure that environmental models involving computer or mathematical 
models receive a minimum level of meaningful review. 
It is recognized that this suggestion flies in the face of the spirit, if 
not the letter, of traditional judicial interpretations of judicial review 
statutes, as well as recent Supreme Court opinions.535 Those cases 
by the U.S. Supreme Court can be distinguished, in that they address 
only issues of judicial review under NEP A, arguably only a proce-
dural review statute, and in any event should not be read to preclude 
534. See, e.g., Matheny and Williams, Scientific Disputes and Adversary Procedures in 
Policy-making: An Evaluation of the Science Court, 3 LAW & POLICY Q. 341 (1981); Martin, 
Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty: The Science 
Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. LEG. 443 (1979). See also Whitney, supra note 225, at 33-35. 
535. E.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
------------
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a meaningful level of review. The Supreme Court in Strycker's Bay 
did reject one of the premises of this paper, that is, that special treat-
ment should be given to administrative decisions that entail "com-
plex or technical factual issues or 'Issues of Great Public 
Import.' "536 However, if Justice Marshall is correct in his dissent in 
Strycker's Bay in saying that such a holding limits "the reviewing 
court to the essentially mindless task of determining whether an 
agency 'considered' environmental factors even if that agency may 
have effectively decided to ignore those factors in reaching a conclu-
sion,"537 then Justice Marshall has the better of the argument. If 
necessary, an amendment should be made to NEPA, the APA, and 
the various substantive environmental statutes to allow courts suffi-
cient flexibility to engage in a minimal level of meaningful review. 538 
Courts should be provided with sufficient appropriations to hire, 
either on a permanent or part-time basis as appropriate, the neces-
sary technical expertise to assist them in analyzing the data and 
methodology used in environmental models and to establish a train-
ing center or program designed to better acquaint judges with the 
rudiments of the scientific and technical issues underlying environ-
mental decisions based on models. These steps, while less drastic 
than the creation of a separate Science Court, would allow courts to 
better address the disputes and questions often involved in environ-
mental decisions based on models and would better equip the courts 
to ensure that environmental decisions are always of a demonstrable 
correctness to protect the integrity of the environmental effort and 
the confidence of the public in it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The courts in reviewing environmental cases involving computer 
models and other quantitative methodologies have been constrained 
to apply too limited and deferential a standard of review in those 
decisions. As a result, some of those decisions have been upheld, 
even though the decisions were based upon methodologies and data 
which were neither conclusive nor shown to be correct. As a cor-
ollary result, less confidence can be placed in the correctness of such 
536. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 545 (1978) (quoting 
Brief for Respondents). 
537. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228, 231 (1980) 
(Marshall, Jr., dissenting). 
538. Kennedy, Bumpers Amendment: Regulating the Regulators, 67 A.B.A. J. 1639 (1981); 
O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review 
Amendment, 49 U. CINN. L. REV. 739, 772, 778-80 (1980). 
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decisions where the apparent absence of demonstrated error in 
methodology or data actually reflects only the limited and deferential 
nature of judicial review applied by the courts under the Overton 
Park standard. Consequently, the court should apply a sufficiently 
searching and flexible level of judicial review to ensure a meaningful 
review of all except the purely policy-related portions of the environ-
mental decision. In particular, a court should take all necessary ac-
tions to examine the data and methodologies underlying those deci-
sions, including the use of court appointed experts, supplemental 
proceedings, supplemental briefs, technical advisory panels, or post-
argument conferences or testimony. Above all, courts should use the 
flexibility under the Overton Park standard of review to fashion and 
apply an explicitly defined scope of review to ensure a minimal level 
of meaningful review of environmental decisions based on computer 
models and quantitative methodologies. 
